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BRITISH ROMANTICISM AND COMPOSITION THEORY:
THE TRADITIONS AND VALUE OF ROMANTIC RHETORIC
by
Sherrie L. Gradin 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1990
My study examines, through the philosophies and 
writings of the British Romantic poets, particularly those 
of Wordsworth and Coleridge, their beliefs about education, 
their theories on composing, and their interaction with the 
political and social climate as they relate to current 
expressivist rhetorical theories and pedagogies. I explore 
the ways in which Romantic assumptions surface in subsequent 
philosophers, educators, and rhetoricians such as Matthew 
Arnold, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey, and more recently, 
Ann Berthoff, Donald Murray, and Peter Elbow. I argue that 
like the Romantics, current expressivists are interested in 
cultivating an imaginative intellect in their writing 
students.
The dissertation makes a case for expressivist 
rhetoric, arguing that it is valuable and should not be 
ignored or forgotten in light of new social theories of 
rhetoric. Recently, Romantic rhetorical theories have come
viii
under sharp attack for, among other things, perpetuating the 
myth of the "inspired writer, and for ignoring the fact that 
individuals are socially constructed and that the writing 
situation involves the dialectical interaction among writer, 
community, and social, political, and economic conditions. 
Although some of these attacks are valid, I argue that the 
problems critics have identified lie not with the theories 
themselves, but with the short-sighted application of these 
rich and complex Romantic theories. I look back, for 
instance, to the Romantic poets' philosophies of the self in 
order to show expressivists that the tradition from which 
they evolved recognized that the individual was not isolated 
from its culture. I also argue, however, that the recent 
denigration of the expressivist theories of composition is 
often based on misconceptions of Romantic theory and 
practice as well as an incomplete knowledge of the tradition 
from which they arise.
I argue that expressivist rhetorical theories are also 
valuable because they align themselves with feminist theory 
and pedagogy and offer a way of teaching writing that is 
especially useful for women. Finally, I examine the 
usefulness of expressivist theories for the cross-cultural 
classroom, and point out ways in which these theories are 
valuable and ways in which they are problematic for ethnic 
minority students.
INTRODUCTION
Composition theorists acknowledge that there is 
more than one rhetorical theory underlying our pedagogical 
practice. Currently there are at least three dominant 
categories into which rhetorical theory falls: cognitive, 
social-constructivist, and Romantic or expressivist 
theories. My interest lies in the theory, or set of 
theories, that have arisen from the traditions of 
Romanticism, specifically British Romanticism— the rhetoric 
that Richard Young has called "new romanticism," James 
Berlin "expressionistic," and Lester Faigley "expressivist. 
Recently, these Romantic theories of rhetoric have come 
under sharp attack. Although some of these attacks are 
valid, I believe that the problems critics have identified 
lie not with the theory itself, but with the short-sighted 
application of this very rich and complex theory. I also 
believe, however, that the recent denigration of the 
Romantic theories of composition is often based on 
misconceptions of Romantic theory and practice as well as 
incomplete knowledge of the tradition from which they arise 
In 1978, Richard Young, while discussing the "current- 
traditionalist" paradigm that was firmly entrenched through 
the early 1980's, suggests that as new research in the 
discipline began to change the complexion of that paradigm
2two ultimately incompatible theories emerged from within it 
("Paradigms and Problems: Needed Research in Rhetorical 
Invention"). He claims that our discipline was in crisis 
because the incongruity cannot be resolved: one theory 
emphasizes the composed product, and the other focuses on 
the composing process. The theoretical stance stressing the 
product also privileges "the analysis of discourse into 
words, sentences, and paragraphs; the classification of 
discourse into description, narration, exposition, and 
argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling, 
punctuation) and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis); 
the preoccupation with the informal essay and the research 
paper; and so on" ("Paradigms" 31). Young calls the 
opposing stance the "vitalist." Its assumptions are 
"inherited from the Romantics"; it recognizes the composing 
process as important, and stresses the "natural powers of 
the mind and the uniqueness of the creative act" (31). By 
1980 Young is arguing that these positions are completely 
incompatible, and to underscore their theoretical 
differences, he labels one the "new classicism" and the 
other the "new romanticism" ("Arts, Crafts, Gifts and 
Knacks").
Since the early 1980#s, others have identified what 
they believe to be various theoretical postures within the 
field of rhetoric, relabeling and redefining them to fit
3their own understanding of these views. James Berlin, for 
example, identifies three current theories of rhetoric at 
work: "objective," "subjective," and "transactional" 
(Rhetoric and Reality). The objective theories are those 
which posit that reality is located in an empirically 
determined material world, and the writer's object is to 
relay that world as accurately as possible. Within this 
category Berlin includes current-traditional rhetorics, as 
well as behaviorist, semanticist, and linguistic rhetorics 
(x). Subjective theories, according to Berlin, find truth 
within the individual or within a context that is available 
only through the individual's internal perspective— "reality 
is a personal and private construct" (143). He suggests 
that the roots of subjective theories, at least in America, 
are found in Platonic idealism as modified by Emerson and 
Thoreau and that these various rhetorics are commonly called 
"expressionistic." His final category, that of 
transactional theories, is based on an epistemology that 
"sees truth as arising out of the interaction of the 
elements of the rhetorical situation: an interaction of 
subject and object or of subject and audience or even of all 
the elements— subject, object, audience, and language—  
operating simultaneously" (15).
In "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class," Berlin 
updates the ideas he expressed in Rhetoric and Reality. He
4identifies three major theories of current rhetoric: 
cognitive rhetoric, expressionistic rhetoric, and social- 
epistemic rhetoric. He cites Linda Flower and John Hayes as 
the best- known proponents of cognitive rhetoric. He 
summarizes their stance as one in which "the most important 
features of composing are those which can be analyzed into 
discrete units and expressed in linear, hierarchical terms, 
however unpredictably recursive these terms may be. The 
mind is regarded as a set of structures that performs in a 
rational manner, adjusting and reordering functions in the 
service of the goals of the individual" (482).
According to Berlin, expressionistic rhetoric developed 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century; it is 
a "descendant of Rousseau on the one hand and of the 
romantic recoil from the urban horrors created by 
nineteenth-century capitalism on the other" (484). He finds 
it closely tied to theories of psychology that argue for the 
inherent goodness of the individual. In fact, the existence 
of this rhetoric is "located within the individual subject 
. . . . [Writing] is an art, a creative act in which the 
process— the discovery of the true self— is as important as 
the product— the self discovered and expressed" (484). The 
names that Berlin associates with expressionistic rhetoric 
are Ken Macrorie, Walker Gibson, William Coles, Donald 
Murray, and Peter Elbow.
5The third rhetoric, social-epistemic, and the one that 
Berlin favors, is distinguished by a belief that the "real 
is located in a relationship that involves the dialectical 
interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social 
group) in which the observer is functioning, and the 
material conditions of existence" (486). He argues that the 
individual is not a private self, as the expressionists 
might say, but that the self is a "social construct."
"There is no universal, eternal, and authentic self that 
beneath all appearances is at one with all other selves. The 
self is always a creation of a particular historical and 
cultural moment" (487). The greatest advantage that Berlin 
sees in social-epistemic rhetoric is that it views knowledge 
as an "arena of ideological conflict: there are no arguments 
from transcendent truth since all arguments arise in 
ideology. It thus inevitably supports economic, social, 
political, and cultural democracy" (487). Rhetoricians that 
Berlin cites as advocates of the social-epistemic or social 
constructivist rhetoric include Richard Ohmann, Kenneth 
Bruffee, Lester Faigley, David Bartholomae, Patricia 
Bizzell, and Karen Burke LeFevre.
Lester Faigley, narrowing his discussion to that part 
of the rhetorical triad which focuses on composing, suggests 
that "current-traditional" rhetorics are out of favor and 
that the two major competitive perspectives on composing
6come from within the process movement of rhetoric. Relying 
on Berlin's discussions of the present rhetorical scene, 
Faigley similarly identifies these two outlooks on composing 
as a "cognitive view" and an "expressive view" ("Competing 
Theories of Process"). He also acknowledges the emergence 
of a social view which is akin to Berlin's definition of a 
social-epistemic rhetoric.
Faigley traces cognitive theory to the American 
movement in cognitive psychology. He places cognitive 
compositionist theories, like those of Flower and Hayes, 
within a cognitive research tradition which has helped 
"promote a 'science consciousness' among writing teachers" 
(534). The expressivist theory he sets within the tradition 
of British Romanticism, since it views good writing as 
having "integrity, spontaneity and originality— the same 
qualities M.H. Abrams uses to define 'expressive' poetry in 
The Mirror and the Lamp" (529). He terms the rhetoricians 
in this camp— such well known names as D. Gordon Rohman, 
Albert Wlecke, Peter Elbow, Donald Murray, and Donald 
Stewart— as "authentic voice" proponents. Finally, Faigley 
suggests that the third view of rhetoric, the social view, 
is less codified than the cognitive and expressive because 
it does not arise from a single tradition. Rather, he says, 
"it arises from several disciplinary traditions. Because of 
this diversity a comprehensive social view cannot be
7extrapolated from a collection of positions in the same way 
I have described the expressive and cognitive views of 
composing" (534-35). He presents an understanding of a 
social rhetoric much like that of Berlin's. Faigley 
describes the social view as resting on one central 
assumption: "human language (including writing) can be 
understood only from the perspective of a society rather 
than a single individual" (535). In a nutshell, the social 
view of rhetoric rejects the idea that writing is an 
activity that springs from an individual, private construct. 
Instead, it posits that the "individual is a constituent of 
a culture" (535).
As I have stated, my interest in these discussions of 
current rhetorical theory and pedagogy lies in those 
rhetorical theories that have arisen from the traditions of 
Romanticism. I will offer a rereading of Romanticism for 
composition scholars, thereby correcting some of the 
inaccurate myths that surround Romantic ideas and which play 
a part in the reaction against expressivist rhetorics. 
Moreover, I wish to enrich expressivist theories and 
pedagogies and open them up to new possibilities by offering 
a fuller understanding of the Romantic heritage from which 
they evolve. Finally, I wish to caution teachers and 
scholars against squelching or neglecting the many valuable 
aspects of these rhetorics as we enter a new phase of
8research and pedagogical theory based on social 
constructivism.
Perhaps an analogy will help to justify my concern for 
their neglect: as the classical theories of rhetoric were 
challenged by expressive theories, the former were abruptly 
dismissed by hasty critics as wrong-headed. When several 
brave souls attempted to make a case for the usefulness of 
classical theory for current-day pedagogy, they were 
vehemently discounted. However, through the continuing 
efforts of scholars such as C. Jan Swearengin, Edward P.J. 
Corbett, Robert J. Connors, S. Michael Ha11oran, and Andrea 
Lunsford, we have begun to reacknowledge the usefulness of 
classical rhetoric.
With the new and promising move toward social theories 
of rhetoric, the discipline is once again shifting its 
theoretical view, and history appears to be repeating 
itself: this time it is the contributions of the Romantic 
rhetoric that are being neglected or too quickly dismissed. 
The classical approach to rhetorical theory and pedagogy, 
for instance, considers the Romantic view unsuitable for 
composition pedagogy because it is premised on the Romantic 
assumption that successful writing is a mysterious process 
or act of genius. Classical critics believe that proponents 
of Romantic pedagogies assume that students improve their 
writing through subjective means— through "inspiration” or
9"self-discovery." This inner and individual focus, they 
claim, comes at the expense of intellectual rigor. Along 
similar lines, theorists of various persuasions have accused 
Romantic rhetorics of anti-intellectualism, and of thus 
making a poor theory on which to build a pedagogy. The 
social constructivists find Romantic approaches to the 
teaching of writing deficient because they seem to focus on 
the individual as opposed to the relationships among the 
writer, the community, and the social, political and 
economic conditions of existence. The result, they charge, 
may be an individual "empowered" but unaware of economic, 
political, and social issues (Berlin). A Romantic rhetoric 
and pedagogy, they believe, results in isolated, fragmented, 
politically ineffectual students and citizens.
Some of these criticisms have merit, but others are 
based on incomplete definitions and faulty conceptions of 
Romantic theories of rhetoric and the tradition from which 
they arise. It is important, I believe, to recover a more 
accurate understanding of expressivism's roots in British 
Romanticism, not only to better understand the value of 
Romantic rhetoric and to correct the misconceptions 
surrounding it, but to adjust expressivist pedagogies when 
they fall short. Thus, I will examine, through the 
philosophies and writings of the British Romantic poets, 
particularly those of Wordsworth and Coleridge, their
10
beliefs about education, their theories on composing, and 
their interaction with the political and social climate as 
they relate to a theory of rhetoric; and, I will explore the 
rich and varied influence of their work on subsequent 
educators and rhetoricians such as Matthew Arnold, J.S.
Mill, and John Dewey, and more recently, Berthoff, Murray, 
and Elbow.
CHAPTER I
REFLECTING ON EDUCATION: THE VIEWS OF 
WORDSWORTH AND COLERIDGE
Modernists have often asserted that Romanticism died 
over a century ago, or that it is an unworthy subject, or 
both. The term has become equated with anti-rationalism, 
emotionalism, liberalism, and naive idealism. Yet, to the 
field of composition and to others interested in rhetorical 
and pedagogical theory, Romanticism is not a thing of the 
past. We can open books or periodicals and quickly realize 
that Romanticism and its rhetorical counterpart, 
expressivism, is considered a liability, a mistake, or 
occasionally, as I ultimately argue, something to be 
honored and kept alive.1 Composition and educational 
philosophers like Mark Waldo, James Kinneavy, and John M. 
Willinsky, for instance, have recently discussed the 
importance of Romanticism to theories of rhetoric, 
discourse, and educational curricula. Waldo's 1982 
dissertation has gone a long way toward placing Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, and their influence on current composition 
theories, in perspective.2 And Willinsky, in an article on
12
current curricula, has suggested that Romanticism, and 
especially the work of Wordsworth and Coleridge, initiated a 
much needed revolution in educational thought— one that is 
still felt today.3 Kinneavy, in his important book on 
theories of discourse, notes that Wordsworth and Coleridge's 
theories on education and composing arise as a "reassertion 
of the importance of the individual, of subjectivity, of 
personal value in an academic, cultural, and social 
environment which tended to ignore the personal and the 
subjective" (A Theory of Discourse 396). These scholars, 
then, have begun to identify what is revolutionary in the 
Romantics' thoughts on education: their reaction to a system 
that suppressed the individual's emotions, experience, and 
imagination.
During the late eighteenth century and through the 
nineteenth, most educators continued to uphold a 
longstanding belief that knowledge is best gained through 
the analytical study of books, mechanical exercises, and 
rote memorization. The educational policies they followed 
made learning a chore, something to dread. As James 
Fotheringham explains in his book on Wordsworth's The 
Prelude as a study of education, "the older educationists 
had made everything, or most things, hard, distasteful.
They even seemed to act on the principle that the 
educational value of things in a course of training turned
13
on their hardness, their unpleasantness" (35). There was 
simply no tolerance for those facets of education that 
Wordsworth and Coleridge spent much of their lifetime 
arguing for. Instead, the curriculum in English schools was 
strictly based on classical literature and languages and 
consisted of memorizing passages of literature. A student 
in the fifth or sixth form, for instance, would spend a 
great deal of time memorizing passages from Homer, Virgil, 
and Horace. What time was not spent on memorizing and 
reciting was spent at writing Latin verses and composing 
"themes" in Latin.4 The theory underlying the instructional 
practices of reading and recitation garnered further support 
from the psychological theory of associationism put forth by 
Locke and Hartley. This view saw the mind as a kind of 
machine "in which were associated atomic particles of 
meaning" (Wardle 82), and worked on the assumption that if 
the simplest possible "elements" were stored in the mind, 
the teacher could impart his subject material in such a way 
that elements were associated together in useful 
connections, if one element were recalled, the others would 
be "drawn from the mind after the manner of a string of 
sausages" (Wardle 82).
This approach to pedagogy was not completely without 
value. It relied on thorough preparation, and the material 
given was carefully analyzed. It also took into account the
14
importance of experience and a developmental approach to 
learning. On the negative side, however, it represented 
much that Wordsworth and Coleridge found at fault in 
educational practices. Pupils, for example, became passive 
recipients of material given by the teachers. Most student 
participation was merely recapitulation and the student did 
not participate in any active search for meaning or 
knowledge.
Because of such practices, the early nineteenth century 
heard much discussion of education; "treatises on the 
subject were a fashion, and many new and plausible schemes 
of human culture were being zealously advocated as a part of 
the passion of the time for human improvement" (Fotheringham 
14). The educational philosophies of Jean Jacques Rousseau 
were being tested in various forms. Perhaps Rousseau's 
greatest contribution led to the first wide-spread 
consideration that human growth and education occur in 
developmental stages; he demanded that the child be valued 
as a child, not as a diminutive adult. Also, he disagreed 
strongly with the prevailing assumption that, because of 
Original Sin, children were predisposed toward evil— if left 
to their own, children would simply fall the way of crime 
(Coveny 42). It had been the part of education to redeem 
these children, usually through strict discipline; thus, the 
well-practiced adage: "spare the rod and spoil the child."
15
Rousseau viewed the child not as a passive receptor of 
external experience, but as an active soul, virtuous from 
birth. This active soul and virtuous self, according to 
Rousseau, needed to be carefully developed and nurtured 
slowly "towards the necessities of social existence" (Coveny 
42) .5
While Coleridge's thoughts on education are scattered 
throughout his notebooks, lectures, letters, and marginalia, 
Wordsworth's are nicely drawn together in The Prelude. An 
account of the development of the poet's own philosophical 
and poetic mind, The Prelude is, among other things, a 
treatise on education. In fact, in its original design it 
was conceived as a work explicitly about education (Chandler 
95) and we can find in it Wordsworth's statement of a plan 
for national education of the masses that "marks him as a 
pioneer poet among those men of letters who appreciated the 
need of universal education" (Babenroth 360).
The Prelude follows the course of the poet's life, 
selecting the events and experiences which had significant 
influence in shaping his mind, personality, moral beliefs, 
and intellectual powers. In its completed form, the poem 
stands as an examination and condemnation of what Wordsworth 
felt was a misguided schooling. The Prelude includes not 
only a denunciation of the state's negligent and inept 
educational practices, but also of the many home education
16
systems that had arisen in attempts to replace the formal 
systems both Wordsworth and Coleridge found so offensive 
(Babenroth 217).
Although Wordsworth was not specifically a follower of 
Rousseau, and there is little evidence that he seriously 
studied Rousseau's theories (Fotheringham 53), it is 
difficult to read The Prelude as a treatise on education 
without recognizing that Rousseau had helped set the stage 
for those educational philosophies that Willinsky has 
identified as revolutionary. Like Rousseau, Wordsworth spoke 
out against forcing children into premature adulthood; he 
believed the child should experience childhood and a slow 
and natural growth into the adult world. He also denounced 
the belief that children were evil, believing instead in 
their natural goodness and innocence. Like Rousseau, he 
recognized the importance of childhood, and respected it as 
necessary for proper psychological and educational growth.
Against this background, then, Wordsworth proposed his 
own educational theories in opposition to those that kept 
children from reaching what the Romantics believed to be the 
most encompassing intellect. To reach this higher form of 
intellect, according to Wordsworth and Coleridge, children 
must not be denied their childhood; they must exercise the 
imaginative and creative imagination in conjunction with a 
more traditional approach of mechanical exercise, 
memorization, and analytical reasoning.
17
In much of his poetry Wordsworth proclaims, in what
might seem an extremely radical stance to his readers, that
the child will benefit from the wisdom and education
fostered outside the schoolroom walls. In "The Tables
Turned," for instance, Wordsworth counsels leaving study and
books to come into the woods where the real learning will
take place:
Books! 'tis a dull and endless strife:
Come, hear the woodland linnet,
How sweet his music! on my life,
There's more of wisdom in it. . .
One impulse from a vernal wood 
May teach you more of man,
Of moral evil and of good,
Than all the sages can.
This extreme stance is more easily understood, however, when
set against much of what was passing as education inside
the school walls— systems based solely on recitation and
memorization of facts. Charles Dickens' Hard Times, though
written much later in the century, serves to help illuminate
the kind of schooling Wordsworth and Coleridge were reacting
against. Although Hard Times paints a satirical and
fictional portrait of that "hard and distasteful" education,
it is nonetheless based in reality:
"Now what I want is Facts. Teach these boys 
and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone 
are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, 
and root out everything else . . .". The
speaker, and the schoolmaster, and the
third grown person present, all backed a 
little, and swept with their eyes the 
inclined plane of little vessels then and
18
there arranged in order. . .Mr. Gradgrind.
. . seemed a galvanizing apparatus; . . . 
charged with a grim, mechanical substitute 
for the tender young imaginations that were 
to be stormed away . . . .  (47-48)
Dickens' language, "inclined plane," "vessels," "galvanizing
apparatus," underscores the mechanical and lifeless,
noncreative, passive and non-imaginative education that
takes place in Mr. Gradgrind's school. This educational
system "storms" the imagination away, so that when Gradgrind
demands of young Bitzer, "Your definition of a horse," the
young student's answer is cold, calculated fact. He sees
the horse in its parts, but not as a whole:
Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely 
twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve 
incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy 
countries sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but 
requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by 
marks in mouth." Thus (and much more) Bitzer.
(50)
Dickens' fictional account of these miseducated 
students is similar to that of real students that Wordsworth 
portrays in The Prelude. The result of the commonplace 
schooling is a child "Full early trained to worship 
seemliness." Like Bitzer in Hard Times, this student mimics 
the attitudes and inclinations of adults, thereby becoming 
the "diminutive adult" which Rousseau condemned as 
inappropriate and harmful. Wordsworth's wrongly educated 
student of The Prelude is lacking anything emotive, is 




The insides of the earth, and spell the stars;
He knows the policies of foreign lands;
Can string you names of districts, cities, towns, 
the whole world over, tight as beads of dew 
Upon a gossamer thread; he sifts, he weighs;
All things are put to question[.] (The Prelude V 
317-23).®
The problem for students trained in this manner, according
to a Wordsworthian educational scheme, is that their
intellectual abilities rely solely on memorization,
analysis, and recapitulation (Waldo PWC 52). In other
words, if the child is not allowed to know what "Nature
teaches" and is kept confined to a curriculum that excludes
creative and imaginative life experiences, including those
beyond the schoolroom walls, then school becomes a prison
and the student a prisoner assigned to death row. As
Wordsworth writes in The Prelude:
In lieu of wandering, as we did, through vales 
Rich with indigenous produce, open ground 
Of fancy, happy pastures ranged at will,
We had been followed, hourly watched, and noosed,
Each in his several melancholy walk
Stringed like a poor man's heifer at its feed,
Led through the lanes in forlorn servitude;
Or rather like a stalled ox debarred 
From touch of growing grass, that may not taste 
A flower till it have yielded up its sweets 
A prelibation to the mower's scythe. (V 235-45)
In these lines, Wordsworth accuses the educational
philosophy of his day of having made students passive,
ineffective, and unable to reach their potential as
philosophical beings. In Wordsworthian educational theory
the potential for the intellect, or philosophical mind, will
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remain unfulfilled if the student only learns through books
and rote exercises, and if the imagination is not nurtured
through experience, perception, and interaction with nature.
The student of the passage above is deficient. He may know
geography, politics, and science, but because he has merely
absorbed information, he lacks imagination, the essential
element for a fully developed intellect; like Dickens'
Bitzer he can analyze that information but not synthesize it
since synthesis takes an active imagination. The closing
books (XII and XIII) of The Prelude strongly emphasize that
the method in knowledge and education should be constructive
and synthetic, not analytic (see Fotheringham). In James
Fotheringham's summary of Wordsworth's thoughts,
the real apprehension of a thing is a 
creative and not a mechanical process.
Taking things to bits, and regarding them 
singly, we never know them. Taking them 
coldly and through a medium of logical 
process only, we never grasp them, and 
cannot give them to other minds. We must 
grasp them as living facts, in a whole that 
itself lives for us. (37)
Wordsworth and Coleridge both warn that without a 
curriculum that nurtures the creative mind and imagination, 
students are "manufactured" full of factual knowledge but 
empty of any thoughts or ideas of their own; they are apt to 
have merely passive minds. The poets felt schools denied 
students the possibility for growth of the imagination and 
thus the faculty of mind necessary for synthesis.
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Wordsworth sees the imagination as a power that shapes and 
creates, not only by dissolving and separating unity into 
number, but also by "consolidating numbers into unity" (1815 
Preface 754). The fully operational mind is one that 
embraces both the passive principles of analysis and the 
active principles of the creative imagination. It perceives 
in "wise passiveness" while at the same time imprints itself 
on the world. Coleridge speaks of two interlocking forms of 
the imagination, the primary imagination and the secondary 
imagination. The primary imagination is "all of perception" 
and is accessible to everyone. The secondary imagination is 
creative, and has the power to reconcile opposites: "it
dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create . . . 
to idealize and to unify" (Biographia Literaria 304). It is 
cultivated and put into action by conscious will, and works 
upon material received by the primary imagination. Again, 
what is important to this immediate discussion is the 
conjoining of two different operative principles: the 
passive and active. In his desire to reconcile these 
opposites, Coleridge adopts the figure of the androgyne as a 
controlling image throughout his prose writings. He uses 
this image because it allows him to underscore 
metaphorically the importance of fusion between disparate 
faculties. A great mind reconciles the active and the 
passive, and thus is androgynous in Coleridge's scheme:
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I have known strong minds with imposing, 
undoubting, Cobbett-like manners, but I 
have never met a great mind of this sort.
And of the former, they are at least as 
often wrong as right. The truth is, a 
great mind, must be androgynous. (Table 
Talk September 1, 1832).
This "androgynous" or imaginative and synthetic mind is
similar to the mind that Paul Armstrong describes as
inventing "new ways of fitting things together by
recognizing and even creating new analogies, new patterns of
similarity and difference" (31). The result of recognizing
and creating these new patterns of similarity and difference
is an ability to create new concepts— to form a point of
view. In other words, the imagination is essential, along
with reasoning and analytical powers, to the growth of a
full intellect, a creative, synthesizing intellect.
A passage from the Biographia Literaria is helpful in
illuminating Coleridge's desire to have both passive and
active processes become an element in the educative mission
of fostering encompassing intellects. Using the water
spider as an example, Coleridge describes the imagination in
terms of its two parts:
Most of my readers will have observed a small 
water-insect on the surface of rivulets, 
which throws a cinque-spotted shadow 
fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny 
bottom of the brook; and will have noticed, 
how the little animal wins its way up 
against the stream, by alternate pulses of 
active and passive motion, now resisting 
the current, and now yielding to it in 
order to gather strength and a momentary
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fulcrum for further propulsion. This is no 
unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience 
in the act of thinking. There are 
evidently two powers at work, which 
relatively to each other are active and 
passive; and this is not possible without 
an intermediate faculty, which is at once 
both active and passive. (In philosophical 
language, we must denominate this 
intermediate faculty in all its degrees and 
determinations, the IMAGINATION. . . ).
(BL 124)
Both Wordsworth and Coleridge, then, felt that if schools 
neglect one of these powers, and traditionally the "active” 
has been disregarded, then the imaginative mind will not 
come to fruition.
Wordsworth's stance on education is one which calls for 
"quitting" books and wandering about in nature. We cannot 
escape, however, the irony of Wordsworth's counseling to 
stop reading while at the same time he is communicating his 
theories to us through the written word. This, of course, 
seems to negate his dictum that we should give up books as 
an educational pursuit, what we must remember, however, is 
that Wordsworth's relentless and apparently one-sided demand 
for an education of nature is in some ways a rhetorical 
ploy. In other words, in poems like "Tables Turned," 
"Expostulation and Reply," and parts of The Prelude as well, 
Wordsworth is carefully choosing and selecting those 
experiences which made his education different from the 
traditional one. He employs a rhetorical strategy that 
allows him to emphasize what he saw as the detrimental lack
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of imaginative schooling commonly practiced by most schools 
of his day. And as we shall see, Wordsworth did not 
unconditionally condemn books and reading as a cursory study 
of his works might suggest, but only in so far as they were 
misused for educational purposes both in formal school 
systems and in amateur systems at home.
In light of Wordsworth's supposed stance against books,
it is especially interesting to note that while at Hawkshead
he was considered rather bookish. In 1885, the son of
Hawkshead Headmaster Thomas Bowman recalled things his
father had said about Wordsworth and reading:
My father used to say that he believed that 
he did more for William Wordsworth by 
lending him books than by his teaching, 
though Wordsworth, mind you, did well 
enough under him at both Classics and 
Mathematics, so I understood. But it was 
books he wanted, all sorts of books; Tours 
and Travel, which my father was partial to, 
and Histories and Biographies, which were 
also favorites with him; and Poetry— that 
goes without saying. . . A story he used to 
tell about William Wordsworth is that he 
left him in his study once for what he 
thought would only be a minute or two, 
telling him to be looking for another book 
in place of one he brought back. . .he was 
kept half and hour or more . . . .When he 
got back, there was W. poring over a book, 
so absorbed in it he did not notice my 
father's return . . .And "what do you think 
it was" my father would say . . .  It was 
Newton's "Optics". (As qtd. in T.W.
Thompson's Wordsworth's Hawkshead 343-44)
What, then, prompts Wordsworth to suggest that the reading
required by schools is damaging to the intellect? In large
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part it was that the study of books was forced 
indiscriminately on children. Wordsworth read because he 
was excited and yearned for knowledge. Hawkshead made 
books available to all of its students, not only through the 
library proper, but through the Boy's Book Club which 
Wordsworth promptly joined, and the Headmaster's personal 
library. In his earliest years of school, Wordsworth read 
"all Fielding's works, Don Quixote, Gil Bias, and any part 
of Swift that I liked; Gulliver's Travels, and Tale of a 
Tub, being much to my taste"(Gill 28). What is strikingly 
different for Wordsworth than for most school children of 
his day, is that he was able to pursue his own interests as 
well as those expected by the school. "The importance of 
any school," however, as Stephen Gill notes in his biography 
of Wordsworth, "lies not so much in the formal curriculum or 
even in the quality of the teaching as in the encouragement 
it offers to a pupil's own interests and the possibilities 
it opens up" (28).
Wordsworth's duration at Hawkshead also gave him the 
time he believed necessary for children to spend at play, 
released from directed study. He was able to develop the 
emotional and experiential components of his mind as well as 
the intellectual by wandering in the countryside and seeing 
firsthand the beauties of nature. The custom of students 
living in the villagers' homes rather than at the school
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gave Wordsworth freedoms that other grammar students did 
not enjoy (Waldo FWC 50). Not only was he granted time for 
play, but he was able to escape the problems of other 
grammar schools where overcrowded conditions resulted in 
boys sleeping two and three to a bed, a problem that 
disrupted studies and health, thereby putting a damper on 
any extracurricular activities, which Wordsworth believed 
fostered "affections and human sympathies, and placed in the 
context of the whole being the use of the intellect" (Waldo 
FWC 50).7 From the time Wordsworth entered Hawkshead at age 
nine, he lived with Dame Ann Tyson in her home, the most 
consistent adult figure in his life from childhood through 
young manhood (see Thompson).8 Wordsworth loved and 
cherished her. She captivated his imagination with tales 
and real-life experiences from her days as a servant in 
Scotland. In fact, some of his narrative verses are a 
poetic retelling of her tales (Thompson 65-69).
I do not intend to suggest that Wordsworth's education 
at Hawkshead was all play and no work. That would be 
misleading and inaccurate. The Hawkshead curriculum was 
strenuous; the school was considered one of the best in 
England. Every year several Hawkshead boys were sent to 
Cambridge, many of whom became prize-winning Fellows. 
Wordsworth was not only given a solid background in 
mathematics and natural philosophy, but he was given a firm
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grounding in the Classics as well. This foundation, however, 
was not built through tiresome exercises in verse 
compositions in Greek and Latin and rote learning as it was 
at most schools (Gill 27). As Stephen Gill suggests, 
Hawkshead's approach to learning must have worked with 
Wordsworth, for he had a passionate love of Virgil, Ovid, 
and Homer, all of which he read at school; he was affected 
deeply by the beauty of Classical literature (27). Gill 
writes;
that he was able to delight in the poetry 
as something more than an academic chore, 
to feel in the 1790's the contemporaneity 
of Juvenal, and to profit from the ideas of 
Cicero and Seneca must be attributed to
early teaching of rare quality. (27)
The reading and study required of Wordsworth became a
pleasurable activity rather than a chore because he was
granted time for play as well as work. His imagination was
stimulated by jaunts through the countryside, through the
stories of Dame Tyson, and the readings of his own choice.
He was allowed the pursuit of experience, emotion, and
active education. He was not merely crammed full of facts—
not educated into a miniature adult.
So it was Wordsworth's academic studies and the 
imaginative pursuits animated by what Wordsworth calls 
"vital feeling" or the "vital soul" (Fotheringham 31) as 
well that led him to promote so strongly the educational 
philosophy that it is the emotive and imaginative faculties
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in conjunction with the intellectual and analytical that 
make for a mature and encompassing intellect.9 The "vital 
soul" is crucial to Wordsworth. It is the self that 
perceives, creates, and feels. It is "the ground of all 
real education, and the free expansion of the 'vital soul' 
is the true end of education . . . There is no real and 
right growth for the human mind without depth and cordiality 
of feeling" (Fotheringham 31-33). In fact, an inability to 
develop the vital soul spells certain death for the 
encompassing intellect.
Wordsworth's "Lucy" poems, though very complex and not 
amenable to a single interpretation, might be read as 
eulogies for the death of the vital soul. In "A Slumber did 
My Spirit Seal," for instance, if we understand Lucy to be 
emblematic of the soul, the slumber that closes Lucy off 
from the "touch of earthly years" also seals her off from 
the "vital feelings of delight" ("Three Years She Grew"):
A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel 
The touch of earthly years.
No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.
In the passive state of slumber, the vital soul is unable to
perceive, to feel, to create; thus, the mind is without one-
half of the equation needed to make it the all powerful
faculty of Wordsworth's philosophic mind.
29
The vital soul is a natural element for children, and
unless it is educated out of them, it grants children
passionate feelings such as hate and love. According to
Wordsworth, the vital soul and all the passionate feelings
that are a part of it are necessary for a full education.
And with these come
Simplicity in habit, truth in speech,
Be these the daily strengtheners of their minds?
May books and Nature be their early joy!
And knowledge, rightly honored with that name—  
Knowledge not purchased by the loss of power!
(The Prelude V 421-25)
Passions, books, and Nature are what shape these "real 
children" who can grow physically, emotionally, and 
intellectually (Waldo PNC 51). It was Wordsworth's desire 
in much of his poetry and prose to show how most educators 
had gone astray, even damaged the intellect of their 
students by barring them from emotion, experience, and 
imagination. If the analytical mind is severed from the 
passions and the imaginative intellect, knowledge comes at 
great cost— lost is the higher intellect, the powerful 
intellect that melds both reason and imagination, what I 
have been calling the "encompassing intellect."
The growth of the philosophic mind does not end in 
childhood, but continues, forever in progression, until 
death. It is not surprising, then, that Wordsworth's 
interest in the instruction of pupils does not end with 
grammar school. Wordsworth's years at Cambridge served to
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reinforce what his Hawkshead schooling had taught him about 
learning and the fostering of a complete intellect (see 
Schneider). His tenure at Cambridge spurred him to 
articulate what he found wrong with the university system 
and to continue arguing for his own ideal vision of the 
university where the fertilization of the encompassing 
intellect p r o c e e d e d . O n c e  again, it is The Prelude that 
lends most insight into Wordsworth's thoughts on higher 
education and the growth of the mental faculties.
Although Wordsworth certainly did not find his time at
Cambridge a total loss, there was much he found lacking. In
Book V of The Prelude he "condemned" (Schneider 39)
The guides and wardens of our faculties,
Sages who in their prescience would control 
All accidents, and to the very road 
Which they have fashioned would confine us down 
Like engines[.] (354-58)
Cambridge was such a place for Wordsworth. The system was
too controlling. He comments directly on this:
I did not love,
Judging not ill perhaps, the timid course 
Of our scholastic studies; could have wished 
To see the river flow with ampler range 
And freer pace[.] (Ill 496-500)
The result of this too tightly controlled educational system
was to leave Wordsworth divorced from his scholarly
activities: "many books / Were skimmed, devoured, or
studiously perused, / But with no settled plan. I was
detached / Internally from academic cares" (VI 23-26).
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Schneider suggests that Wordsworth found Cambridge at 
fault because it placed knowledge at risk: this system
initiated and honored competitive strife while actively 
discouraging within students a true desire to learn.
"Prizes, like carrots in front of donkeys noses, were set 
before the undergraduates at strategic places all over the 
educative landscape" (Schneider 25). The students came to 
value these prizes more than the "knowledge obtained in 
gaining them" (Schneider 25). Perhaps the most atrocious 
outcome of this competitive system, in Wordsworth's view, 
was its effect on the quality of teaching. Under a routine 
of competition for prizes, students were not obliged to 
study unless they desired a prize, and thus tutors were not 
obliged to teach them (Schneider 25). Since the pursuits of 
students were for prizes and not knowledge, professors 
ceased to function as teachers. Believing that the prizes 
themselves were enough to stimulate learning, they 
"contented themselves with putting the proper material 
before them [students] in lectures, which were usually dull" 
(Schneider 27). The teaching was poor, the students 
inappropriately inspired to prizes, not knowledge, not 
learning for learning's sake.
Wordsworth would have none of this. He did not compete 
for prizes and consequently he took no honors at Cambridge. 
Wordsworth cut his own educational path and continued to
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walk it until he took his B.A. He read voraciously, but did 
not give up the nurturing of his emotional and experiential 
side for the narrowness of the Cambridge curriculum. He 
continued to enrich his vital soul through study, 
imaginative pursuits, and his beloved nature:
Beside the pleasant Mill of Trompington 
I laughed with Chaucer in the hawthorn shade;
Heard him,
while birds were warbling, tell his tales 
Of amorous passion . . .
Sweet Spenser, moving through his clouded heaven 
With the moon's beauty and the moon's soft pace,
(The Prelude III 278-84)
Wordsworth hoped for a system of higher education that 
would foster learning for its own sake. He longed for a 
broader curriculum, one that would inspire students to an 
active, imaginative, and life-long desire to learn. In 
contrast to the Cambridge he knew, Wordsworth imagined an 
ideal university "whose studious aspect should have bent me 
down / To instantaneous service; should at once / Have made 
me pay to science and to arts / And to written lore" ([The 
Prelude III 377-79] Schneider 40).
* * * * * *
Wordsworth is speaking of Coleridge when he writes of a 
friend raised in the city and denied the joys of the English 
countryside. Coleridge was not educated at Hawkshead where 
Wordsworth found the luxury of expanding his imagination
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through interaction with nature. Rather, Coleridge was 
schooled at Christ's Hospital, a far more traditional 
school, where he was tightly governed by the hand of the 
Reverend James Boyer. Yet despite the differences in their 
upbringing, both men grew to hold many similar ideas and 
philosophies, not only about politics, poetry, and theories 
of the imagination, but about education as well. One might 
argue that Coleridge came to kindred conclusions with 
Wordsworth about the part creative activity, reading, self­
reflection, self-knowledge, emotion, perception, and the 
imagination play in the growth of a full intellect, not only 
through his own limited but memorable imaginative childhood 
play, but through a vicarious sharing of the childhood of 
his friend William Wordsworth— a man Coleridge considered to 
have a truly great mind.
By the time Coleridge is raising and educating his own
children, he has come to hope for a more Wordsworthian
education for them then he had for himself (Waldo FWC 105).
In "Frost at Midnight" he gives thanks that his son Hartley
will not suffer the "cloisters dim":
My Babe so beautiful! it thrills my heart 
With tender gladness, thus to look at thee,
And think that thou shalt learn far other lore,
And in far other scenes! For I was reared 
In the great city, pent 'mid cloisters dim,
And saw not lovely but the sky and stars.
But thou my babe! shalt wander like a breeze 
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the clouds,
Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores 
And mountain crags:
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Read literally, Coleridge was certainly blessing Hartley's 
opportunities to frolic amongst the pleasures of the natural 
world. He sees in his son's interactions with nature a 
chance to foster the "natural child," the passionate and 
experiential component of learning that Wordsworth claims 
such power for in his chronicle of the growth of the 
philosophical mind. It is no accident that these lines 
about learning appear in a poem so directly about the 
imagination: Coleridge means to draw attention to the 
importance of the imagination in the education of children.
I would suggest that the "cloisters dim," which shut 
Coleridge off from the world of nature, are more than city 
dwellings. Coleridge was not merely "pent" physically, but 
mentally and imaginatively as well, and this Coleridge sees 
as detrimental to education and learning.
Consider, for instance, that Coleridge's father 
disallowed the reading of anything fanciful. Before his 
father put a stop to it, Coleridge, as a young boy, read 
fairy tales and stories of adventure (Waldo FWC 98). He 
remembers these readings fondly, and as an adult makes an 
argument for them in the shaping of the encompassing 
intellect:
From my early reading of fairy tales and genii, 
etc., etc., my mind had been habituated to the 
Vast, and I never regarded my senses in any way as
the criteria of my belief. I regulated all my
creeds by my conceptions, not by my sight, even at
that age. Should children be permitted to read
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romances, and relations of giants and magicians and 
genii? I know all that has been said against it; 
but X have formed my faith in the affirmative. I 
know of no other way of giving the mind a love of 
the Great and the Whole. (Letters Vol. I 16)
Like most children when left to their own imaginative
pursuits, Coleridge entered into the world of play and
fantasy where he would act out exciting adventures.
Coleridge's father was tyrannical in some ways, however, and
when he observed his son acting out the readings in
imaginative play, he burned the books (Waldo FMC 99). This
was harsh discipline for the young Coleridge, and it
resulted in a dimming of imaginative light that is
metaphorically parallel to being "pent 'mid cloisters dim"
in the "great city."11
As Waldo Suggests, the "stern preceptor" remembered by 
Coleridge in "Frost at Midnight," while recalling his 
father, probably refers more directly to James Boyer, 
Coleridge's teacher at Christ's Hospital( FS/iC 105). In the 
Biographia Literaria, Coleridge writes ambivalently of Boyer 
and his educative techniques. Boyer followed the tradition 
of the time in that his instruction consisted mostly of 
memorization and drills. Student prose compositions were 
important only as grammatically correct products destined to 
fit a pre-determined form. They were to contain none of the 
subjectivity, emotion, or imaginative pursuit that later 
became a major tenet of Romantic theories on literature. In
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fact, Boyer took great pains to keep the imagination of his
students in check.^ Coleridge recollects:
In our own English compositions (at least 
for the last three years of our school 
education) he showed no mercy to phrase, 
metaphor, or image, unsupported by sound 
sense, or where the same sense might have 
been conveyed with equal force and dignity 
in plainer words. Lute, harp, and lyre, 
muse, muses and inspirations . . . were all 
an abomination to him. In fancy I can 
almost hear him now, exclaiming "Harp?
Harp? Lyre? Pen and ink, boy, you mean!
Muse, boy, Muse? your Nurses's daughter, 
you mean! Pierian spring? Oh! aye! The 
cloister-pump, I suppose!" (BL I 9-10)
Coleridge, then, did not share with Wordsworth an 
education that nurtured the imagination. But as drastically 
different from Wordsworth's as his education was, Coleridge 
came to hold a similar educational philosophy, according to 
which analytical practice and imaginative pursuits should be 
yoked together in order to obtain optimum mental powers, and 
he agreed with Wordsworth on how this educative goal can be 
reached. Coleridge joined ranks with Rousseau and 
Wordsworth in his belief that children should not be 
educated as though they were miniature adults. Therefore, 
Coleridge also agreed with Wordsworth that the pursuit of 
knowledge takes place in progression, and that it is a great 
error to cram young minds with facts that pass as knowledge. 
Since the child is capable of appreciating only a few simple 
relations, education should attempt to refine the sense of 
relation and connections because, according to Coleridge,
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"the comparing power, the judgment, is not at that age 
active, and ought not to be forcibly excited as is too 
frequently and mistakenly done in modern systems of 
education . . (Walsh 19). To force academic pursuits 
and exercise, rote memorization, and factual information 
upon young children is a grave mistake. In a powerful 
analogy Coleridge wrote, "Touch a door a little ajar or half 
open, and it will yield to the push of your finger. Fire a 
cannon-ball at it, and the door stirs not much: you make a 
hole thro' it, the door is spoilt for ever, but not moved " 
(Inquiring Spirit 81).
Coleridge would connect, I believe, the school system's 
tendency to rely on rote memorization to "memoria technica," 
a process which he decries as "artificial memory" in the 
Biographia Literaria. Memoria technica is an ancient 
technique of impressing places and images on the memory.
The problem that Coleridge had with this is that, because it 
was solely passive, it neglected the role the will plays in 
memory:
But the will itself by confining and 
intensifying the attention may arbitrarily 
give vividness and distinctness to any 
object whatsoever; and from hence we may 
deduce the uselessness if not the absurdity 
of certain recent schemes which promise an 
artificial memory, but which in reality can 
only produce a confusion and debasement of 
the fancy. (BL 127)
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It is the active participation of the will, as it relates to 
the act of remembering, that rote memorization fails to 
stimulate.
It is clear, then, that by education Coleridge meant
more than gaining expertise or memorizing little-known
facts; and he meant even more than the imaginative pursuits
afforded by readings of the fantastic. Education also
includes moral growth— preparation of the mind to make the
best judgments for the good of society. It takes both
aspects of education, moral and intellectual, to be truly
educated, which in Coleridge's terms meant having the
ability to see all things in fullness and relation to each
other. As he wrote in the Biographia Literaria, "the
educated man chiefly seeks to discover and express those
connections of things, or those relative bearings of fact to
fact . . ." (53):
the intercourse of uneducated men, is 
distinguished from the diction of their 
superiors in knowledge and power by the 
greater disjunction and separation in the 
component parts of that, whatever it be, 
which they wish to communicate. There is a 
want to that prospectiveness of mind, that 
surview, which enables a man to foresee the 
whole of what he is to convey, appertaining 
to one point; and by this means so to 
subordinate and arrange the different parts 
according to their relative importance, as 
to convey it at once, and as an organised 
whole. (EL II 58)
Ultimately this is Coleridge's definition of the
encompassing intellect. As with Wordsworth, the mind is
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fully mature when it is synthetic and unified. According to 
Coleridge, the ability to nurture the young mind into the 
unified intellect must include reflection, self-knowledge, 
and consciousness, all which lead to the melding of 
reasoning and imaginative powers necessary to the completely 
educated mind.13 "Our intellectual life," he argued in a 
lecture on Shakespeare, passes "not so much in acquiring new 
facts, as in acquiring a distinct consciousness" (Coburn The 
Self-Conscious Imagination 25). Without a consciousness of 
self the moral intellect is stunted, damaging not only the 
individual, but society as well. He felt the lack of it can 
be harmful to others and often spoke to this issue.
Speaking of the conflicts in human societies Coleridge 
asked, "Why is difference linked with hatred?" His answer 
was, from lack of consciousness of self (Self-Conscious 
Imagination 32).
This consciousness is in turn linked to reflection and 
self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is the ability to commune 
with the "very and permanent" self and it is a prerequisite 
for any knowledge that is not cursory. All knowledge, 
Coleridge argues, is "not merely mechanical and like a 
carpenter's rule, having its whole value in the immediate 
outward use to which it is applied . . .all knowledge. . . 
that enlightens and liberalises, is a form and means of 
self-knowledge, whether it be grammar, logical or classical"
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(Letter to Gillman qtd. in Walsh 60). Coleridge's self- 
knowledge is much like Wordsworth's vital soul, and may be 
attained through a method of thinking, feeling, 
experiencing, imagining, and cultivating sensitivity. It 
comes from a combination of inner and outer awareness.
Outer awareness is observation, and he calls inner awareness 
the art of reflection. Reflection is a mode of personal 
experience; it is concrete and individual. As William Walsh 
points out, it is not to be confused with reverie, "a 
lackadaisical, bemused sauntering in the company of a mere 
sequence of notions and images" (58). Rather, it is a very 
difficult and active process calling on "energy and thought" 
(Walsh 58). According to Coleridge, "It requires no 
ordinary skill and address to fix the attention of men on 
the world within them, to induce them to study the processes 
and superintend the works which they are themselves carrying 
on in their own minds" (Aids to Reflection Introductory 
Aphorisms).14 The educational philosophies with which both 
Coleridge and Wordsworth disagree err by ignoring the 
cultivation of a reflective self-knowledge. Rather than 
"educing" it from within, they try, says Coleridge, to 
"shape convictions and deduce knowledge from without by an 
exclusive observation of outward and sensible things" (Walsh 
58). This results in a mind able to distinguish between 
aggregate parts but not a vitally whole mind capable of
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making connections.
Learning the art of reflection includes reflective
self-knowledge— examining one's own thoughts and actions—
but since we are shaped by language and the written word, it
also includes learning to actively analyze language and
question what we read:
Reflect on your thoughts, actions, 
circumstances and— which will be of 
especial aid to you in forming a habit of 
reflection— accustom yourself to reflect on 
the words you use, hear or read, their 
truth, derivation and history. For if 
words are not things, they are living 
powers, by which things of most importance 
to mankind are activated, combined and 
humanised. (Aids to Reflection Preface)15
"The first question," alleges Coleridge, "we should put to
ourselves when we have to read a passage that perplexes us
in a work of authority is: What does the writer mean by all
this? And the second question should be, What does he
intend by all this?" (Walsh 61). Coleridge suggests that as
readers we should consider each part of the text in relation
to the whole, what the author has written in relation to
ourselves, and the intention of the author. Further, he
suggests that reflection, whether of ourselves or of a text,
can help lead to a refined sense of "distinction." For
Coleridge, making distinctions, but seeing those
distinctions reunified within the whole, is the sign of the
truly educated mind. A "distinct consciousness" leads to an
encompassing intellect.
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Through his own learning experiences, his vast reading 
on the nature of knowledge, and his deep friendship with 
William Wordsworth, Coleridge came to believe that a 
child's intellect must be strengthened through excitement, 
imagination, nourishing support, reflection, a consciousness 
of self, and time. Education is an active process. If we 
approach education as "educing . . . the blossom . . . from 
the bud" in a natural progression that begins with 
respecting the capabilities of the young mind and the need 
for creative activity, as opposed to the memorization and 
regurgitation of factual information, the imaginative power 
will come alive. And as Walsh argues, it is the imagination 
that leads to great intellectual deeds and the growth of a 
society:
. . .  In the imagination of man exist the 
seeds of all moral and scientific 
improvement; chemistry was first alchemy, 
and out of astrology sprang astronomy. In 
the childhood of those sciences the 
imagination opened a way, and furnished 
materials, on which the ratiocinative 
powers in a maturer stage operated with 
success. The progressive being; and I 
repeat that it ought to be carefully guided 
and strengthened as the indispensable means 
and instrument of continued amelioration 
and refinement. (23)
With an education that truly educes the "vital soul," as
Wordsworth calls it, "vital excellencies" in Coleridge's
terms, of imagination, passion, and reason, a deep-feeling
and moral intellect can be cultivated. As a passage in a
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letter of 1801 from Coleridge to Poole underscores, "deep
thinking is attainable only by . . . deep feeling." 16
Coleridge, like Wordsworth, firmly believed that a
mechanized approach to education that did not take into
account the natural development of a child's mind and moral
being, or the importance of the vital excellencies, was
gravely damaging. Echoing passages of Wordsworth's from The
Prelude, Coleridge condemns those educators who deny the
young mind its natural growth toward intellectual and moral
power. Teachers are, he says,
instructed how to metamorphose children 
into prodigies; . . . prodigies of self- 
conceit, shallowness, arrogance, and 
infidelity. Instead of storing the memory, 
during the period when the memory is the 
predominant faculty, with facts for the 
after exercise of the judgment, and instead 
of awakening by the noblest models the fond 
and unmixed love and admiration, which is 
the natural and graceful temper of early 
youth, these nurslings of improved pedagogy 
are taught to dispute and deride, to 
suspect all but their own and their 
lecturer's wisdom, and to hold nothing 
sacred from their contempt but their own 
contemptible arrogance[;] (BL I 13)
Although Wordsworth believes cramming young minds with
intellectual miscellany when the faculty for memory is not
yet grown leads to a weakened intellectual capability,
Coleridge, at least in this passage, suggests that a certain
amount of memorization at an early age is fruitful. Where
this "storing" of memory fails, though, is when facts are
passively received or when young students are taught to
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argue or dispute on the facts they have memorized, not 
through their own ability to discriminate, but simply by 
virtue of what they have been told. The educational 
philosophies practiced during the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, however, often treated students as 
passive receivers of knowledge, and learning as an inactive, 
non-imaginative process. And further, according to 
Coleridge, under the traditional system of schooling, 
students of a young age have not cultivated the judgment 
necessary to make any productive use of the "storing of 
memory." Forcing youth to "dispute" and "deride" rather 
than "love" and "admire" short-circuits the natural 
development of mind. Consequently, as the passage above 
suggests, when an education based on memorization is 
misapplied students become mirrors of their instructors, 
able to recapitulate what they have heard and read, but 
unable to form a point of view of their own. Although 
Wordsworth and Coleridge might disagree on when memorization 
should be employed, or even on how useful it is, both poets 
envisioned a curriculum which allowed children to feel and 
experience a full range of emotion and imaginative activity. 
Learning was not to be forced through fear, humiliation, and 
punishment, but educed through love. Schooling should 
excite the imagination through reading and life experience, 
not the passive exercise of memorization and recapitulation.
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Students should learn to reflect, to question, and to feel
deeply in order to think deeply.
Through their poetry, letters, and lectures, Wordsworth 
and Coleridge offered educational alternatives which they 
believed fostered the growth of a moral, unified, synthetic, 
and encompassing intellect. They have had immense influence 
in the years following the publication of their poetic works 
and statements on politics and philosophy. We often forget 
that both Wordsworth and Coleridge had much of value to say 
about education as well as the theory of poetics. But if we 
reexamine their works in this light, it becomes clear that
the legacy they left has had a profound impact on educators
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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Endnotes
1 As Arthur O. Lovejoy has made clear (see "On the 
Discrimination of Romanticisms"), it is a mistake to 
assume that Romanticism is one unified concept.
Rather, there are many different ideas and several 
distinct strains that are to be found under the rubric 
of Romanticism. For my purposes, I am using the term 
"Romanticism" in a general sense as a descriptor of the 
major tenets of thought that arose with the English 
Romantic poets, i.e., Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, and 
Shelley.
2 I am greatly indebted to Mark Waldo's 
dissertation, The Rhetoric of Wordsworth and Coleridge: 
Its Place in Current Composition Theory. I have taken 
an approach similar to his and worked with many of the 
same materials. Although my first chapter covers much 
of the same ground Waldo does, it will be used as 
background information which will serve to launch me in 
directions not taken by him.
3 Willinsky points out, among other things, that 
what he calls the "New Literacy" is grounded in organic 
metaphors, the questioning of authority, and an 
acceptance of the "personal" voice in student work.
4 Occasionally, a school would have allowed other 
subjects to creep into the curriculum, and geography 
and algebra might be taught.
5 Two popular educational systems of concern to 
Wordsworth and Coleridge that arose during this time 
are attributed to Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster. 
Although they were great rivals, their systems were 
quite similar and the establishment of their respective 
systems spoke to problems that had arisen within the 
schools by the end of the eighteenth century. 
Fundamental to both of them was the reliance on a 
monitorial system, because the schools were so over 
crowded that a teacher could not handle all of the 
students. They instituted two of the first monitorial 
systems in which certain number of older pupils were 
selected as tutors and much of the instruction was 
undertaken by them.
Despite many similarities, Bell and Lancaster 
differed greatly in their approaches to punishment. 
While Bell's system left punishment up to the judgment 
of a student's peers, except in extreme cases, and
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preferred to focus on positive reinforcement through 
praise, Lancaster's, to the contrary, focused on severe 
punishments. These included hanging six-pound logs 
about the necks of offenders; shackling their legs with 
pieces of wood; tying frequent offenders together by 
pieces of wood fastened around their necks; forcing 
them to walk backwards; and hanging pupils in a sack 
suspended from the roof for the amusement of other 
students. It was the issue of punishment that most 
drew Wordsworth's and Coleridge's ardent support of 
Bell, and Coleridge's continual rebuttals to Lancaster. 
Coleridge was publicly verbal in his aspersions against 
Lancaster and his praise for Bell. In his Lecture on 
the New System of Education at Bristol in 1813, he 
condemned Lancaster for mishandling discipline. 
Coleridge dealt with other aspects of education in the 
lecture, but emphasized, in contrast to Lancaster, the 
need to teach children through love rather than fear 
and humiliation.
Coleridge was also drawn to Bell's system because 
the practice of the monitorial system was "a dynamic 
principle" which would arouse the "whole individual" 
into activity (BL II 60).
6 All citations from The Prelude will be the 1850 
edition unless otherwise noted.
7 Stephen Gill in Wordsworth: A Life, and Mary 
Moorman in William Wordsworth: A Biography: The Early 
Years, as well as Waldo, offer useful accounts of 
Wordsworth's education at Hawkshead. Moorman also 
notes that Wordsworth was not the only poet to proffer 
praises of the Hawkshead education. Charles Farish, a 
fellow student of Wordsworth's published a poem 
exalting the outdoor adventures of the Hawkshead 
students entitled The Minstrels of Winandermere (26).
8 Ann Tyson granted Wordsworth enormous freedom. 
Although she was a church-goer she never forced young 
William to attend or study the doctrines of the church. 
She allowed him to be himself and do as he pleased. He 
took full advantage of the freedom he was granted, and 
as early as age nine, when he first arrived in 
Hawkshead, he wandered about the hills and fields until 
long after nightfall.
9 Mark Waldo's dissertation also points out that 
the crucial aspect of the educational philosophy 
Wordsworth is promoting is based on the conjunction of
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the imaginative and analytical.
10 Ben Ross Schneider Jr.'s book, Wordsworth's 
Cambridge Education, presents a clear study of 
Wordsworth's attitudes, and actions during his time at 
Cambridge.
11 Scholars have speculated that the burning of 
his cherished books caused psychological damage to 
Coleridge which in turn manifested itself in an 
inability to write without great mental anguish.
12 Waldo offers a useful discussion of Boyer's 
effect on Coleridge.
13 Walsh and Waldo also note the importance of 
reflection to Coleridge's theories.
14 See also Walsh page 59.
15 See also Walsh page 61.
16 Elsewhere Coleridge has said that the powerful
intellect is one that discovers: "to invent was
different from to discover— a watch maker invented a 
time-piece, but a profound thinker only could discover" 
(Collected Works of STC vol. V 583).
CHAPTER II
VITAL LINKS: ROMANTIC THEMES IN THE EDUCATIONAL
THEORIES OF ARNOLD, MILL, AND DEWEY
In an article collected in The Web of Meaning, Janet 
Emig speaks of the "tacit tradition" from which our work in 
composition research arises, the implicit knowledge and 
language shared by scholars and thinkers within our 
discipline. She notes that "certain kinds of knowing and 
doing, summed, qualify as emblems of membership and 
participation" ("The Tacit Tradition: The Inevitability of 
Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Writing Research 147). In 
the case of expressivist rhetorics, "certain kinds of 
knowing and doing" have been passed down to us, not only 
through the writings of the Romantics, but by subsequent 
educators and thinkers, not usually considered Romantics, 
who have nonetheless shared some of the "root metaphors and 
governing paradigms" of Romantic thought on education and 
learning. As I will argue here, for example, Matthew Arnold 
John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey can be seen as 
representative philosophers of educational thought and 
practice who have perpetuated Romantic teaching 
philosophies.
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It is useful here to define "Romantic" for the purposes 
of this project. This was not the poets own self- 
discriptor; the label was applied to them in later years by 
English literary historians.
As a result, despite the many attempts to define 
Romanticism in a coherent manner by such scholars as Irving 
Babbitt, Cleanth Brooks, M.H. Abrams, Morse Peckman, Arthur 
Lovejoy, and Rene Wellek, there is still not one agreed upon 
definition for "Romantic." Indeed, Arthur O. Lovejoy argues 
in "On the Discriminations of Romanticisms," that 
Romanticism is not one unified concept. Rather, he sees 
several distinct strains of Romanticism, which he identifies 
by nationality— German, French, English. Other scholars 
have countered Lovejoy's argument. Rene Wellek, for 
instance, believes that the "major romantic movements form a 
unity of theories, philosophies, and style, and that these, 
in turn, form a coherent group of ideas each of which 
implicates the other" (The Concept of Romanticism in 
Literary History" 182). The debates surrounding the 
defining of Romanticism have shown that it is unfortunately 
quite easy either to define Romanticism so broadly that 
everything falls under its purview, or so narrowly as to 
reduce it to an uninteresting technical matter.
I am using the terms "Romantic" and "Romanticism" as a 
general descriptor of the major tenets of thought and action
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that arose with the English Romantic poets, especially 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, including a reaction against the 
rising urbanization and commercialization which eventually 
led to the industrialization of England; in the name of 
liberty, a reaction against a government and political 
system which was oppressive to the majority of English 
people while allowing the newly evolving industrialists to 
prosper; a belief in the importance and almost holiness of 
the natural world; a belief in the importance of the 
individual self; a belief in the superiority of the 
imagination over the merely analytical reason; and a theory 
of poetics which stemmed from the belief that poetry should 
take an organic form and that poetry is a reflection of the 
poet's mind in action. Thus, the process the poet undergoes 
during composition and the poet's capacities of feeling, 
creativity, spontaneity, and the imagination are given 
prominence. Finally, I am including in this definition the 
poets' reaction against traditional schooling which I 
discuss in the first chapter.
My task here is not to claim that Mill, Arnold, and 
Dewey were Romantics in every aspect of the definition I 
have set forth, which they certainly were not, nor is it to 
do a full-scale study of Arnold, Mill, and Dewey and their 
literary and educational theories. Rather, my interest lies 
in showing how these post-Romantics, to use Emig's
52
terminology, share tacit Romantic assumptions, and how they 
have carried forward certain aspects of Romantic educational 
thought which form the shared language and knowledge of 
current expressivist rhetoricians. I am not necessarily 
constructing a chronological history of ideas but am 
attempting to show how the broad and pervasive influence of 
Romanticism has extended into educational philosophies and 
the teaching of writing in the twentieth century, and how 
Romanticism arises in the most unlikely of places. These 
three men are cases in point.
My choice of Arnold, Mill, and Dewey for this study is, 
of course, somewhat arbitrary, but there is a rationale.
In part this choice is a result of the fact that there are 
many similarities between the Romantics and these three 
thinkers despite the differences among the three, and that 
they all three read the Romantics and have written about 
them. Also, in addition to bearing the influence of 
Romanticism, Mill, Arnold, and Dewey are widely published on 
issues concerning education and they are three of the best- 
known literati, philosophers, and educators of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Matthew Arnold is important to this study in that he is 
a central transitional figure linking, as critics like Leon 
Gottfried have argued, his era to our own, and his era to 
the preceding Romantic era, which was in the last decade of
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its bloom when Arnold was born in 1822. Arnold is also 
perhaps the most influential man of letters during the 
Victorian period.
J.S. Mill might seem a less logical choice, as the 
great exponent of utilitarianism, which all the Romantics 
despised. His own estimation of the influence Coleridge and 
Wordsworth held on his thought, and his recognition that it 
was Wordsworth who finally enabled him to become "fully 
educated," might alone be reason enough to include him. But 
of further interest is the fact that Arnold and Mill, though 
contemporaries, are generally seen as representatives of 
antithetical schools of thought. Arnold is generally held 
up as a more conservative and elitist spokesman for 
"culture" as a means of bridging the classes, and Mill as a 
liberal reformist with socialist tendencies. Yet, as 
critics like G.L Nesbitt and Walter Houghton suggest, in 
spite of these differences their views on education are very 
similar. And, as I argue in this chapter, those educational 
views are distinctly Romantic in flavor.
John Dewey seems indispensable to the connections I am 
attempting to illuminate here. He is a pivotal figure 
spanning the late nineteenth century, where Mill and Arnold 
leave off, as far into the twentieth as the early 1950's.
He is probably the most influential American philosopher and 
educator of our century, but since, as Thomas Newkirk
54
suggests, discussions surrounding writing process theory 
have been primarily ahistorical, Dewey has rarely been 
invoked (More than Stories 178). Yet because his own 
theories on progressive education and learning incorporate 
much that is Romantic in thought, and since Dewey's 
progressive education experienced a resurgence in the 1960#s 
during the advent of expressivist pedagogies as proposed by 
teachers such as Rohman, Murray, and Elbow, we might see 
Dewey as a connecting figure between earlier Romantic 
educational thought and current expressivist rhetorics.1
Also, I have chosen Mill, Arnold, and Dewey because 
some of their respective philosophies appear to have arisen 
in reaction to social circumstances similar to those which 
spurred the Romantic poets toward the reactions and general 
tenets I have pointed to. What I am noting as "Romantic" in 
the thought of Mill, Arnold, and Dewey might well be a 
result of similar historical circumstances. For instance, 
although different in many respects from the Romantics, 
Victorians like Mill and Arnold were still responding to, 
and in some cases reacting against an establishment 
characterized by, unenlightened schools, a bureaucratic 
government, churches that seemed aloof from many concerns of 
common life, and an industrial system that exploited its 
workers— including women and children— and that imposed a 
drab materialism on daily life. As the nineteenth century
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wore on, in fact, those concerns that set Romantic 
philosophies in motion reached an even higher pitch. There 
was little or no change in national schooling, the 
government was slow to act even though social changes 
demanded quick political reform, and industrialization 
reached its peak.
Both Mill and Arnold were deeply concerned with the 
state of the government, the problems that arose with 
industrialization, and the educational system. Mill, of 
course, bears the stamp of utilitarianism, which aimed to 
test the usefulness of institutions in light of reason and 
common sense. Yet he learned from his nervous breakdown and 
from Wordsworth and Coleridge that reason is not the be all 
and end all. And Matthew Arnold, like the Romantics who 
preceded him, questioned how full and enjoyable life could 
actually be in a modern industrial society. This is a 
recurrent topic in his poetry and prose, and he is often 
attempting to find possible solutions to the problems he 
finds with the established schools, governments, and 
churches.
John Dewey was facing historical circumstances in 
America that were counterparts of those the Romantics and 
Mill, and Arnold faced earlier in the century in England. 
Between the years of 1865 and 1918, America developed from a 
primarily agricultural country to a modern industrialized
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nation. This rapid expansion of industrialization resulted 
in many of the same atrocities that drew the attention of 
outspoken poets, historians, and philosophers like Blake, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Mill, and Arnold. Like 
workers earlier in England, American employees were helpless 
against their employers. Americans suffered the same 
exploitation and abuse which characterized the industrial 
policies of nineteenth-century England.
By the time Dewey was formulating his philosophies for 
education, America had become fully capitalistic and a world 
power. The rapid change in America, as in England, was not 
without its consequences for education. Schools often 
reflected the ideology of American capitalism by pushing for 
an education of efficiency, production, and discipline in 
order to produce a work force that could continue to fuel 
America's prospering industry. A systematic coverage of 
various subjects and a mastery of facts, concepts, and 
principles acquired through drill had become the established 
and institutionalized norm. As Dewey's philosophical stance 
grew to include ideas from pragmatism, progressive 
education, empirical and objective psychology, and 
democracy, he offered an alternative to the established 
system of schooling. As I will show, some of the directions 
Dewey's philosophy took share general characteristics with 
the thought of Wordsworth and Coleridge, thought that we
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have come to call "Romantic."
We can surmise, then, that there is at least a two-fold 
source for the Romantic ideas in the philosophies of Mill, 
Arnold, and Dewey. Not only were they inspired by the 
Romantics' poetry, theoretical, and educational views, but 
historical circumstances similar to those faced by the 
Romantic poets elicited responses from them which we have 
come to identify as "Romantic."
Moreover, I have chosen Mill, Arnold, and Dewey to 
discuss as descendants of particular Romantic educational 
thought and as predecessors to current expressivist theories 
and practice over specialists in the discipline of rhetoric 
proper— Wendell, Genung, and Scott, for instance— because 
writing teachers are generally more familiar with Mill, 
Arnold, and Dewey than with Wendell, Genung, or Scott.
Until the recent growth of graduate programs in rhetoric, 
composition teachers had not systematically been trained in 
the history of rhetoric. Rather, writing instructors have 
come through the ranks in English or Education departments 
where they have not, for the most part, received educations 
in rhetoric but in literary studies and the history and 
philosophy of education. Since Mill and Arnold are 
generally required reading for literature students and often 
for education students as well, and Dewey is the major 
contemporary influence on American education, I would argue
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that expressivist writing teachers have probably been 
exposed to, and thus more generally influenced by Mill, 
Arnold, and Dewey.
It is with these three threads, then, Matthew Arnold, 
John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey, that I begin stitching 
together one of the histories from which current Romantic 
rhetorics and educational theories arise.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873^
In The Mirror and the Lamp, M. H. Abrams points out 
that Mill's essays on poetry define the poet and poetry in 
terms almost identical to those of Wordsworth and Coleridge. 
Others have recognized that one of Mill's major aims was the 
same as that of the Romantics: ’’the improvement of society 
through . . . the internal culture of the individual” 
(Stillinger viii). Mill was a voracious reader; he read 
Wordsworth, as he tells us in a celebrated passage of his 
Autobiography, and he was intimate with Coleridge's works, 
including the Biographia Literaria. In a letter to John 
Pringle Nichol dated April 15, 1834, Mill wrote that "Few 
persons have exercised more influence over my thoughts and 
character than Coleridge has . . (Literary Essays 304). 
Although John Stuart Mill probably did not read Wordsworth's 
The Prelude when it was finally published in 1850 
(Stillinger ix), he did read Wordsworth's other poems and
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the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, which are also about 
education, at least in the broad sense of the cultivation of 
the imaginative mind. I would suggest, then, that 
Wordsworth's contribution to Mill's theories is pedagogical 
as well as poetic, even though it is unclear whether he read 
Wordsworth's largest and most sustained argument on 
education.
Mill had several specific connections with Wordsworth. 
He first acquainted himself with Wordsworth's poetry in 1828 
while in the throes of a severe mental depression and 
breakdown. According to Mill, it was Wordsworth's poetry 
that first alerted him to the fact that the educational path 
his father, James Mill, had led him down had neglected the 
feelings. Later, in 1829, Mill defended Wordsworth's worth 
as a poet in a debate, and in 1833 he wrote a literary essay 
on him lauding not only Wordsworth's poems, but the poet's 
ability to cultivate emotion and feeling in his readers. In 
1831 Mill met Wordsworth, and considered this meeting one of 
the highlights of his life.
There are striking resemblances between Wordsworth's 
autobiographical poem and Mill's Autobiography. They both 
chronicle the authors' "early lives, intellectual growth, 
crisis and discovery" (Stillinger ix). And although nearly 
every essay written by Mill talks about education in some 
capacity, like Wordsworth's The Prelude, Mill's
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Autobiography speaks in depth about education and the role 
of imagination in the growth of the philosophic mind.
It is in the Autobiography that we learn of the 
specific shape Mill's childhood education took. He was 
educated under the sole tutelage of his father. His days 
were spent in study in "what are considered the higher 
branches of education" (Autobiography 19). By the age of 
eight Mill was reading Herodotus, the Memorials of Socrates, 
and Diogenes Laertius in the original Greek. He began Latin 
at seven, logic at twelve, and introductions to political 
economy by age thirteen. The educational experimentation 
James Mill conducted on his son has many of the attributes 
the Romantics found detrimental to the education of the 
young. In an earlier draft of the Autobiography, Mill 
revealed that his education was forced through fear rather 
than educed through love: "It was one of the most 
unfavourable of the moral agencies which acted on me in my 
boyhood, that mine was not an education of love but of fear" 
(Stillinger 33 Early Draft 66). In the later version of the 
text he recalls that his father was "often, and much beyond 
reason, provoked by my failures in cases where success could 
not have been expected" (Autobiography 19). Both Wordsworth 
and Coleridge bristled at the custom of using fear as a 
catalyst to learning. Coleridge was especially vocal on 
this issue, and Lancaster's tendency to discipline students
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with inhumane punishment provoked Coleridge's fiery ire. In 
his Lecture on the New System of Education, he condemned 
Lancaster and his extreme punishments intended to infuse 
fear. In Lecture on Shakespeare XI, Coleridge argues that 
education is an active process that begins by instilling 
love, and that from the seed of love obedience will 
naturally arise.
The imaginative readings that Wordsworth believed an 
integral part of childhood growth and that Coleridge 
lamented having had taken from him were for the most part 
denied to the young Mill. Although Mill never claims that 
his father barred him from imaginative readings, James Mill 
neither gave his son books like The Arabian Nights nor 
created room for such reading in his curriculum. Mill 
recalls that the only time he had access to tales of fantasy 
and adventure was on the rare occasions that family friends 
would present him with a book like Robinson Crusoe or The 
Arabian Nights as a gift. Moreover, as an adult, J.S. Mill 
lamented the fact that the modern system of education had 
deleted the literature of chivalry and romance from the 
curriculum. In an essay of 1838, Mill mourned the fact that 
"for the first time perhaps in history, the youth of both 
sexes of the educated classes are universally growing up 
unromantic" {Literary Essays 53). Mill lauded books which 
stimulate the imagination with the heroic people, and keep 
alive the "chivalrous spirit."
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James Mill not only neglected to include imaginative
readings in his son's upbringing, but kept his son from
participating in childhood recreation as well. In the
Autobiography, Mill explains that his father shielded him
from the "ordinary corrupting influence which boys exercise
over boys," so that he might not be contaminated with
"vulgar modes of thought and feeling" (Autobiography 22).
Mill was not one of the "real children," rightly educated,
that Wordsworth considered himself and the students that
shared his Hawkshead education to be:
A race of real children, not too wise,
Too learned, or too good; but wanton, fresh,
And bandied up and down by love and hate;
Mot unresentful where justified;
Fierce, moody, patient, virtuous, modest, shy;
Mad in their sports like withered leaves in winds; 
Though doing wrong and suffering, and full oft 
Bending beneath our life's mysterious weight 
Of pain, and doubt, and fear, yet yielding not 
In happiness to the happiest upon earth.
(The Prelude V 411-25)
Instead, Mill was Wordsworth's "miracle of scientific lore."
Because of the "deficiencies" in his education, Mill found
himself to be a social "misfit" (Autobiography 24) just like
Coleridge. In a letter to Thomas Poole of October 9, 1797,
Coleridge, describing how the same sorts of deficiencies in
his education made him a social pariah, could have been
writing of Mill as well as himself:
I was fretful and immoderately passionate, 
and as I could not play at anything and was 
slothful, I was despised and hated by the 
boys; and because I could read and spell
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and had, I may truly say, a memory and 
understanding forced into almost unnatural 
ripeness, I was flattered and wondered at 
by all the old women. And so I became very 
vain, and despised most of the boys that 
were at all near my own age. . . .
Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, Mill believes that normal
childhood play and interaction with other children adds an
essential ingredient to a youth's education.
Mill was not only denied the company of youngsters his 
own age, but simple physical activity was limited for him as 
well. Although he took solitary walks daily, these were 
subdued and "in general of a quiet, if not bookish turn, and 
gave little stimulus to any other kind of mental activity 
than that which was already called forth by my studies" 
(Autobiography 23). Wordsworth is also known for his 
solitary walks, but he had a balance unknown to Mill, and 
indulged in play as well as deep thought; Wordsworth was the 
Winander boy hooting back at the owls, while Mill was the 
"miracle of scientific lore." Wordsworth opened himself up 
to nature. He observed nature's ways, allowed his 
experiences in nature to stimulate all of his senses. Mill 
was "utterly inobservant: I was as my father continually 
told me, like a person who had not the organs of sense. My 
eyes and ears seemed of no use to me, so little did I see or 
hear what was before me, and so little, even of what I did 
see or hear, did I observe or remember . . . "  (Autobiography 
24). Because his senses were closed to nature he was unable
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to nurture the experiential and emotive aspects of his 
intellect.
However, from the vantage point of an adult restored to
health through the cultivation of feelings, Mill remembered
two Wordsworthian-like experiences from his childhood that
"bettered" his education:
From 1814 to 1817 Mr. Bentham lived during 
half of each year at Ford abbey, in 
Somersetshire . . . which intervals I had 
the advantage of passing at that place.
This sojourn was, I think an important 
circumstance in my education. Nothing 
contributes more to nourish elevation of 
sentiments in a people, than the large and 
free character of their habitations . . .
[the Abbey] gave the sentiment of a larger 
and freer existence, and were to me a sort 
of poetic cultivation . . . .
(Autobiography 35-36)
At Bentham's residence in Somersetshire, Mill was finally 
made aware of the importance of interaction with nature as a 
stimulant to feelings and thus to education. For the first 
time he found himself in circumstances allowing him the 
luxury of communing with nature.
The second occurrence Mill writes of was a stay in 
France where "the first introduction to the highest order of 
mountain scenery made the deepest impression . . . and gave 
a colour to my tastes through life" (37). As unemotional as 
this latter passage of Mill's might seem, it recalls 
Wordsworth's much more passionate telling of crossing the 
Alps. Perhaps of more direct interest is Mill's mention of
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the "colouration" of his tastes. What Mill is suggesting is 
that the mountain scenery excited his imagination, and once 
having excited his imagination, this particular scene stayed 
with him throughout life, was stored in his memory, in the 
way Wordsworth's mind is "a mansion for all lovely forms." 
Also, the language chosen by Mill is strikingly similar to 
that used by Wordsworth in his discussion from the Preface 
to the Lyrical Ballads on the Poet's ability to imbue 
ordinary objects with imaginative vision by throwing "over 
them a certain colouring of imagination" (734).2 Mill's 
language here, and his discovery that the natural world 
elevates the sentiments, reflect Romantic influences and 
premises.
It was in 1828 that Mill first began to question the 
education his father had so carefully planned and guided him 
through. Mill was suffering from severe depression and had 
begun to believe that his education and life had been for 
naught. In his Autobiography Mill comments that two lines 
from Coleridge were often in his thoughts: "Work without 
hope draws nectar in a sieve, / And hope without an object 
cannot live." It was Coleridge, wrote Mill, "in whom alone 
of all writers I have found a true description of what I 
felt . . . "  (Autobiography 84). This despondent state of 
thought and feelings made reading Wordsworth for the first 
time an important event in Mill's life. Wordsworth's poems 
were "a medicine" for Mill's "state of mind":
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they expressed, not mere outward beauty, 
but states of feeling, and of thought 
coloured by feeling, under the excitement 
of beauty. They seemed to me to be the 
very culture of the feelings, which I was 
in quest of. In them I seemed to draw from 
a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and 
imaginative pleasure, which could be shared 
by all human beings. . . . (Autobiography 
89)
The salve for Mill's intellectual wounds came from 
Wordsworth's poetry, and it came in the exact way that 
Wordsworth intended his poems to work. Finally, in the 
autumn of 1828 Mill began to re-educate himself through the 
cultivation of feeling.3
Previous to this date, Mill's education had been 
structured for the sole purpose of building an analytic 
intellect. His education had failed to create feelings in 
"sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of 
analysis," while the whole course of his "intellectual 
cultivation had made precocious and premature analyses the 
inveterate habit of [his] mind" (Autobiography 84). But 
once Wordsworth's poetry began to educate the emotive side 
of Mill's intellect, Mill came to realize that his "habit of 
analysis" had the "tendency to wear away the feelings: as 
indeed it has when no other mental habit is cultivated, and 
the analyzing spirit remains without its natural complements 
and connectives" (Autobiography 83). Mill is arguing here 
for an education that weds an analytical mind to an emotive 
one, in order to foster the fully capable and creative mind.
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In many essays written after the advent of his fuller
intellect— after the emotional education began— Mill harshly
derides educational systems that rely on rote memorization
and "cram,” just as Wordsworth and Coleridge had before him.
In "On Genius," for instance, Mill bemoans the wide-spread
tendency to teach this way:
Modern education is all cram— Latin cram, 
mathematical cram, literary cram, political 
cram, theological cram, moral cram. The 
world already knows everything, and has 
only to tell it to its children, who, on 
their part, have only to hear, and lay it 
to rote (not to heart). (Literary Essays 
44)
Although in this essay, Mill advocates an education similar 
to that of the ancient Romans and Greeks, it is on the 
grounds that education at that time consisted "not in giving 
what is called knowledge, that is, grinding down other men's 
ideas to a convenient size, and administering them in the 
form of cram," but on "a series of exercises to form the 
thinking faculty itself, that the mind, being active and 
vigourous, might go forth and know" (Literary Essays 40).
Just as Wordsworth believed that many teachers were 
"guides and wardens of our faculties" who "would control all 
accidents" and "confine us down like engines," just as he 
believed that an education of cram and memorization led to 
students who could do no more than parrot back the facts 
force-fed them by instructors, Mill argued that rote
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memorization resulted in pupils unable to form an opinion of
their own. In "On Genius," Mill wrote:
At school, what is the child taught, except 
to repeat by rote, or at most to apply 
technical rules, which are lodged, not in 
his reason, but in his memory? When he 
leaves school, does not everything conspire 
to tell him, that it is not expected he 
shall think, but only that he shall profess 
no opinion on any subject different than 
that professed by other people? (Literary 
Essays 43)
Like Coleridge and Wordsworth, Mill knew that what should be 
required is "not to be indoctrinated, is not to be taught 
other people's opinions, but to be induced and enabled to 
think for themselves" (Letter to Rev. Carr Literary Essays 
304).
In the Autobiography, Mill stresses even further the
problems that arise in an education of cram:
Most boys or youths who have had much 
knowledge drilled into them, have their 
mental capacities not strengthened, but 
overlaid by it. They are crammed with mere 
facts, and with the opinions or phrases of 
other people, and these are accepted as a 
substitute for the power to form opinions 
of their own. And thus, the sons of 
eminent fathers, who have spared no pains 
in their education, so often grow up mere 
parroters of what they have learnt, 
incapable of using their minds except in 
the furrows traced for them. (20)
We might think this passage a perfectly drawn portrait of
Mill and his education, since, after all, he was educated
for the purpose of carrying on devoutly the ideas of his
father and Bentham. Mill did so without much reflection
69
until after his breakdown and return to health. Throughout 
his writings Mill comments that he had not a creative mind 
or genius like his father and Mr. Bentham, but that he had a 
mind trained only for interpretation and analysis.
And almost as though J.S. Mill could hear Wordsworth 
and Coleridge pointing to him as an example of everything 
wrong with education, Mill explains that his education did 
contain valuable aspects that would be found in 
Wordsworthian and Coleridgeian schemes. Perhaps the most 
important to Mill is that his education was not as passive 
as we might be inclined to think. It was active in that, 
according to Mill, his father never just doled out facts and 
answers:
Mine, however, was not an education of 
cram. My father never permitted anything 
which I learnt, to degenerate into a mere 
exercise of memory. He strove to make the 
understanding not go along with every step 
of the teaching, but if possible, precede 
it. Anything which could be found out by 
thinking, I never was told, until I had 
exhausted my efforts to find it out for 
mysel f. (Autobiography 20)
Unlike Wordsworth and Coleridge, Mill does not object to
being introduced to all the "branches of science and
philosophy" as a mere child. In fact, he does not believe
that any "scientific teaching ever was more thorough,"
or better fitted for training the 
faculties, then the mode in which logic and 
political economy were taught to me by my 
father. Striving, even in an exaggerated 
degree, to call forth the activity of my
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faculties, by making me find out everything 
for myself, he gave his explanations not 
before, but after, I had felt the full 
force of the difficulties. (Autobiography 
19)
Mill objects not to what he studied, but to what was left 
out of his education: normal childhood activity, an 
appreciation of beauty, and the cultivation of feeling and 
the imagination.
John Stuart Mill carried forth the ideas of Wordsworth 
and Coleridge in his own writings, and as we will soon see, 
these Romantic assumptions reappear in twentieth century 
composition scholars. Certainly these ideas included those 
of a theory of poetics, as when he writes in "What is 
Poetry?" that the poet's task is to be sincere, to give a 
truthful picture of his own feelings and state of mind. But 
they also include those ideas pertinent to a philosophy of 
education. From Wordsworth and Coleridge, Mill understood 
that the mind cannot thrive if the analytical intellect is 
severed from imagination and feelings. Having learned this, 
Mill's Autobiography, as Jack Stillinger points out, 
"focuses on the role of the imagination in the growth of the 
Philosophic mind (xii)," and by the time Mill gives the St. 
Andrews Inaugural Address in 1867, he insists that there are 
three interrelated parts that make up a full education: 
"intellectual education, moral education, and the education 
of feelings" (Mill on Education 189). Wordsworth's and
71
Coleridge's hope for an education that will nurture an 
encompassing intellect inspired Mill to incorporate what he 
learned from them with his own educative experiences. In 
his writings he passed on to us the Romantics' desire to 
cultivate a vital and imaginative mind.
Matthew Arnold (1822-1838)
Matthew Arnold found much fault with the literary and 
critical theories of the Romantic age which preceded his own 
Victorian era. Arnold believed Wordsworth to be limited in 
many ways and he felt Wordsworth was wrong to ignore the 
"modern situation" by turning back to the past in his last 
years. Arnold read Coleridge but he says very little 
specifically about him, and what he does say is for the most 
part negative. Moreover, Arnold thought that what he 
believed to be the "Romantic cult of the individual" was a 
"dangerous extension of prevailing English provinciality and 
cultural anarchism" (Gottfried 3, 50). Nonetheless, he was 
well acquainted with the work of the Romantics, and in spite 
of his differences with them and his dismissal of many of 
their ideas, his own poetry and his philosophical position 
on education bears the mark of a Romantic contribution.4
Wordsworth was particularly influential for Arnold's 
thought. Arnold himself cites Wordsworth as one of four
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leading influences on his thought and life, and he refers 
often to Wordsworth in his letters, notebooks, and essays, 
and celebrates Wordsworth in a laudatory essay. Wordsworth 
was also a close friend of Arnold/s father and the older 
poet spent a fair amount of time with the Arnolds.5
Arnold shared more than the writing of poetry and 
criticism with the older generation of Romantics. He also 
shared a deep concern for teaching and the state of 
education that is reflected in his essays and reports on the 
status of British education written during his tour as 
Inspector of Schools. Arnold's tenure as School Inspector 
began in 1851, and although he was not particularly pleased 
with the appointment, he went on to make it his life's work. 
His observation of education systems included not only 
English schools, but those on the continent as well. In 
1865 the Schools Enquiry Commissioners assigned him the duty 
of investigating the educational system for the middle and 
upper classes in France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. 
Like Wordsworth, Arnold was interested in a national 
education, and his time as School Inspector resulted in many 
arguments for the changes he saw as necessary to ensure a 
system of education that was workable for the English 
masses.
As Arnold toured the schools of the continent and 
Britain, he saw still in place many of the problems that
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moved Wordsworth and Coleridge to take a stand on the state
of national education in England. Like Coleridge, for
instance, he railed heartily against an educational system
that tried to force knowledge of a factual kind into the
minds of children at too early an age.6 In his report on the
French schools, Arnold praised the French system for
recognizing the intellectual limitations of children by not
pushing competitive examinations upon the pupils, and he
condemned the English system for its misuse of exams. The
English school system's insensitivity to the intellectual
limitations of young minds, in Arnold's view, had the same
effect that Mill objected to in what he calls the "education
of cram." Inappropriate testing had damaging results:
The French have plenty of examinations; but 
they put them almost entirely at the right 
age for examinations . . .  To put to little 
boys of nine or ten the pressure of a 
competitive examination . . .  is to offer a 
premium for the violation of nature's 
elementary laws, and to sacrifice, as in 
the poor geese fatted for Strasbourg pies, 
the due development of all organs of life 
to the premature hypertrophy of one.
(Schools and Universities on the Continent 
92)
This premature "hypertrophy" means that the students will 
never reach a higher intellect capable of judgment, 
comparison, and synthesis.
When Arnold speaks harshly of examinations he is not 
condemning them entirely, in fact, his observations of 
German schools, where exams were completely foregone,
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convinced him that examinations can be useful. His negative
criticism of the examinations given in the English schools
is that of Coleridge and Wordsworth before him— they are
used to the wrong ends. In his Reports on Elementary
Schools, Arnold points out that exams do not necessarily
test any real knowledge that students might or might not
have. He recalls children getting through the Revised Code
examinations in "reading, writing, and ciphering, without
really knowing how to read and cipher":
To take the commonest instance: a book is 
of a certain standard; all the year the 
children read this book over and over 
again, and no other. When the Inspector 
comes they are presented to read in this 
book; they can read their sentence or two 
fluently enough, but they cannot read any 
other book fluently. . . the circle of the 
children's reading has thus been narrowed 
and impoverished all the year for the sake 
of a result at the end of it, and the 
result is an illusion. (219-20)
In other words, knowledge for knowledge's sake was
sacrificed to a system that requested the memorization of a
few facts and techniques that could be coughed up on
request. Learning, in effect, has come to a standstill.
Arnold, through his first-hand observations of the
English school system, records further damage that is done
by propelling children through a system that does not allow
for natural growth and focuses too heavily on examinations:
nervous exhaustion at fifteen is the price 
which many a clever boy pays for over­
stimulation at ten; and the nervous
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exhaustion of a number of our clever boys 
tends to create a broad reign of 
intellectual deadness in the mass of youths 
from fifteen to twenty, who the clever 
boys, had they been rightly developed and 
not unnaturally forced, ought to have 
leavened. (Schools and Universities 92-93).
Arnold's concern with an "unnatural" intellectual growth
recalls Coleridge's belief that education should be an act
of educing, of calling forth; "as the blossom is educed from
the bud, the vital excellencies are within; the acorn is but
educed or brought forth from the bud" (Collected Works of
STC Vol. 5 585). Arnold's argument is also reminiscent of
arguments made by Wordsworth in The Prelude, which was
published the year before Arnold began his tour as
Inspector. In a well-known passage from Book V of The
Prelude, Wordsworth celebrates his escape from such an
education:
yet I rejoice.
And, by these thoughts admonished, will pour
out
Thanks with uplifted heart, that I was reared 
Safe from an evil which these days have laid 
Upon the children of the land, a pest,
That might have dried me up, body and soul.
(V 224-229)
Arnold recognizes, in the "nervous exhaustion" of students, 
Mill's education of "cram" and the same debilitating 
educational system that Wordsworth was lucky to have 
escaped. He felt that the British examinations not only did 
not test any significant knowledge, but worse, that they 
resulted in "intellectual deadness." If wrongly and
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untimely administered, examinations obscure the "true aim" 
of schools: "to develop our mind and to give us access to 
vital knowledge" (schools and Universities 299).
This last phrase of Arnold's resoundingly echoes much 
in the educational theories of both Coleridge and 
Wordsworth. Coleridge, for example, separated "education" 
from "instruction" as it was commonly applied in the 
classroom. As David Calleo writes of Coleridge's stance: 
"True knowledge is not merely information or skill. It is 
the ability to see the fullness of things in their proper 
relation. It results in the ability to avoid partial view 
and thus to achieve a balanced and sane judgment" (Coleridge 
and the Idea of the Modern State 122-23). Learning does not 
take place through examinations or the mere instruction of 
facts. It comes, as Wordsworth argues, through the 
cultivating of the "vital soul," and as Coleridge suggests, 
through "vital excellencies"— terms quite similar to 
Arnold's "vital knowledge." Without an education that 
promotes access to the cultivation of "vital knowledge," the 
"truly educated mind," the encompassing intellect will never 
be achieved.
In their hope for a synthesizing mind at the end of the 
educational journey, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Arnold also 
share thoughts on what is necessary to make the encompassing 
intellect a possible outcome for students. For all of them
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the role of the teacher is to do "as much towards opening
their mind, and opening their soul and imagination, as is
possible to be done with a number of children of their age
and in their state of preparation and home surroundings"
(Reports from Elementary Schools 238), or as Mill describes
it, to prepare students to "go forth and know." Arnold,
like Wordsworth and Coleridge, makes clear that the
curriculum should advance this vital knowledge by "educing"
active participation from students. He writes of elementary
education that "a great deal of the work in elementary
schools must necessarily be of a mechanical kind." But in
order to counter-balance the mechanical aspects of the
curriculum, Arnold argues for "creative activity":
whatever introduces any sort of creative 
activity to relieve the passive reception 
of knowledge is valuable. The kindergarten 
exercises are useful for this reason, the 
management of tools is useful, drawing is 
useful, singing is useful. (Reports from 
Elementary Schools 226)
Whereas Wordsworth, and Coleridge to a lesser extent, would
claim both a student's interaction with nature and reading
as a part of this counter-balance, they do not suggest
specific classroom activities. Arnold, however, focuses
more on the actual pedagogical techniques as his position of
School Inspector requires him to do. Thus, Arnold speaks of
drawing and singing in the early curriculum, and reading,
particularly poetry, as the pupil advances through the
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years.
Arnold desires the same movement toward creativity, 
imagination, and the encompassing intellect as Wordsworth 
and Coleridge do. And like them Arnold believes this 
movement is achieved, at least in part, through literature, 
which has a humanizing and moving effect. As he makes clear 
in an 1860 report on the elementary schools, Arnold was not 
against pupils reading, but against them reading "dry 
scientific" writings of an "inferior order" (215). He 
argues that in the everyday subjects of the curriculum 
(reading, writing, grammar, geography, history, etc.) that 
the teacher's design of instruction should be governed by 
the "aim of calling forth, by some means or other, in every 
pupil a sense of pleasurable activity and of creation; [the 
teacher and student] should resist being made a mere ladder 
with 'information'" (Reports 227).
In the same report, Arnold claims that the teaching of
poetry is a valuable and necessary part of the curriculum
because it is the one thing that can ensure the stimulation
of creative activity. It is Wordsworth he turns to to make
his point:
Wordsworth says, "To be incapable of a 
feeling of poetry, in my sense of the word, 
is to be without love of human nature and 
reverence for God." And it is only through 
acquaintance with poetry, and with good 
poetry, that this "feeling of poetry" can 
be given . . .  it [poetry] inspires the
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emotions so helpful in making principles 
operative. (Reports 223-24)
The importance that Arnold gives to "the emotions" is
noteworthy here. He is suggesting, with distinctly Romantic
language, a distinctly Romantic idea: that emotions are
necessary for a full intellect to become "operative." In a
curriculum where memorization is the major instructive mode,
the mind is dulled unless there is an exercise of
"pleasurable" and "creative activity . . . quite different
from the effort of learning a list of words to spell, or a
list of flesh-making and heat-giving foods, or a list of
capes and bays, or a list of reigns and battles, and capable
of greatly relieving the strain from learning these and of
affording a lively pleasure" (Reports 226). Although we
need not agree with Arnold that poetry is the only or best
way to make all, including the imaginative, "principles
operative," his point is nonetheless important: that at
least some of the mechanical exercises in school must be
replaced with those which open the mind and soul through
"vital knowledge."
There is yet another affinity among Coleridge,
Wordsworth, and Arnold. When drawing some further thoughts
together in a general conclusion to Schools and
Universities, Arnold describes what good instruction should
and should not entail:
The aim and office of instruction, say many 
people, is to make a man a good citizen, or
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a good Christian, or a gentleman; or it is 
to fit him to get on in the world, or it is 
to enable him to do his duty in that state 
of life to which he is called. It is none 
of these, and the modern spirit more and 
more discerns it to be none of these.
These are at best secondary and indirect 
aims of instruction; its prime direct aim 
is to enable a man to know himself and the 
world. Such knowledge is the only sure 
basis for action, and this basis it is the 
true aim and office of education to supply.
(Schools and Universities 290).
Arnold/s position here bears a distinct resemblance to
Coleridge's argument for self-reflective knowledge, and as
will later become clear, it anticipates the current
express ivists' concern with writing from and for the self.
As passages previously quoted from the Aids to Reflection
indicate, Coleridge believes that without reflection an
essential means to knowledge in its fullest sense is
missing. Self-reflection and self-knowledge are certainly a
part of Wordsworth's profile for the fully educated mind. In
fact, in his view it is that ability which nurtures the
strongest intellect of all— the intellect of the creative
poet. It is also in knowing oneself, then, that the
educational theories of Arnold, and of Wordsworth and
Coleridge converge.
Although the means each urges by which students should 
achieve a schooling that promotes the growth of a 
philosophic mind might differ slightly on various points, it 
is clear that Matthew Arnold, like Wordsworth and Coleridge
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before him, sought a restructuring of the educational system 
in order to allow for that growth. He joined with 
Wordsworth and Coleridge in the belief that reading is an 
important part of intellectual growth, but that it is 
usually forced upon the students in such ways as to "only 
increase a child's stock of what is called information" 
rather than to "contribute to the opening of the soul and 
imagination" (Reports 239). Arnold agrees that the 
"philosophic mind" is gained through self-reflection and 
self-knowledge, and that the true aim of education is to 
develop the powers of the mind and to give students access 
to vital knowledge" (Schools and Universities 299). All 
three poets believe that knowledge in its fullest sense 
takes place through activity and creativity of the mind. In 
an 1874 report on the elementary schools, Arnold reminds his 
readers that "the animation of mind, the multiplying of 
ideas, the promptness to connect, in thoughts, one thing 
with another, are what are wanted" (221). This statement of 
Arnold's could easily be attributed to Wordsworth or 
Coleridge, so close is it in thought and phrasing to many of 
their statements on learning and the imagination.
John Dewev (1859-1952^
In discussing this next educator, John Dewey, I have 
moved, albeit rather rapidly, from Victorian England to
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modern America. Although this leap might seem a vast one, 
Dewey is one of America's most renowned philosophers and he 
wrote prolifically on American education. He is, in many 
ways, one of the few American counterparts to the British 
philosophers and intellectuals like Mill and Arnold. 
Moreover, as we will see, he shares key philosophical ideas 
with the Romantics and with Mill and Arnold, which, X 
believe, become part of the general theoretical pool from 
which expressivist rhetoricians draw.
If we were to distill one basic concept of his
philosophy from all of his writings it would be his belief
that learning is a social process. Dewey is often seen as
the forefather of social constructivism. He believes in
collaborative learning and that as humans we are shaped by
our culture:
through the influence of the social 
environment each person becomes saturated 
with the customs, beliefs, the purposes, 
skills, hopes and fears of the cultural 
group to which he belongs. The features of 
even his physical surroundings come to him 
through the eyes and ears of the 
community." (Education Today 295)
Since, as the previous passage indicates, Dewey appears to
be a social philosopher, it might seem strange that I find
him crucial to the history of Romantic educational
philosophies that I am constructing here. If we remember,
however, that my purpose is not to build a case for Dewey as
a Romantic, but rather to show how certain aspects of
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Romantic philosophies have been handed down to current 
educators and teachers of writing, the connections I will 
make here remain important.
The extent of Dewey's familiarity with Romantic thought 
is probably best encapsulated in Art as Experience. It 
becomes clear in this book that Dewey was well versed in the 
writings and theories of Schiller, Blake, Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Lamb, and Hazlitt, to name a few. 
Although Dewey cautions against erring by accepting too 
unthinkingly Romantic theories of art because, he suggests, 
they can go beyond "individual” to "eccentric" (286), he 
nonetheless holds a primarily expressive theory of art. He 
believes, for instance, in the "inherent role of 
individuality in the matter of a work of art" (286), the 
importance of perception and individual experience to art, 
and in the Romantic version of the creative imagination.
Dewey writes forcefully in defense of experience and 
perception in Art and Experience. "It is mere ignorance," 
he argues, "that leads them [critics of expressivism] to the 
supposition that the connection of art and esthetic 
perception with experience signifies a lowering of their 
[the works of art] significance and dignity" (25). Dewey 
argues as an expressivist when he suggests, in antithesis, 
that "Experience . . .  is heightened vitality" (25). In
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other words, experience is vital and it enables the creation 
of art and knowledge. Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, Dewey 
sees the act of experiencing taking place, at least in part, 
through "perception” and participation with the world. 
According to Dewey, the senses are the way in which a "live 
creature participates directly with the ongoings of the 
world" (28). And again, we are reminded of Arnold's call 
for "creative principles" and Mill's desire to "go forth and 
know." This perception and participation, then, leads to 
experience, which in Dewey's argument leads to art.
He also makes the case, as Wordsworth and Coleridge do, 
that perception is more than mere nonparticipatory 
recognition, more than senses being bombarded by an external 
world; it is not completely passive. Dewey writes that 
"perception replaces bare recognition." In this replacement 
there is "an act of reconstructive doing and consciousness 
[which] becomes fresh and alive" (Art as Experience 59). It 
is this act of "reconstructive perception" that Wordsworth 
writes of in "Tintern Abbey"; "with gleams of half- 
extinguished thought, / With many recognitions dim and faint 
. . . / The picture of the mind revives again: / . . . not 
only with the sense / Of present pleasure, but with pleasing 
thoughts / That in this moment there is life and food / For 
future years" (53-65). What Wordsworth remembers and 
comforts himself with as he stands on the banks of the Wye
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is the knowledge that through an active perception in the 
present, he can reconstruct the perception of the past, and 
his memory and experience will always be able to become 
"fresh and alive."
Dewey's "undergoing phase of experience" is receptive 
but not passive. "It involves surrender. But adequate 
yielding of the self . . . through a controlled activity
that may well be intense" (Art as Experience 59). What 
Dewey has described here is particularly fitting to 
Wordsworth's "wise passiveness" and "spots of time," where 
the poet receives Nature in all her power, surrendering to 
the force of "dizzying raptures" so that the world wheels by 
with great intensity. When older and a poet, Wordsworth 
reconstructed his art from the "yielding of self" to 
experience.
Also apparent in Dewey's explanation of undergoing 
experience as it relates to art is the importance of a 
spontaneous overflow of feeling which both he and Wordsworth 
find necessary for artistic expression. Dewey, however, is 
not satisfied that the experience itself will lead to art; 
art is not just the overflow of spontaneous emotion, but 
contemplated spontaneous feeling. Dewey enlists Wordsworth 
to explain that it is the spontaneous overflow of "emotion 
recollected in tranquillity" that leads to expression (75), 
a concept we shall see that is crucial to current 
expressivist theory as well.
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Dewey's tie to Wordsworth and Coleridge is also seen in
his discussion of the imagination. In Art as Experience,
Dewey bases his ideas about imaginative experience on
Romantic theories of the imagination, in fact, he cites
Coleridge on the "esemplastic Imagination”:
"The poet," he said, "diffuses a tone and 
spirit of unity that (as it were) fuses 
each to each the faculties of the soul with 
the subordination of each according to 
relative dignity and worth, by the 
synthetic and magical power to which I 
would exclusively appropriate the name of 
Imagination." (272)
Dewey notes of this passage that Coleridge used "the
vocabulary of his generation" which referred to the
faculties and imagination as separate. Although he
disagrees with Coleridge's "verbal mode" in this definition,
Dewey agrees with Coleridge's meaning of the "imaginative
experience" (Art as Experience 272).
Dewey's own description of the imagination is Romantic
in flavor. He sees the imagination as animating, feeling,
and actively composing an "integral whole":
it designates a quality that animates and 
pervades all processes of making and 
observation. It is a way of seeing and 
feeling things as they compose an integral 
whole. It is the large and generous 
blending of interests at the point where 
the mind comes in contact with the world.
When the old and familiar things are made 
new in experience there is imagination.
(Art as Experience 271)
Dewey's language echoes Coleridge's explanation of the
Primary and Secondary Imagination from the Biographia
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Literaria: we can pair Dewey's "animates,” "pervades,"
"observation," and "blending of interest" to make "old"
things "new" with Coleridge's creative Imagination. Dewey's
description of the imagination also recalls Wordsworth's
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads. Dewey's statement "when the
old and familiar things are made new in experience there is
imagination" is an apt understanding of Wordsworth's project
in the Lyrical Ballads:
The principal object, then, proposed in 
these Poems was to choose incidents and 
situations from common life, and to relate 
or describe them, throughout, as far as was 
possible in a selection of language really 
used by men, and, at the same time, to 
throw over them a certain colouring of 
imagination, whereby ordinary things should 
be presented to the mind in an unusual 
aspect[.] (Preface to the Lyrical Ballads)
Wordsworth is reconstructing the familiar language of the
"common man" so we can experience it anew; he has, in
Dewey's terms, taken "old and familiar things" and made them
"new in experience." By throwing over the common language
of the common man a "certain colouring of imagination,"
Wordsworth's mind has, as Dewey writes, "come in contact
with the world."
Dewey's earlier work of 1887, Psychology, which he 
states is a book "expressly for use in class-room 
instruction," looks, by its table of contents, much like an 
argument for faculty psychology. But, as he writes of 
perception, memory, imagination, thinking, intuition,
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feeling, and the will as interrelated processes, it begins
to look more like a Romantic manifesto. Here he
distinguishes among the "Mechanical Imagination," "Fancy,"
and the "Creative Imagination." "The Mechanical
Imagination," he says, "proceeds by the laws of association
and dissociation . . ." while the Fancy "throws itself about
all things, and connects them together, through the medium
of feeling . . .  It affords keen delight rather than serves
as an organ of penetration" (Psychology 171). Different
still, according to Dewey, is the Creative Imagination,
which is not confined to isolation and 
combination of experiences already had, 
even when these processes occur under the 
influence of sensitive and lively emotion.
It is virtually creative. It makes its 
object new by setting it in a new light. It 
separates and combines, indeed; but its 
separations and combinations are not the 
result of mechanical processes, not of the 
feeling of the moment. They are filled 
with a direct and spontaneous sense of the 
relative values of detail in reference to 
the whole. (Psychology 171).
As in Art as Experience, Dewey's descriptions of the
imaginative experience and the lesser powers of the
Mechanical Imagination and the Fancy are essentially those
of Wordsworth and of Coleridge. If we recall Wordsworth's
discussion of spontaneity, of "separating unity into number"
and "consolidating number into unity," as well as
Coleridge's "dissolving" in order to "unify," the Romantic
influences on Dewey's thought become more apparent. Dewey
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also finds an understanding of imaginative processes 
necessary and important to class-room instruction, 
reinforcing, it seems to me, Coleridge's and Wordsworth's, 
as well as Mill and Arnold's, instistence on the importance 
of the creative imagination within the educational arena.
Many of Dewey's educational ideas correspond, in fact,
to those of Wordsworth and Coleridge's. Again, I am not
suggesting that Dewey accepted all aspects of Romantic
educational theory. He makes a point of saying that he does
not. He made explicit objections, for instance, to the use
of the analogy of the development of a seed into the full-
grown plant, an analogy he ascribes to Rousseau but which
was pervasive among English Romantic poets.7 Dewey believed
that the "growth of a seed is limited as compared with that
of a human being . . .It has not got the capacities for
growth in different directions toward different outcomes
that are characteristic of the more flexible and richly
endowed human young" (Education Today 289). He also objects
to the more "exaggerated parts of Rousseau's doctrines":
sentimental idealization of the child's 
immaturity, irrational denial of superior 
worth in the knowledge and mature 
experience of the adult, deliberate denial 
of the worth of the ends and instruments 
embodied in social organization.
Deification of childish whim, unripened 
fancy, and arbitrary emotion is certainly a 
piece of pure romanticism. (Education Today 
69)
90
It is clear from the tone of this passage that Dewey does 
not accept "romanticism" when it is defined in terms of 
"whim" or "arbitrary emotion," and although Dewey does not 
directly address these criticisms to Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, he surely would have objected to Wordsworth's 
belief in the child as a Philosopher. Coleridge, however, 
was much more closely aligned to Dewey's way of thinking on 
this issue, and he himself takes Wordsworth to task. In the 
Intimation Ode, Wordsworth suggests that the child is by 
nature a philosopher. In Book XXII of the Biographia 
Literaria, however, Coleridge disagrees with Wordsworth and 
writes:
In what sense is a child of that age a 
philosopher? In what sense does he read 
"the eternal deep"? In what sense is he 
declared to be "for ever haunted" by the 
Superior Being, or so inspired as to 
deserve the splendid title of a mighty 
prophet, a blessed seer? by reflection? by 
knowledge? by conscious intuition? or by 
any form or modification of consciousness?
(Walsh 18-19)
Like Dewey, Coleridge finds this particular position on 
childhood a "sentimental idealization" and a "deification" 
of the child. Although Coleridge shares a belief in natural 
development of the child with Dewey, Dewey differs not only 
from Coleridge but from Arnold and Mill as well, because he 
was reading about "experimental" and "emergence" psychology. 
In fact, he was beginning to establish a theory of 
"developmental" psychology.
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Nevertheless, in spite of a more socially focused 
educational philosophy and certain objections to Romantic 
analogies and ideas, Dewey repeats many of Wordsworth's and 
Coleridge's arguments against the old traditions of 
schooling. He argues against a method of education that saw 
the mind of the student, in a metaphor that Coleridge might 
particularly have liked, as a "phonographic disc upon which 
certain impressions were made by the teacher, so when the 
disc was put on the machine and the movement started. . .it 
might reveal what was described upon it" (Education Today 
242). In antithesis to this traditional schooling, Dewey 
argued for a child-centered curriculum and progressive 
schools which, I believe, draw heavily from a Romantic 
philosophy of education.
A passage from Dewey's "Progressive Education and the
Science of Education" will help illuminate my point, in
arguing for Progressive schools, Dewey writes that they
"exhibit as compared to traditional schools"
a common emphasis upon respect for 
individuality and for increased freedom; a 
common disposition to build upon the nature 
and experience of the boys and girls that 
come to them, instead of imposing from 
without external subject-matter and 
standards . . . Emphasis upon activity as 
distinct from passivity is one of the 
common factors. (John Dewey on Education:
Selected Writings 170)
Three of the basic elements crucial to an educational theory
grounded in Romantic philosophy, the importance of the
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individual, personal experience, and an emphasis on activity 
as opposed to passivity, are advanced in this passage.
Even though Dewey never forgets that individuals are 
culturally shaped, he remains adamant in his belief that the 
individual and individuality are important. Like the 
Romantics, Dewey realized that the individual was being lost 
in modern industrial society. He urged a firm stand against 
the suppression of the individual, and he argued that the 
only way to fight against this suppression was by looking 
inward. In other words, the responsibility is ours as 
individuals to "cultivate our own gardens" so that we might 
make changes in society. "Looking inward" to the self also 
becomes a mainstay of expressivist pedagogy later in the 
twentieth century.
"Individualism and socialism are one," he wrote. "Only
by being true to the full growth of all the individuals who
make it up, can society by any chance be true to itself"
(The School and Society 7). Dewey wishes to underscore the
value of individuality, and in "Mediocrity and
Individuality," he argues for the use of the word
"individuality" over "individualism" in order to make clear
that his focus on the individual is positive:
Individualism is about the most ambiguous 
word in the entire list of labels in 
ordinary use. It means anything from 
egotistically centered conduct to 
distinction and uniqueness. It is possible 
to say that excessive individualism is an
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outstanding curse of American civilization, 
and that absence of individualism is our 
marked deficiency. When the former remark 
is made, economic and legal conditions are 
in mind; when the latter, intellectual life 
is in question. Individuality is a surer 
word; it carries with it a connotation of 
uniqueness of quality, or at least of 
distinctiveness. It suggests a freedom 
which is not . . . external but which is 
intrinsic and constructive. (Education 
Today 164)
It was this same need for "intrinsic" and "constructive" 
freedom in an ever growing industrial society prone to 
suppressing individuality that spurred the Romantics to 
their reliance on, and defense of, the individual. Thus, 
what became important was the uniqueness and individual 
processes of mind that lay behind their art.
The importance of the individual is one of the basic 
concepts underlying Dewey's argument for Progressive schools 
and child-centered learning. To change from the receptive 
education promoted by the "pipeline" or "phonographic disc" 
method of teaching to a creative and active education, 
requires, according to Dewey, "studying and treating 
individuals in their distinctive and unique qualities" 
(Education Today 69). The question of the place of 
experience in the role of education is not, in practice, 
separate from that of the role of individuality. Dewey sees 
experience as the foundation which will lead to an education 
that honors individuality, an active rather than passive 
education, and which can eventually lead to the sort of
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educated intellect that Wordsworth calls the "philosophical 
mind." "Moral and intellectual powers increase in vigor," 
says Dewey, when a "spontaneous interest and desire to 
accomplish something are behind them" (Education Today 79).
In Dewey's educational scheme, experience becomes the 
motivation for learning. A typical evil that Dewey finds 
prevalent in traditional schools is the lack of any positive 
motivation. Since "the lack of any organic connection with 
what the child has seen and felt and loved makes the 
material purely formal and symbolic" (The Child and the 
Curriculum 24), the learner has no connection or interaction 
with the material and cannot learn in the true sense of the 
word. The student can merely parrot back what has been read 
or heard. As Coleridge argues, true learning is organic, is 
"educed" and not externally imposed.
In The Child and Curriculum, Dewey argues that if the 
"subject-matter . . .  be such as to have an appropriate 
place within the expanding consciousness of the child, if it 
grows out of his own past doings, thinkings, sufferings 
. . .no device or trick of method has to be resorted to in 
order to enlist interest" (27). This is exactly 
Wordsworth's point when he writes disdainfully of his 
Cambridge education where academic prizes became the "trick 
of method." It is also Coleridge's point when he responds 
with such ire against the Lancastrian system of punishment.
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Dewey is in complete agreement with Wordsworth and Coleridge
when he argues that
the externally presented material, 
conceived and generated in standpoints and 
attitudes remote from the child, and 
developed in motives alien to him, has no 
such place of its own. Hence the recourse 
to adventitious leverage to push it in, to 
factitious drill to drive it in, to 
artificial bribe to lure it in. (The Child 
and Curriculum 27).
For Dewey, as for Wordsworth, Coleridge, Mill, and Arnold,
experience generated through perception and an organic
connection between child and subject matter is the more
beneficial path to knowledge than the external method of
drilling facts into passive brains.
Dewey also shares with Wordsworth and Coleridge the 
same educational means by which to gain the experience so 
crucial to the encompassing intellect: interaction with 
nature. In "Democracy in Education," Dewey suggests that in 
order to "free the processes of mental growth," "the child 
[should be taken] out of doors, widening and organizing his 
experiences with reference to the world . . No real
knowledge is gained about nature, for example, unless it is 
"nature study when pursued as a vital observation of forces 
working under their natural conditions, plants and animals 
growing in their own homes, instead of mere discussion of 
dead specimens" (Education Today 71).
Just as Wordsworth suggests it is "murder to dissect," 
Dewey rejects the analytical approach to learning about a
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subject like botany where students are "pulling these 
flowers to pieces and giving technical names to the 
different parts," without an understanding of the plant as 
a whole. And to understand it as an integral whole, the 
student must see the plant as it is in nature, must see it 
in relation to, and interaction with, the soil, water, sun 
and air. In a stance truly reminiscent of Wordsworth, Dewey 
argues that "we cannot overlook the importance for 
educational purposes of the close intimate acquaintance with 
nature at first hand," because in this interaction with 
nature comes "continual training of observation, of 
ingenuity, [of] constructive imagination . . . "  (The School 
and Society 11). It is this point that Wordsworth makes in 
the poem "Tables Turned." To "hear the woodland linnet" has 
more of "wisdom in it," says the poet, than the "dull and 
endless strife" of books ill used. Also like Wordsworth, 
Dewey believes that books are misused in traditional 
schools. He is aligned with Wordsworth when he remarks that 
it is not a "Philistine attack upon books and reading" that 
he has in mind, that the question is not "how to get rid of 
them, but how to get their value . . . "  (Education Today 
29). In a Wordsworthian educational scheme, the student is 
miseducated if books are not tied to experience, perception, 
imaginative activity, and interaction with the world.
Because of his freedom to read what excited him, and because
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of the Hawkshead school which promoted an education of 
experience, Wordsworth was an avid reader, and, as Book V of 
The Prelude points out, his readings were of great influence 
in the shaping of his philosophical mind. Wordsworth, in 
fact, fits the description of Dewey's ideal for learning 
through reading: "the child should have a personal interest
in what is read, a personal hunger for it, and a personal 
power of satisfying this appetite" (Education Today 29).
Dewey realizes that a full intellect cannot be nurtured 
without the growth of personal experience and without 
interaction with nature, for without these, there is no 
nourishing of what Coleridge calls "vital excellencies" and 
Wordsworth the "vital soul." As Dewey talks about methods 
of learning to read he is arguing that only a "vital 
relation" to the subject at hand will breed successful 
learning: most methods "lack the essential of any well-
grounded method, namely relevancy to the child's mental 
needs. No scheme for learning to read can supply this want. 
Only . . . putting the child into vital relation to the 
materials to be read" (Education Today 28). True learning 
that moves students toward an encompassing intellect must 
arise out of the cultivation of Wordsworth's "vital soul," 
Coleridge's "vital excellencies," and out of what Dewey 
calls "vital relations" and "vital observations." If this 
is neglected, the student will lack what Dewey has called
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"spontaneous interest" and will instead be "thrown into a 
passive, receptive, or absorbing" educational setting where 
true learning cannot take place. (Education Today 13).
Like Arnold, Dewey further incorporates Romantic
concepts in his view that "reflection" is a crucial aspect
of the journey toward the encompassing intellect. He makes
his belief in this matter clear in an essay entitled "Why
Reflective Thinking Must Be an Educational Aim." Like
Coleridge, he finds that the reflective mind is a
prerequisite to the truly educated intellect:
A person who has gained the power of 
reflective attention, the power to hold 
problems, questions, before the mind, is in 
so far, intellectually speaking, educated.
He has mental discipline— power of the mind 
and for the mind. (The School and Society 
147).
Coleridge in Aids to Reflection makes similar points and 
urges his readers to "Reflect on . . . thoughts, actions, 
circumstances . . . "  because not to engage in reflection 
results in a mind unable to make connections, unable to 
observe the whole. And as Dewey seconds, "reflective 
thinking is a process of detecting relations . . ." 
(Education Today 247).8
Coleridge suggests that through reflection we will 
nourish a sense of "distinction" and cultivate a questioning 
and active mind. In The School and Society, Dewey makes an 
almost identical argument:
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True reflective attention, on the other 
hand, always involves judging, reasoning, 
deliberation; it means that the child has a 
question of his own and is actively engaged 
in seeking and selecting relevant material
with which to answer it, consider the
bearings and relations of this 
material . . . .  (148) [original emphasis]
The questioning that arises out of reflection leads to
Coleridge's sense of "distinction" which is like Dewey's
selecting of "relevant material." Finally, for Dewey as for
Coleridge, self-reflection and reflective thinking are
necessary ingredients to intellectual success. In "The
Process and Product of Reflective Activity: Psychological
Process and Logical Form," Dewey wrote that something is
"achieved through conquering, by personal reflection, the
difficulties that prevent immediate overflow into action and
spontaneous success" (Selected Writings 257), or as Arnold
puts it, reflection and self-knowledge are prerequisites to
action.
In John Dewey's educational stance on Progressive 
schools and child-centered curricula, we find many 
affinities with the Romantics' philosophy on education and 
learning. Dewey argued for Progressive schools, for 
instance, because he believed, as did Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, that the traditional schools were "hostile to 
genuine mental activity and to sincere emotional expression 
and growth" (Selected Writings 170-71). He also objected to 
the "separation and compartmentalization of emotion and
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thought, practice from insight, imagination from 'executive 
doing'" (Art as Experience 27). Dewey felt that the mind 
could not be educated to its fullest potential in 
traditional schools because method relied on Mill's version 
of "cram": passivity, drills, and reason separated from
emotion. Thus, like the Romantics, he sought an education 
that fosters emotion and imagination in conjunction with 
analysis and reason.
Not only does Dewey define the same problems with the 
school systems as do Wordsworth and Coleridge, but he offers 
the same solution when he suggests the "introduction of more 
active, expressive, and self-directing factors" (The School 
and Society 29). Dewey is incorporating Romantic ideas into 
his own philosophy. As he writes his educational arguments 
for us, he keeps alive some of the ideas articulated by 
Wordsworth and Coleridge more than a generation earlier. 
Clearly Dewey is passing on some of the most important 
concepts and ideas of a Romantic philosophy on education 
when he argues that "It is a method of discovery through 
search, through inquiry, through testing, through 
observation and reflection— all processes requiring activity 
of mind rather than merely powers of absorption and 
reproduction" (Education Today 242).
In my discussion of Arnold, Mill, and Dewey, I have 
begun to show how pervasive Romantic ideas are, and to make
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explicit part of the "tacit tradition" from which the 
current philosophies of Romantic rhetorics arise.9 I have 
attempted to illuminate how these three educators, by 
enfolding Romantic assumptions and ideas into their own, 
have carried forward certain aspects of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge's literary and educational thoughts and theories, 
and thus point to several avenues by which the Romantic 
influence has entered the realm of education and 
expressivist composition theory. I have also shown how 
Romanticism emerges even in the most unlikely of places, and 
that to reject Romantic philosophies is to discard the key 




1 This resurgence of Deweyen-like thought is 
easily seen in the 1966 Dartmouth Conference on the 
teaching of English. The conference participants 
encouraged an active rather than passive model of 
learning and emphasized self-expression in writing and 
language use.
2 M. H. Abrams has pointed out in the Mirror and
the Lamp that in the two essays "What is Poetry?" and
"The Two Kinds of Poetry," Mill relied heavily on 
Wordsworth's Preface.
3 Mill's explanation for the healing reads like a 
shortened version or paraphrase of Wordsworth's 
statement of purpose in the Preface:
to choose incidents and situations from common 
life, and to relate or describe them, throughout,
as far as was possible in a selection of language
really used by men, and at the same time, to throw 
over them a certain colouring of imagination, 
whereby ordinary things should be presented to the 
mind in an unusual aspect; and, further, and above 
all, to make these incidents and situations 
interesting by tracing them, truly though not 
ostentatiously, the primary laws of our nature: 
chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we 
associate ideas in a state of excitement. (Preface 
734)
4 Gottfried examines the Romantic influence on 
Arnold's poetry and theory of poetics.
5 At one time, Wordsworth even helped the young 
Arnold study for an examination. (Gottfried 6)
6 Coleridge argued that the growth of the 
intellect takes place in progression, that the child 
begins with a capability limited to appreciating only 
"A, and B, and C; but not ABC=X" (Inquiring Spirit 
204).
7 M.H. Abrams takes note of the importance of the 
plant metaphor to the Romantics in The Mirror and the
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Lamp.
8 Dewey had read Coleridge's Aids to Reflection 
and occasionally quotes from this work.
9 Perhaps more than one reader will have noticed 
that as this history has unfolded I have neglected to 
mention the role that the American counterparts to the 
British Romantics might play in past or current 
Romantic educational philosophies and rhetorics. I am 
thinking specifically here of the American 
Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson. But since I am 
not giving a full trajectory or geneology of Romantic 
ideas in educational thought and practice, Emerson need 
not be a major figure in my study. Further, James 
Berlin has already noted Emerson's tie to Romantic 
rhetorics and to the practices being established in 
current composition textbooks by teachers such as Ken 
Macrorie, William Coles, and Donald Stewart. (See 
Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American 
Colleges and the 1982 CE article, "Contemporary 
Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories".)
I am inclined to remind readers, however, that 
Emerson himself is directly shaped by the influence of 
the British Romantics, and especially by Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge. As the American critic F.O. Matthiessen 
points out in the acclaimed American Renaissance, 
Emerson's belief in the organic principle comes 
directly from Colderidge. In fact, Matthiessen even 
argues that "the most immediate force behind American 
transcendentalism was Coleridge, who gained many ardent 
readers in New England . . ." (6).
PLEASE NOTE:




DISCOVERY, EXPERIENCE, REFLECTION, IMAGINATION: ROMANTIC
COMPLEXITIES IN ROHMAN, MURRAY, ELBOW, AND BERTHOFF
I have elaborated on the Romantic ideas in the 
educational philosophies of Mill, Arnold, and Dewey because 
scholars in the field of composition and rhetoric generally 
have not considered them as Romantic in any way, nor as 
having perpetuated key concepts and "governing ideas" of 
Romantic educational philosophies which, in turn, are major 
elements in current expressivist rhetorics. Mill, Arnold, 
and Dewey share much of the same philosophical ground as 
current expressivists. As a result they have had a broad 
influence on writing teachers, creating a tacit climate of 
opinion which we don't recognize as Romantic but which, in 
large part, is. The "vital" elements— feeling, experience, 
reflection, imagination— are as important to the current 
expressivists as to the three earlier philosophers.
Moreover, these Romantic ideas and "vital elements" 
that current expressivists share with the Romantics and with 
Mill, Arnold, and Dewey appear to be in response to 
historical contexts similar to those that sparked the 
original philosophies of the Romantics and the subsequent 
expressivist ideas of the later philosophers. In other
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words, the pedagogies and theories of people like D. Gordon 
Rohman, Ann Berthoff, Peter Elbow, and Donald Murray arose 
in reaction to the conservative "establishment" which 
prescribed a teaching practice of skill, drill, and rote 
memorization and which subscribes to a mechanized view of 
writing instruction.
By the 1950's American education had swung into another 
conservative phase. Although "progressive" and "new" 
educational philosophies were not obsolete, they no longer 
held center stage. Technology continued to advance and 
Russia's launching of Sputnik in 1957 pushed the United 
States fully into the technological race. As the nation 
progressed as a leader in technology education did reap some 
benefits. Yet, there were negative outcomes from this 
technological growth as well. Teaching practices became 
more automated and mechanical, and encouraged student 
passivity. William Van Gil, the Chair of the Department of 
Secondary Education at New York University during the early 
1960's, noted that the ideas that had occupied John Dewey 
were no longer being widely spoken about, and teaching 
practices seemed to revert to a traditional view of the 
student as a vessel to be filled with knowledge. This time, 
however, the traditional approach had a new technological 
twist;
American education in the early 1960's is
engrossed with the application of
107
technology to education, by means of 
educational television, language 
laboratories, courses on film, and 
programed learning through teaching 
machines. (Van Til 67)
Although we have come to use technology in the classroom
more advantageously in the last decades of the twentieth
century, during the time in which expressivists rhetorics
began to emerge in the 1960's "teaching machines" and
"programed learning" had become a part of the American
classroom, promoting once again a mechanical view of
teaching and learning. This general mechanical approach to
teaching was reflected in writing instruction as well.
"Current-traditional" rhetoric was in vogue, and by the
1960's most writing classes focused on mechanical skill and
"correct" style, and any emphasis on process and the
student's role in self-expression was rare. Writing was not
seen as generative nor as an act of discovering meaning.
When students wrote they did not focus on invention or ideas
but rather were taught to focus on the product and to
practice writing in certain models or modes. In reaction to
this, the pedagogies that we have come to call "Romantic" or
"expressivist" reentered the educational conversation. D.
Gordon Rohman's work on "pre-writing" refocused composition
instruction from mechanics, style, and product to invention
and process. The 1966 conference at Dartmouth College on
the teaching of English emphasized self-expression and an
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active rather than passive model for the teaching and 
learning of writing.
What I am arguing, then, is that expressivist rhetorics 
are linked to the Romantics and to Mill, Arnold, and Dewey, 
in that they arose in response to similar kinds of social 
circumstances or historical patterns and not only through 
direct influence. Expressivists such as Berthoff, Elbow, 
and Murray build their theories on foundations similar to 
those of the earlier poets and philosophers. In fact, the 
crux of expressivist theory is based on a desire to create a 
pedagogy that not only cultivates writing capabilities, but 
develops students7 minds to their greatest capacity. A 
pedagogy that works toward these ends according to 
expressivist doctrine, relies on what I have identified in 
the philosophies of the Romantics and in Mill, Arnold, and 
Dewey as discovery, experience, reflection, and imagination. 
These are the Romantic ideas that have flourished in 
response to mechanical and passive educational philosophies 
and product-centered writing instruction. While neo­
classical rhetorics and cognitive writing theories also 
arose in reaction to product-centered writing instruction, 
these approaches still viewed writing as a linear and 
hierarchical activity which could be analyzed in terms of 
separate units or stages. Expressivist theory, however, 
does not view the act of composing as linear or
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hierarchical, but rather as a blending of experience, 
reflection, discovery, analysis, synthesis, reason, and 
imagination. It is in this recursive blending of these 
"vital" actions that we can see the Romantic legacy.
This project is not, however, a definitive genealogy of 
Romantic ideas, but, in its larger scope, a critique of 
anti-Romantic and anti-expressivist arguments and most 
importantly a defense of Romanticism in its original 
richness, a richness that has contributed not only to the 
work of three very influential philosophers, but to 
expressivist rhetorics as well. There are many names, in 
fact, that I might invoke in a discussion of the influence 
of Romanticism on current composition theory: James
Moffett, William Coles, Ken Macrorie, James Britton, Walker 
Gibson, Toby Fulwiler, Janet Eraig, D. Gordon Rohman, Peter 
Elbow, Ann Berthoff, and Donald Murray. I will focus on the 
last four, all of whom have been associated at some point 
with expressivist rhetorics. Discussions on the aspects of 
their pedagogy and theory that relate directly to the 
tradition of British Romanticism, however, have been few in 
number and limited in scope. If, for example, the 
relationships have been noted between freewriting and 
spontaneity, or between pre-writing and the imagination, the 
notation of likeness has been merely cursory and without 
full recognition of the complexity and depth of the ties to
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the Romantic poets. I have chosen these four scholars, 
moreover, because D. Gordon Rohman's highly influential 
article in 1965 on pre-writing is a key expressivist 
document, and because Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff are the 
most often beleaguered representatives of the expressivist 
movement. They are recognized as having Romantic 
assumptions at their theoretical center, but at best this 
recognition is cursory and is seen as a negative attribute. 
Yet, the grounding for their theories includes the most 
admirable of Romantic assumptions: the belief that students
should be given every opportunity to cultivate the 
encompassing intellect.
As I have noted, the expressivist ties to Romanticism 
have thus far been merely surface recognitions. Lester 
Faigley, for example, notes that "good writing" according to 
expressivists includes essential qualities of Romantic 
expressive poetry ("Competing Theories of Process 529). He 
mentions "integrity, spontaneity, and originality," but he 
does not explore the complexity and richness of the larger 
Romantic philosophy from which expressivist ideas such as 
spontaneity arise. Similarly, Richard Young, although he 
admits that we lack "the historical studies" that permit 
generalizing with confidence, notes that the expressivist 
position seems
a reaffirmation of the vitalist philosophy
of an old romanticism enriched by modern
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psychology, it maintains that the 
composing process is, or should be, 
relatively free of deliberate control; that 
intellect is no more in touch with reality 
than non-logical processes; and that the 
act of composing is a kind of mysterious 
growth fed by what Henry James called "the 
deep well of unconscious cerebration (1934 
p. 23)." Above all, it insists on the 
primacy of the imagination in the composing 
process. ("Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks"
55)
Young points to the expressivist ties to Romanticism but he 
glosses over the major elements without supplying any of the 
"historical studies" that would show whether current 
expressivists actually are descendants of Romanticism, and 
if so, how these ideas of "mysterious growth," "unconscious 
cerebration," and "imagination" play themselves out in 
expressivist theory and pedagogy.
What I will show, through a less cursory examination 
than either Faigley or Young offer, are the specific ways in 
which certain Romantic ideas are incorporated into the 
theories and pedagogies of current expressivist 
rhetoricians. What will become evident as the expressivist 
ties to Romanticism are more fully articulated is that the 
theories and pedagogies of teachers such as Donald Murray, 
Ann Berthoff, and Peter Elbow form a coherent group of ideas 
that are founded on shared assumptions which do indeed 
include the "primacy of the imagination," as well as 
"unconscious cerebration," and "spontaneity." This is not 
to say, however, that each of these expressivist scholars is
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identical to the others in theory or practice, for 
certainly, as Lovejoy argues for Romanticism, "there is 
. . . plurality of romanticisms, of possibly quite distinct 
thought-complexes" (68). Yet, just as Wellek counter argues 
in the debate on Romanticism, I would submit that among 
expressivists there are, in spite of various differences, "a 
unity of theories" that "form a coherent group of ideas"
("The Concept of Romanticism" 182). Thus far, as the
passages from Young and Faigley suggest, the identification 
of these unifying theories have been merely noted but have
not been explored in any depth.
Before turning directly to Rohman, Berthoff, Elbow and 
Murray, however, I would like to begin with a brief 
digression on Francis Christensen as a way of further 
showing how the Romantic influence will often appear in 
theorists and teachers who have not typically been labeled 
expressivists. Christensen, I suggest, was in fact Romantic 
in his philosophy on the construction of sentences and 
paragraphs even though he is often defined as a "formalist," 
a term usually used in opposition to expressivism (Gere 31). 
Christensen's "A Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence" first 
appeared in the October 1963 issue of College Composition 
and Communication.1 Although Christensen is not generally 
perceived as an expressivist, this essay and the work that 
followed on the generative paragraph are grounded in
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Romantic theories of language. My point in looking briefly 
at Christensen is to underscore my belief that the Romantic 
influence is more pervasive and profound than we have 
realized.
In "The Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence," 
Christensen expresses his discontent with the traditional 
approach to the teaching of sentence-production. He 
suggests that "tear-out work books and four-pound 
anthologies" are ways of avoiding the hard work it would 
take to make a difference in student understandings of 
language. It may not seem likely, at first glance, that a 
discussion of the grammatical unit of the sentence, written 
from such a great distance in time from Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, would bear their influence. But the method 
Christensen would like to see in place of workbook drills is 
Romantic in theory. "We need," he argues, "a rhetoric of 
the sentence that will do more than combine the ideas of 
primer sentences. We need one that will generate ideas" 
(Graves 110).
Christensen perceives language as the Romantics do: as 
productive and creative. He suggests that when writing is 
successful it is not merely ornamental and static. Thus, 
Christensen offers the cumulative sentence as the foundation 
for generative writing because it is "dynamic rather than 
static, representing the mind thinking" (111-12). The
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representation of the "mind thinking" is a key Romantic 
concept. Christensen's position here is the one articulated 
by Wordsworth and Coleridge in response to the eighteenth- 
century view of language. It is their belief that language 
is creative, and their poems in effect are meant to be the 
linguistic representative of "the mind thinking."2 
Moreover, Wordsworth rejected the use of personification 
when used merely as ornamentation, because like Christensen 
he sees language as generative. When using personification 
in his own poetry, Wordsworth insisted that he was not using 
it for ornamentation, but that it grew naturally out of the 
passion and the language and context of the creative moment.
In his discussion on the grammar of the sentence, 
Christensen relies on organic analogies in order to 
establish that the cumulative sentence mirrors live and 
productive language in action. The cumulative sentence, 
says Christensen, is "probing its bearing and implications, 
exemplifying it or seeking an analogy or metaphor for it, or 
reducing it to details. Thus the mere form of the sentence 
generates ideas" (112). Coleridge's position on language 
also relies on an organic theory. In the Preface of Aids to 
Reflection he reminds us that words are "living powers," and 
in a letter to Godwin that words are "parts and germinations 
of the Plant," they are "Things, and living Things 
too"(Collected Letters of STC Vol. 1 626).
115
In this cursory gloss of Christensen's position on 
language, we can see that the "Generative Rhetoric of the 
Sentence" bears a Romantic influence. And in his argument 
against a traditional grammar and for a generative one, 
Christensen is searching for a theory and method that 
reveals "the language as it operates" rather than one that 
"leaves everything, to borrow a phrase from Wordsworth, 'in 
disconnection dead and spiritless'" (112). I am not 
suggesting that the Romantic influence is the only one that 
Christensen's work reveals. It would be hard to imagine, 
for instance, that an article written in 1963 about 
"generative" language might not bear the mark of Chomsky as 
well. What I am suggesting, however, is that the Romantic 
influence is perhaps more pervasive, profound and valuable 
than we have previously explored, and in my consideration of 
Rohman, Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff I hope to illuminate 
what some of those deeper Romantic ties might be.
D. Gordon Rohman
It is much less surprising to find Romantic metaphors 
and Romantic ways of "knowing and doing" in D. Gordon 
Rohman's 1965 article on Pre-Writing ("Pre-Writing: The 
Stage of Discovery in the Writing Process") than in 
Christensen's "The Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence."
The assumption underlying the practice of pre-writing is
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that students can write well, with "originality" and 
"spontaneity," if they can just discover the "exceptional 
power of revealing experience by expressing it first to 
[themselves] (Pre-Writing), and then to others 
(Communicating) so that we recognize the experience as our 
own too" (108). Rohman believes, then, that pre-writing 
allows the writer to discover experience.
Further, pre-writing for Rohman is tied to generative 
thought, and thinking he describes as "that activity of mind 
which brings forth and develops ideas, plans, designs, not 
merely the entrance of an idea into one's mind; an active, 
not a passive enlistment in the 'cause' of an idea . . ." 
(106). Thus, pre-writing is a creative act, defined in 
terms kindred to the Romantic Imagination. In fact, in their 
study on pre-writing, Rohman and his colleagues "sought ways 
for students to imitate the "creative principle" itself 
which produces finished works" (107). Much like Arnold's 
call for non-mechanical exercises that would introduce 
"creative activity," the pre-writing activities are meant to 
stimulate the imagination, the "dynamics of creation," so 
that good writing can occur. And "good writing" itself is 
an imaginative act according to Rohman, which closely 
resembles Coleridge's description of the creative 
imagination;
The meaning of writing is the meaning of
the combination, the pattern that the
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meaning of the many words makes when fused 
by a writer/s consciousness in the moment 
of "discovery." (107).
Good writing comes from shaping, through a combinatory act
(Secondary Imagination), patterns determined in an
experience (Primary Imagination), an experience discovered
through pre-writing. Worthwhile writing, says Rohman in a
truly Romantic fashion, is that discovered "combination of
words" which allows for "fresh and original" insight.
In order to help students "imitate the creative
principle itself," Rohman and his colleagues employed the
keeping of journals, the practice of religious-like
Meditation, and the use of analogy as teaching techniques.
The use of analogy, writes Rohman, enables us "to know
anything in our present simply because we have known similar
things in our past to which we compare the present. Each
act of present 'knowing' associates the present with the
past as another instance" (111). This associative or
analogical "knowing" is a way of "rearranging and
reassembling the focus of our experience" (111). Thus, this
use of analogy is creative. Further, argues Rohman,
analogy also provides practice with the 
concrete world of the five senses, and, by 
enlisting the student writer in a 
personally-experienced encounter with his 
subject freshly seen from the perspective 
of a new analogy, we have provided him with 
the "motor" to make his subject "go" for 
him. (Ill)
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In other words, analogy can help the student, as Wordsworth 
puts it, to "throw over" an incident "a certain colouring of 
imagination," and thereby lead to poetry in the poet's case, 
and good writing in the student's.
Since Rohman's assumption is that writing is a 
"personally transformed experience of an event," he suggests 
the technique of Meditation as a method that might give 
students "an inner knowledge transforming their 'events' 
into 'experiences'" (109). What he is after here, though 
perhaps in a less extreme way, is the sort of mystical 
experience that Wordsworth retells in the boat-stealing 
episode in The Prelude. Taking the boat onto the lake was 
merely an event, but Wordsworth's "meditative" powers, his 
ability to "transform" this event into an experience, 
brought the mountains alive and closing rapidly upon his 
back. This was an event that he transformed into an 
experience powerful enough to play a part in shaping the 
philosophical mind of the poet. Rohman sees the practice of 
Meditation achieving the effect of an experience no longer 
merely happening "to you but in you" just as it happened 
with the young Wordsworth. Since Pre-Writing and Meditation 
issue "from the same sort of dynamic interplay of self and 
world," the Meditation can help lead to the imitation of the 
creative principle that Rohman assumes Pre-Writing is.
Rohman#s students were also asked to keep journals in 
which they wrote daily. They were given a long list of
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questions that would hopefully provoke them to discovery of 
"what they believed, what they felt, what they knew" (109). 
Rohman and his colleagues were attempting to guide the 
students into the kind of reflective state that Coleridge, 
Arnold, and Dewey demand of the educated mind. Rohman 
explains that "in the process of introspection, formalized 
by the daily writing in the journal, we hoped to mobilize 
the consciousness of every student writer" (109). In other 
words, his hope is to foster, through reflective writing, 
the "distinct consciousness" that Coleridge claims comes 
from the same source: self-reflection.
In D. Gordon Rohman's initiatory article on Pre-Writing 
(bear in mind that in the twenty-five years following its 
publication that pre-writing became a term inevitably 
associated with expressive rhetorics), we can find a 
methodology that is based on Romantic assumptions about the 
creative imagination. He believes that as teachers we must 
foster experience and reflection in our students so that the 
"creative principle" can be imitated through pre-writing.
Donald Murray
Donald Murray, one of the best-known writing teachers 
in the field, has been talking and publishing about the 
process of writing since the early 1960's. He might be
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seen, in fact, as one of the earliest of what we today are 
calling expressivist rhetoricians. He is usually noted as 
such because of his insistence on the importance of the 
process as opposed to product and the value he places on 
individual voice. At any rate, he is clearly another 
composition specialist whose theory and practice have deeper 
roots within the Romantic tradition than those usually 
observed. Murray often argues, for instance, that writing 
courses must go against the traditional classroom techniques 
and curricula. He makes this case because, as Wordsworth 
and Coleridge were over a hundred and seventy years ago, he 
is aware that real learning rarely takes place in classrooms 
that focus on rote memorization and passive reception of 
facts. He strongly believes that students do not learn to 
write under the circumstances or method of teaching that 
Dewey calls the "phonographic disc" method in which 
teachers' impressions are "described" upon the student's 
mind. In response to writing courses grounded in the 
traditional educational schemes, Murray offers a theory and 
pedagogy of composition which he hopes will foster what I am 
calling the encompassing intellect.
Like other Romantic philosophies on pedagogy, Murray's 
model for the teaching of writing is based on discovery of 
the inner self, perception, and reflection. These, in turn, 
lead to imaginative thinking and writing. While reflecting
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on a piece of his own writing, for instance, he chronicles
the progression from perception to the moment when the
writing comes together:
There is the surprise of perception that I 
experience when the character in my novel 
saw no color. There is the surprise of 
recollection when I heard that terrible 
cough left over from a previous war. There 
is the surprise of connection when I relate 
my surprise in writing . . . There is the 
surprise of celebration when we re-create 
something. . . the surprise of pattern when 
a whole complex of connections click into 
place on the page, [emphasis added]
("Writing and Teaching for Surprise"
Expecting the Unexpected: Teaching Myself—  
and Others— to Read 9)
In this discussion on surprise we can see a list of terms
that as a whole are clearly Romantic in complexion:
"perception," "experience," "recollection," "connection,"
"re-create," "pattern," "whole."
As the Romantics argued, to see, feel, hear, smell, 
and taste the outer world allows for the growth of the inner 
self; to actively engage the senses tills the soil of the 
soul for the fertile harvest of experience. The ability to 
perceive through all the senses leads to what Wordsworth has 
called a more "lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and 
tenderness . . .  a greater knowledge of human nature" 
(Preface to the Second Edition of the Lyrical Ballads 737). 
And, in "Frost at Midnight," while speaking of the future 
education and mental growth of his infant son, Coleridge 
likewise stresses the importance of communing with, of
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perceiving through the senses, the mountains, lakes, and 
shores of the natural world. Along with this external 
world, "Frost at Midnight" portrays the poet's mind at work, 
looking inward, perceiving, as it were, the internal world 
of the self.
Murray, recognizing the importance of gaining
experience through perception, has incorporated this
Romantic philosophy into his teaching. The full intellect,
and thus the capable writer, is like the satellite, says
Murray. The writer actively places herself in strategic
places so that she is always "receiving" and "collecting"
(IVrite to Learn). Murray's metaphor of the satellite
antenna, though it might appear a non-Romantic metaphor, is
in some ways analogous to Wordsworth's "wise passiveness."
Although this receiving through the senses can be merely
passive, it is, as Wordsworth suggests, "wise" because the
passive receptiveness is the basis for perceiving and
experiencing, and being wisely passive leads to growth of a
great mind. Murray has said that the writing course is the
practice of perception (Learning By Teaching 117). In
"Internal Revision: A Process of Discovery," Murray
discusses what he calls "prevision":
This term encompasses everything that 
precedes the first draft— receptive 
experience, such as awareness (conscious 
and unconscious), observation, remembering; 
and exploratory experience such as
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research, reading, interviewing, and note- 
taking. (Learning by Teaching 73).
Experience, the process of taking inward what the world
offers, is an important step toward effective writing, and
learning to perceive leads to experience.
The reflective state is also a must in learning to 
write well for Murray. If we do not cultivate reflection, 
according to Murray, we will not be able to make meaning 
through language. Today's world does not allow the time 
needed for the inward looks afforded by reflection, and 
thus, Murray makes a point of starting the day with 
stillness in which he may "stare vacantly out the window" 
and into himself, "notebook open, pen uncapped" (Reading for 
Surprise" Expecting the Unexpected 21). If he bypasses the 
reflective state, the writing will not work. It will be 
like trying to make "mashed potatoes pass through a 
keyhole." In order for it to work, we must return to that 
"reflective state" where we can "play with language, 
connecting and disconnecting, listening for voice" ("Writing 
and Teaching for Surprise" Expecting the Unexpected 8).
This reflective state can also result in what Murray 
calls surprise. Surprise for him is like Wordsworth's and 
Dewey's spontaneity. It is when something suddenly arises 
from within us. It is finding the unexpected. It is when 
we put ourselves in touch with the perceptions, feelings, 
and experiences that we have internalized. It is yet
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another form of self-discovery. And the "wonderful thing 
about surprise" says Murray in "Writing for Surprise," is 
that "the more you experience surprise the easier it becomes 
to experience it. Surprise breeds surprise. And you can 
learn to be patient at your desk waiting for surprise to 
land" (Expecting the Unexpected 6). Once it has "landed," 
this surprise is likely to be the nugget for a good piece of 
writing.
It is important to note here that surprise in Murray's
terminology, and spontaneity in the Romantics', is not
something that just happens if people are lucky, and does
not happen if they are down on their luck. Rather, surprise
and spontaneity are cultivated through receptivity and
reflection. It comes out of perception, feeling,
experience, and practiced reflection. They come from
opening the mind to experience. As David Perkins explains
in Wordsworth and the Poetry of Sincerity, spontaneity
begins in a concrete immediacy, and goes on 
to ponder it in discursive terms. Out of 
a particular experience and reflection upon 
it, the poetry builds toward a moment of 
insight, when a general truth seems to 
break upon the mind with compelling force.
(23)
Surprise for Murray is this "moment of insight" as it 
"breaks upon the mind." Thus, the habit of reflection 
allows for the mind, as Wordsworth puts it in the Preface, 
to be "connected with important subjects" (Second Edition
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735). Once the connection is made, Wordsworth can compose 
"blindly" (Preface Second Edition 735), just as Murray lets 
his pen be "the blind man's cane."
Murray's privileging of surprise is also tied to the
Romantic idea of organicism. The writing should come as
"easily as leaves to the tree" as Keats argues, from a "germ 
within" as Coleridge suggests, or as the "tree does from the 
vital principle that actuates it" as Wordsworth says. Not 
to let the writing take this organic path is to place the 
writer at risk. Murray cautions, for instance, that "we run 
the danger of closing down thinking, exploration, and 
discovery" if we impose pre-established form to the 
surprise, the insight, or the writing. What we must do, 
urges Murray, like the Romantics before him, is to trust to 
the organic nature of creating meaning— the organic nature 
of the imaginative act. It is a mistake to "pay too much 
attention to genre at the wrong time," he warns ("First 
Silence, then Paper" Expecting the Unexpected 45). Instead, 
we need to allow the surprise, the thought, the word, or the 
line to "lead us to form. And it should" (45).
Further, it is Murray's belief that if we have a theory
and pedagogy for writing that cultivates discovery,
perception, and reflection, we not only have a basis for 
surprise and spontaneity, but for the imaginative act of 
making meaning out of language as well. He sees writing as
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active and creative, for instance. It calls on innumerable
imaginative processes. It is, in his view, ever moving, ever
changing perception, collecting, focusing, and ordering.
Writing makes "meaning out of chaos" ("Reading for Surprise"
24). The language that Murray uses when he speaks of this
act of meaning making is akin to the Romantic imagination:
Words . . . allow us to play with 
information, to make connections and 
patterns, to put together and take apart 
and put together again, to see what 
experience means. In other words, to think.
(Write to Learn 3)
Murray's passage echoes Wordsworth's definition of the
imagination as a "modifying power" capable of "consolidating
numbers into unity, and dissolving and separating unity into
number." It is very close to Coleridge's definition of the
Secondary Imagination which, Coleridge claims, shapes
perception and experience into patterns and connections by
fusing together and taking apart.
In Donald Murray, then, we can find kinships with the 
Romantic poets. Some of these ties are to the more complex 
Romantic traditions that he also shares with Mill, Arnold, 
and Dewey such as the belief in discovery, feeling, 
perception, experience, and reflection. We can note 
parallel theories of organicism and similar descriptions of 
imaginative acts. Finally, we can recognize, in Murray's 
strategies for the teaching of writing, the Romantic poets' 
educational ideas for the fostering of the philosophical
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mind. We can see Murray's attempts to cultivate the 
intellect so that the student's imaginative mind can make 
meaning through language. As Murray tells his students, in 
words which resonate a clear Romantic tone, "write and look 
to yourself, pay attention to what you feel, what you say, 
how you say it, how you create a situation that makes your 
best writing possible" ("Reading while Writing" Expecting 
the Unexpected 108).
Peter Elbow
Peter Elbow, well-known as a composition theorist since 
the late 1960's, must be acknowledged in any discussion of 
Romantic rhetoric. Current scholars in the field 
continually place him as an expressivist, primarily, it 
seems, because of his focus on freewriting and voice. Both 
freewriting and voice are philosophical and pedagogical 
aspects of any discussion on writing for Elbow, because they 
naturally arise out of a concern with the writing process.
Freewriting, as Elbow describes it, is simply writing 
without stopping for five or ten minutes, simply letting the 
words tumble out and onto the page. The goal is not good, 
polished writing, but a stream of consciousness. The focus 
is on the process, not the product. If we write freely 
during the first stage of our writing process according to 
Elbow, we "will warm up all [our] faculties" (Writing With
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Power 10). In Writing Without Teachers, Elbow describes 
this process as "cooking" and "growing"— metaphors that 
would feel quite comfortable to the Romantics. Once the 
faculties are warm, the possibility then exists for entire 
pieces of writing to "cook perfectly" in our heads. These 
pieces will "grow out of that magic which some excellent 
writers can call on at will: simultaneous creativity and 
critical thinking" (Writing With Power 10). The sort of 
spontaneity that Elbow suggests happens with freewriting is 
the surprise that Murray cultivates. This spontaneity comes 
from stimulating what lies within our unconscious. Once 
tapping what lies below our consciousness the good writing 
can begin to flow, just as Coleridge claimed it did for him 
in the creation of Kubla Khan.
Elbow also claims that freewriting can help in the 
development of a writer's voice, and what voice in writing 
implies for him is "words that capture the sound of an 
individual on the page" (287). "Writing without voice,’* he 
claims, "is wooden or dead because it lacks sound, rhythm, 
energy, and individuality" (299). Elbow's project for the 
contemporary writer is like that of the Romantic poets for 
their poetry. They rejected, for instance, much of 
eighteenth-century poetry which they felt was "dead and 
spiritless" precisely because it lacked the "energy and 
individuality" which came with infusing the writing with the 
experiences, feelings, passions, and voice of the poet.
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In his quest for what he identifies as voice, it is
easy to assume that Elbow neglects quality. Elbow himself
acknowledges that he faces these charges (WWP 300), but one
way in which he finds freewriting valuable is that in spite
of the fact that it can turn out "careless, excessive, or
self-indulgent writing," it can also nurture voice and lead
to good writing. Thus, in his answer to the charges that he
ignores quality, Elbow retorts:
My theory of voice helps me trust my own 
taste and deal with the accusation that I 
don't care about quality. I now see that 
caring about quality has two different 
meanings and springs from two different 
temperamental approaches to writing. On 
the one hand caring about quality implies a 
hunger to stamp out terrible writing. A 
hunger to destroy defects, failing, excess, 
and ugliness. I don't have this hunger. I 
am content to let people write much that is 
bad . . .  On the other hand, caring about 
quality implies hungering for excellencies, 
wanting the real thing, not settling for 
mere adequacy. That's me. I want the 
moon. (301)
Elbow is not ignoring quality. He is out to get what is 
"real" and moving, exactly I would add, what the Romantics 
wanted for their poetry. As Elbow unabashedly admits, he 
and his students produce much that is not top-notch writing, 
just as the Romantics wrote a great deal of second-rate 
poetry. Nonetheless, Elbow's students do produce good 
writing and the Romantics have given us some of the greatest 
poetry of the English language.
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Elbow also argues that there are many benefits that 
arise from student writers' search for voice. It can lead 
them "toward new thought, feelings, memories and new modes 
of seeing and writing" (Writing with Power 284). In effect, 
it leads to discovery on many levels. It also prompts 
reflective writing which leads to a "greater connection 
between their writing and themselves," which in turn leads 
to "growth or development" (284). Reflection occurs because 
the search for voice means exploring "angry feelings, 
perhaps depressed feelings, perhaps a particular area of 
their lives" (284). Coleridge felt that a lack of 
reflective thinking and writing led to stasis, but that 
active self-reflection led to mental growth; Arnold 
believed that the instructor's "prime direct aim is to 
enable a man to know himself and his world" in order to take 
any worthwhile action which could lead to intellectual 
development; Elbow believes that freewriting and the search 
for voice are catalysts to reflective thinking and writing 
which result in "growth or development" (284). The growth 
Elbow speaks of might come about through writing to voice 
anger, hurt, or betrayal. The crux here is feelings, and 
giving vent to feelings gives way to the sorts of healing 
and growth that Mill found inherent in Wordsworth's poetry.
Elbow is careful to explain more fully what he means by 
feelings and emotions as they relate to good writing,
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however. He is aware that he may have "made real voice
sound as though it is always full of loud emotion" (312).
His message is not that writers must always be writing lots
of "strong feelings," but that they must "experience" what
they are writing about. He means something "much closer to
'should see and hear7 than 'should feel strongly7" (333).
Elbow grants that feelings naturally occur when we
experience something fully but that strong feelings alone do
not make good writing, and often, in fact, make bad writing.
To be good, says Elbow, writing must come out of the "event
or scene itself" (334). In order to experience something
again we must go back and "see, smell, and hear everything":
Direct all your efforts into experiencing—  
or re-experiencing— what you are writing 
about. Put all your energy into connecting 
with the object. Be there. See it.
Participate in whatever you are writing 
about and then just let the words come of 
their own accord. (335)
Elbow further concentrates on ways of experiencing and
ways to bring about re-experiences because like Wordsworth
he believes that the ability to really experience something
is educated out of children:
As children get older and more 
sophisticated, they get better at making 
the kind of refusal to experience that most 
adults are good at. At a certain age— often 
adolescence— we see a child working 
overtime to strengthen these refusal 
muscles. (321)
In poems like "We Are Seven," Wordsworth is arguing that the 
ability to imagine, to experience or re-experience, has
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vanished by adulthood. The adult in this poem insists that 
the little girl and her siblings are five in number, not 
seven, since two "in the church-yard lie." The child, 
however, is re-experiencing play as it was when her siblings 
were alive: she is able, as Elbow puts it, to "see, hear, 
and smell everything": "'Nay'," says the child, "'we are
seven!'." Like the Romantics' desire to maintain the "fresh 
gaze of a child with the obstinate integrity of a man 
consulting his own experience, and hence thinking outside 
traditional categories or interpretations" (Perkins 65), 
Elbow wants his students to be able to experience in order 
to think and write well.
Ann Berthoff
Ann Berthoff is forthright about her ties to 
Romanticism, and in fact, calls on Coleridge at every turn. 
He is, according to Berthoff, "our best guide in developing 
a philosophy of rhetoric" (The Making of Meaning 64). Her 
philosophy and pedagogy of composition are based on the idea 
of "reclaiming the imagination" and she uses Coleridge's 
definitions of the imagination as her starting point.
Berthoff argues for the "reclaiming of the imagination" 
as a necessity because positivists have relegated it to what 
they call the "affective domain." Berthoff understands, 
however, that in its complexity the Romantic imagination
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does not pertain solely to emotions and feeling as opposed 
to thought. She sees the imagination, as Coleridge does, a 
way of knowing and making meaning. Its domain includes both 
thought as well as feeling. The imagination, in Berthoff#s 
scheme, is synonymous with the "active mind." It is akin to 
Arnold's "vital knowledge" and Mill's "vigourous" mind. She 
defines and redefines the imagination throughout her various 
works in Coleridge's language: it is "the shaping spirit";
it is a "doer, an agent"; it is the "form-finding form- 
creating power"; it is, she says, as Coleridge wrote "in one 
of the most famous passages in the literature of criticism 
. . ., 'the living power and prime agent of all human 
perception'" (The Making of Meaning 28).
Berthoff's point is that once we have restored
imagination to its proper realm, we have the perfect theory
on which to build a pedagogy for composition because it
gives us a basis for generating a concept of "forming":
Its power lies in the fact that it makes 
possible so many fruitful analogies between 
writing and all other acts of mind whereby 
we make sense of the world. Imagination 
can help us form the concept of forming.
Forming depends on abstraction, 
symbolization, selection, "purposing"; it 
requires or enables us to coordinate and 
subordinate, to amalgamate, discard, and 
expand; it is our means of giving shape to 
content. (The Making of Meaning 4)
Here we not only see Berthoff's allegiance to the Romantic
definition of the imagination, but to the idea that
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language, or writing, is in itself a creative and forming 
act as well. "When we write," she says, "we represent our 
recognitions of relationships: that is what composing means" 
(Reclaiming the Imagination: Philosophical Perspectives For 
Writers and Teachers of Writing 1).
For Berthoff as for the Romantics and Mill, Arnold, and 
Dewey, the imagination is a crucial part of a fully capable 
intellect, and she relies on the Romantic means of nurturing 
the imagination in her own method of teaching. She suggests 
that as teachers we must realize that "perception" is an 
important model for the "process of making meaning" (The 
Making of Meaning 46). She argues that every composition 
course should begin with activities meant to stimulate 
observation because the ability to see and re-see is vital 
to the imagination. Observation is so important because 
looking closely is active and engages the mind. Without an 
actively engaged mind, no composing will take place. She 
recommends writing assignments such as a detailed record of 
ten minutes of observation and reflection carried out daily 
for a week. Close "descriptions and speculations in 
response to a seashell, a milkweed pod, a chestnut burr, or 
any natural object" could reap a rich harvest for the mind. 
But we must remember to "think of perception as visual 
thinking" or as Dewey would also argue, observation becomes 
a mechanical exercise for the sake of producing "vivid
135
detail about nothing much" as opposed to what it really is: 
the "mind in action" (64).
A theory of imagination not only provides occasions for 
the practice of perception, in Berthoff/s estimation, but it 
gives us a new way to approach language instruction, even at 
the very basic level of the sentence. She concedes that 
"drill can teach youngsters— and college freshman— how to 
correct faulty sentences in workbooks," but drill is 
inadequate because it "cannot teach them to write 
substantial, readable sentences" (The Making of Meaning 24). 
To really "compose" sentences and not just glue together 
"somebody else's pretend subsentences, we will have to know
something about language as . . .  a means of making 
knowledge" (24). Language, and thus writing, for Berthoff 
as for her Romantic mentor, are alive and powerful. Writing 
creates meaning. It is an act of forming and shaping. It
is the recognition of relationships. The process of 
composing is analogous to the imagination in action.
Berthoff offers the double-entry notebook as a 
pedagogical technique that arises from a theory of the 
imagination, and thus one that can teach students to "really 
compose." Her approach is to have students write 
continuously in a spiral-bound notebook. On the right side 
they make reading notes on "direct quotations, observational 
notes, fragments, lists, images— verbal and visual" (The
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Making of Meaning 45). On the other side they make notes 
and observations about their original entries. The double­
entry format, suggests Berthoff, "provides a way for the 
student to conduct that 'continuing audit of meaning' that 
is at the heart of learning to read and write critically.
The facing pages are in dialogue with one another" (45). in 
the double-entry notebook Berthoff brings the processes of 
reading and writing together. She believes that writing in 
this way can help develop a critical method of reading as 
well as writing because it gives students access to watching 
a text come into being, in this case their own. It also 
encourages the habits of "reflective questioning in the 
process of reading" (45), which, we will remember, is what 
Coleridge urges us to do in Aids to Reflection. If we do 
not consider each part of the text in relation to ourselves 
through this kind of reflective questioning, then, according 
to Coleridge, we cannot cultivate the "educated mind" or 
what I call the encompassing intellect.
Berthoff also finds the double-entry notebook useful in 
that it sets up a dialectic in the juxtaposition of entries, 
which is important to Berthoff*s method and theory of 
imagination because she believes that composing is a 
dialectical process. Through this dialectic students are 
able to generate new meaning. Here again her affinity with 
Coleridge is a strong one. In the creation of art, in the
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voluntary action of what Coleridge calls the Secondary 
Imagination, are embedded reflective and dialectical 
processes. For Coleridge this dialectic takes the form of 
the "reconciliation of opposites." As the mind is engaged in 
the creative act of finding "multeity in unity," it engages 
in a dialectic of self and world, matter and spirit, nature 
and mind, object and subject. As the mind engages in this 
dialectic, meaning is forged through a "progression of 
contraries." Berthoff's aim for the composition of new 
meaning through dialectic is similar. When students write, 
observe, and reflect about nature, about objects, about 
their world, about their reading, writing, and thinking in 
the double-entry journals, they are faced with the 
dichotomies between subject and object, self and world, mind 
and nature. As they return to their original entries to 
summarize, formulate, find likeness in difference, they are 
performing the creative act of composing— forming new 
meaning.
If this dialectical process seems potentially chaotic 
for students, it is. In "Learning the Uses of Chaos," 
Berthoff argues that "learning to write is a matter of 
learning to tolerate ambiguity" (The Making of Meaning 71). 
She notes that chaos is scary for both students and 
teachers, but that if we give in to it and understand it can 
enhance composing. "Meanings," argues Berthoff, "don't come
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out of the air; we make them out of a chaos of images, half- 
truth, remembrances, syntactic fragments, from the 
mysterious and unformed" (70). It is these sorts of 
"mysterious and unformed" images and remembrances from which 
Coleridge claims to have created the poem "Kubla Khan." And 
likewise, it is from chaos that the Kubla Khan decrees his 
"stately pleasure dome" within the poem. If, as teachers, 
we can encourage our students to accept chaos by cultivating 
Keats's negative capability as Berthoff argues we can, or as 
Coleridge has done in the creation of "Kubla Khan," they 
begin to find meanings which "can be discerned taking shape 
within it" (70-71). Berthoff suggests that the way to do so 
is to design assignments that let student writers discover 
the potential of language by playing with it, working it, 
pushing it to its limits. They must reflect on it and 
recognize that it is dynamic. If we can design courses that 
allow this then students will learn to tolerate ambiguity 
and chaos. And since chaos generates language, argues 
Berthoff, students "can learn to write by learning the uses 
of chaos, which is to say, rediscovering the power of 
language to generate the sources of meaning" (70).
Ann Berthoff is one of the most philosophical of 
composition scholars writing today. Much of her philosophy 
is grounded in the complex theories of knowing and creating 
that Coleridge set forth in the Biographia Literaria, and
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she continually relies on his definitions of the 
imagination. She understands, as Coleridge did, that in 
order to write or compose we must "learn to intuit,” to "see 
how things are related," to "grasp" the "relationship of 
parts to the meaning of a whole" (The Making of Meaning 57). 
She demands that we "reclaim the imagination," because once 
we have done so, we have a method for teaching that 
"recognizes the human need and ability to shape, 
discriminate, select" (29).
Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff, the three scholars still 
active in the teaching of composition, are not carbon copies 
of each other. Their interests, theories and pedagogies do 
vary. Yet, they also share certain characteristics and 
assumptions that arose in the 1960 #s with the advent of the 
New Rhetoric which sparked an interest in writing as a 
process. They hold the belief that writing is a complex 
process, and thus writing pedagogy should focus on this 
process, and they contend that our students will not learn 
to write well until they understand writing as a process. 
This is not to say that the written "product" is not 
important. Rather, they argue, a poem, a story, an essay, 
or a research paper does not mysteriously appear, in 
finished form, on the page or screen in front of us.
Their theories differ from other process-oriented 
writing theories such as neo-classical and cognitive
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approaches, however, in that an expressivist does not see 
the process in terms of linearity, hierarchy, and in 
discrete units that can be clearly separated into stages. 
Linda Flower, the leading proponent of cognitive approaches 
for writing instruction, has written that her goal is to 
make "unconscious actions a little more conscious: to give
writers a greater awareness of their own intellectual 
processes, and therefore the power and possibility of 
conscious choice" (Problem Solving Strategies for Writers 
vi). Her desire to make more conscious the "unconscious 
actions" indicates that Flower finds the expressivist 
attempts to cultivate the imaginative intellect ineffective 
because they result in a model for composing that is too 
muddled. In other words, the expressivists' rather global 
approach to the writing process remains unarticulated and 
thus unconscious. Yet, expressivists also try to make 
"conscious" how these more "unconscious actions" of the 
writing process work. Having students write about and 
examine their writing and thinking is an attempt to 
articulate the more unconscious aspects of writing; and 
certainly, Donald Murray's pedagogical use of professional 
writers talking and writing about their works is also an 
attempt to make conscious the actual working out of the 
writers' imaginative and composing processes.
It is not in trying to make conscious the unconscious, 
then, that expressivists and cognitivists differ. Rather,
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it is in how to make this transformation take place.
Flower, in order to bring forth the hidden aspects of 
composing, separates the process of writing into 
"distinctive parts" (vii). She builds a model of composing 
that can take place in stages. While expressivists do not 
object to Flower's using scientific methods to research the 
ways in which writers compose, they do object to a pedagogy 
that is founded on the hierarchical models that represent 
her vision of the composing process. Expressivists fear 
that this separation of the process into parts and stages 
can lead students and teachers to view writing in a 
simplistic light. They also believe that the cognitivist 
approach tends to sever the affective realm from the 
cognitive creating the potential to reduce the complex human 
intellectual and imaginative aspects of writing to a 
mechanical set of writing strategies.
Cognitivists, then, believe that expressivist theories 
are too nebulous to help students become better writers.
And while expressivists can find value in cognitivist 
approaches as a research tool, they find fault with a 
pedagogy that bases itself on cognitivist composing models 
because, according to expressivist scholars, writing is not 
a set of distinctive processes but a process of discovery 
and coming to knowledge through an imaginative act. Writing 
is an act of the whole being for expressivists, and it is
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through reflecting, questioning, feeling, experiencing, 
reasoning, and imagining that writers come to be. While 
this might seem an ambitious and ideal approach to writing 
instruction, I would argue that it is just such an ideal 
that we need to hold in order to truly educate students in a 
system that denies the emotive, creative, and imaginative 
aspects of the intellect.
The expressivist theories of Rohman, Berthoff, Murray, 
and Elbow, arose in reaction to a conservative educational 
system which denied the more creative aspects of the 
intellect and which promoted a theory of writing instruction 
that privileged passive learning, rote drills, and the 
written product over the process. Twenty years later we are 
still facing a less than enlightened educational system and 
Elbow, Murray, and Berthoff are still working against this 
system, each in his or her own way. Rather than standing in 
front of a classroom filling passive students with 
grammatical rules and the "correct" reading of a work of 
literature, these teachers are placing students in an active 
and participatory role in their own learning processes. Ann 
Berthoff's students, for instance, work in dialectical 
notebooks, responding in writing to what they read, think, 
and observe. Rather than being told how to read and write, 
her students develop, through work in the double-entry 
notebooks, their own methods for critical reading and
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writing by engaging in "reflective questioning." Peter 
Elbow uses groups for developing a critical method of 
reading and writing. Students working together in these 
groups engage in dialogue about the texts being written and 
read. They are actively thinking, reflecting, questioning, 
and discovering. Likewise, Donald Murray subverts the 
traditional teaching model by making the student/teacher 
conference the center of his pedagogy. When the student 
enters into a discussion with Murray she is the "expert" and 
she makes decisions about her own writing. Through this 
close one-on-one dialogue, she learns to probe, question, 
reflect, and discover for herself. She may indeed be an 
inexperienced "expert," and she may in fact make many 
ineffective decisions about her work. But, as Murray would 
argue, it is in these false starts and failed attempts that 
real discovery, real learning, and thus real writing, takes 
place.
I have chosen to focus my discussion on D. Gordon 
Rohman because his article on pre-writing is a key 
expressivist document, and I have selected Murray, Elbow, 
and Berthoff because I find them the most often identified 
as expressivists, and also the most misunderstood or 
caricatured as expressivists. While scholars and teachers 
might recognize that these three have ties to Romanticism, 
they have not examined the underlying assumptions in depth.
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The Romantic and expressivist privileging of spontaneity, 
for instance, is not usually understood as a skill that 
arises only as the result of practice and through 
cultivating a certain habit of mind. In extending this 
examination of the ties between the Romantics and Murray, 
Elbow, and Berthoff further than other critics have, I am 
attempting to show that the theories and practices of these 
four contemporary scholars are a complex and valuable 
reincarnation of what is most worthwhile in the educational 
and poetic theories of the original Romantics.
Their Romantic pedagogies foster in students the 
ability to create knowledge through writing. Rohman,
Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff promote teaching practices which 
cultivate "authentic" voice— a voice which, contrary to what 
most of our students come to us with, is powerful and alive. 
And particularly interesting in light of the pervasive view 
that expressivists are primarily practitioners and lack a 
theoretical center is the fact that they not only share 
assumptions held by the Romantics, but that they share much 
of the same philosophical grounding as three men who are 
generally seen as profound thinkers and philosophers of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries— Mill, Arnold, and Dewey. 
Like Dewey, they understand that having experiences and 
being able to know and name those experiences play a vital 
role in the discovery and creating of writing and coming to
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knowledge. They share with Mill, Arnold, and Dewey the 
belief that education must not deny experience, must not 
separate the emotive from the analytical, but instead must 
capture what is most vital: feeling, experience, reflection, 
creativity. And like Dewey, Arnold, Mill, and the Romantics 
before them, Rohman, Murray, Elbow, and Berthoff, in an 
attempt to counter-act a pedagogy that views learning as 
passive and writing as a mechanical act, nurture the 
opportunity for students to reflect, question, and think 
deeply in order that the imaginative mind, the "encompassing 
intellect," can flourish.
The traditions and philosophies of Romanticism are
clearly present in many of our composition theories and
pedagogies. In fact, as Albert 0. Wlecke and D. Gordon
Rohman recently argued at the 1990 Conference on College
Composition and Communication in Chicago, there is much of
modern society that is deeply rooted in Romanticism.
Moreover, as M. H. Abrams says of Wordsworth:
he has affected our consciousness and our 
culture. Either directly or by way of his 
influence on other writers, he has altered 
the way we perceive and describe not only 
the natural world, but our own selves and 
other men and women, as well as the ways in 
which we respond to what we perceive. ("The 
Strangeness of Wordsworth" 45)
As the field of composition begins its exploration of
social-epistemic theories, it will attempt to break free of
many of these Romantic ties. Perhaps some of these roots do
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need to be severed, but perhaps it would serve us better to 
graft many of these Romantic roots to the new shoots of the 
social-epistemic rhetoric. There is much in expressivist 
theories and pedagogies, and in their heritage of British 
Romanticism, that is worthwhile.
Endnotes
1 The version I am using is collected in Richard 
L. Graves' Rhetoric and Composition.
2 My oversimplification here does a disservice to 
the Romantic view on language. Their theories are 
complex and insightful. Three essays that I find 
helpful in understanding Romantic theories of language 
are A.W. Phinney's "Wordsworth's Winander Boy and 
Romantic Theories of Language," Jonathon Ramsey's 
"Wordsworth and the Childhood of Language," and Gene 
Ruoff's "Wordsworth on Language: Toward a Radical 
Poetics for English Romanticism." Also of interest is 
Isobel Armstrong's Language as Living Form in 
Nineteenth~Centry Poetry.
CHAPTER IV
MISREADINGS AND REREADINGS OF ROMANTICISM: 
NEW LIGHT ON OLD PROBLEMS
As new educational and rhetorical theories arise, many 
valuable aspects of Romantic philosophy and expressivist 
rhetorics are falling into disrepute. The attacks on 
Romantic rhetorics, although sometimes justified, often rely 
not only on a misunderstanding of the theories of particular 
expressivist rhetoricians but on a caricature or misreading 
of the tradition of Romanticism from which they evolve. In 
this chapter my defense of expressivist rhetorics will 
revolve around three levels of argument: that there are
general myths surrounding Romanticism which have become 
commonplace and thus play a part in the reaction against 
expressivism; that stereotyping expressivists because of a 
denigrated view of Romanticism does a disservice to the 
complexity of expressivist theories; and that not only can 
we correct some of these caricatures or myths surrounding 
Romanticism and expressivist theories by looking to the 
Romantic tradition and understanding it better, but that 
this glance backward might also offer the opportunity to 
open up current expressivist pedagogies to new 
possibilities. Thus, I hope to remind readers of the 
positive aspects of expressivist theories and pedagogies, to
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disinfect the term "Romantic" from some of the false 
associations that have hampered a more positive view of 
current Romantic rhetorics, and to widen the term "Romantic" 
for those who have conceived of it too narrowly.
The historian Jacques Barzun has pointed out that the 
twentieth century has harbored an "anti-Romantic animus"
(Classic, Romantic, Modern xi). When we consider how 
pervasive and relentless the disparagement of Romanticism 
has been, it is not surprising that a theory of rhetoric 
which has been identified as a descendant of Romanticism 
should come under attack as well. Much of the aversion to 
Romanticism, however, seems based on caricatures of the 
Romantic poets, caricatures which have their roots in false 
images either perpetuated by the poets themselves or by the 
satirical portraits of Romantic contemporaries like Thomas 
Love Peacock.1
Peacock's sympathies were with neoclassical critical
principles and he adroitly parodies a number of ideas
popularized by Wordsworth and Coleridge. Feigning
Wordsworth's voice, Peacock manages to portray the Lake
Poets as idealistic nature freaks who have no use for
society, and who walk around being showered with "poetical
impressions":
"Poetical impressions can be received only 
among natural scenes: for all that is 
artificial is antipoetical. Society is 
artificial, therefore we will live out of
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society. The mountains are natural, 
therefore we will live in the mountains.
There we shall be shining models of virtue, 
passing the whole day in the innocent and 
amiable occupation of going up and down 
hill, receiving poetical impressions. . .
("The Four Ages of Poetry 495)
Although satire is sometimes based on some truth in what is 
being ridiculed, we must also remember that satire makes its 
case by reduction and simplification. From a passage like 
this arises the false sense that the Romantics were merely 
"nature poets" who saw themselves as virtuous souls in a 
decaying society. While the Romantics were idealistic and 
even they promoted a caricature of themselves as brooding, 
isolated, and lonely poets, they were actually less so than 
either they or Peacock portray.
Peacock goes on, this time in his own voice as literary 
critic, to suggest that the Romantics lacked reason and 
intellectual rigor, and to denigrate the imagination to a 
form of "fantasy": "[the Lake Poets] remaining studiously 
ignorant of history, society, and human nature, cultivated 
the fantasy only at the expense of the memory and the 
reason" (495). He also offers a scathing interpretation of 
the Romantic focus on feeling: "The highest inspirations of
poetry are resolvable into three ingredients: the rant of 
unregulated passion, the whining of exaggerated feeling, and 
the cant of factitious sentiment" (486).
Jacques Barzun's cultural history of Romanticism, 
Classic, Romantic, Modern, explains that extreme views of
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Romanticism like Peacock's became accepted though unfounded 
generalizations that promoted the twentieth century's 
negative view of Romanticism. Some of these widespread 
generalizations include the idea that Romanticism is stupid, 
anti-intellectual, fanciful, irrational, sentimental, an 
exaggeration of individuality, and overly emotional.2
The Romantic emphasis on imagination, creativity, and 
process, for instance, has often resulted in a charge of 
anti-intellectualism. We can see how this has leaked into 
discussions on composition when Richard Young reminds us 
that a "frequently heard accusation against the new 
romanticism" is its lack of academic and intellectual 
"rigor" ("Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks" 56). This 
general accusation picked up additional force when some 
expressivist rhetoricians dropped all reading from their 
writing courses and advocated that the students own writing 
be the primary text in the class. Donald Murray, for 
example, taught writing courses at the University of New 
Hampshire where the only required reading was the reading of 
the texts generated by the students in the course. This was 
in response, it seems, to the traditional Freshman English 
course, which was not specifically a writing course.
Rather, it was taught as another literature course which 
required the typical literary analysis. Murray himself 
explains in his recent anthology of reading expressly for
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composition classes that the typical approach to the 
teaching of writing did not allow students to make any 
connection between the problems they faced in their own 
drafts and the finished products they were reading: "When I
first taught Freshman English I had to follow a syllabus 
that forced the students to read prose models that the 
students— and I—  could not relate to the problems they face 
in their own writing" (xiii). Although Murray's intent was 
admirable— to connect reading to the actual writing 
process— he might well have added to the already prevalent 
belief that anything "Romantic" lacks "rigor."
Moreover, it is quite possible that individual 
expressivist teachers have unintentionally curtailed 
intellectual activity in the classroom through an attempt to 
bring imagination, feeling, and spontaneity to the 
forefront. If for example, teachers allow students to write 
whatever and however they wish in the name of "creativity," 
or "spontaneity," while too often ignoring craft, content, 
revision, or the needs of an audience, then this charge is 
credible. I would urge expressivists, then, as well as 
those who wish to condemn Romantic educational theories on 
the basis of anti-intellectualism, to re-examine what the 
Romantics actually practiced.
The Romantics believed strongly in the importance of 
intellectual activity. Shelley wrote insightful and
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knowledgeable essays on many subjects, including love, 
religion, and politics. Coleridge was a philosopher as well 
as a poet, and perhaps one of the best read thinkers of all 
time. Moreover, his lectures on Shakespeare remain a 
standard in the literary canon. In Aids to Reflection he 
argues not only for reading, but for reflection, analysis, 
and synthesis of that reading. It is a misunderstanding of 
Wordsworth, perhaps, that has most promoted the belief that 
the Romantics were anti-intellectual. If poems such as 
"Expostulation and Reply" and "Tables Turned" are read at 
face value, severed from Wordsworth's fuller philosophy, 
then it appears that he indeed might be privileging frolic 
with nature over intellectual activity. But Wordsworth was 
adamant about books and study, not only for himself, but in 
his plan for a successful national education as well.3 
Finally, a study of all of the Romantic poets and their 
works reveals their thorough knowledge of the greatest works 
of science, history, art, and literature, not only of their 
own time, but of the past.
If we look closely at what the Romantics can offer a 
theory for education and rhetoric, it is a far cry from 
anti-intellectual. They simply argue for a different sort 
of intellect— one that is representative of the human mind 
working to its fullest capacity, an imaginative and 
synthesizing mind. It is study of books and study of nature,
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it is reason and imagination, but not anti-intellectualism, 
that allow for the encompassing intellect. In turn, this 
fuller intellect fostered in our students can result in the 
ability to think and reflect deeply, and to create ideas and 
solutions. It is this that expressivists want for students 
and not merely the ability to repeat such memorized "facts” 
as dates and definitions, as Dickens' Bitzer does in Hard 
Times. As Ann Berthoff would argue, without an imaginative 
mind capable of "forming,” composition becomes a mere act of 
drill rather than an act of making meaning.
Expressivist rhetorics have also been negatively 
appraised if not dismissed on the grounds that pedagogies 
which arise from the Romantic tradition are premised on a 
view that successful writing occurs only through 
inspiration or through genius. Unfortunately, this is 
another case where the Romantics help to paint a caricature 
of themselves. Linda Flower, for instance, argues that the 
myth of the inspired writer arose from Coleridge's 
introductory remarks on how he composed the poem ”Kubla 
Khan." "Coleridge's account of his experience," explains 
Flower, "contains four major elements of the myth of 
inspiration" (Problem solving Strategies for Writers 42).
In his introduction to "Kubla Khan" Coleridge suggests that 
the creative vision comes without effort, fully articulated, 
that it comes in a matter of moments, and that it cannot be
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repeated because it is a gift from the muse. Flower finds 
that expressivism falls short as an effective theory for 
writing instruction, then, because this Romantic "myth of 
the inspired writer" does not take into account cognitive 
processes and such writerly strategies as problem solving 
and goal setting, and because the myth breeds passivity in 
students who would believe in inspiration and the muse 
rather than in hard work and the practice of successful 
writing strategies. John Gage argues that students learn to 
believe that "'Writers are born not made.' 'Writers are 
sensitive people, gifted with imagination'" ("Why Write?" 
17). This belief, says Gage, is "mixed up with another 
general superstition, perpetuated by the culture, that 
writers are special people, an idea that has its origin in 
the romantic adulation of writers as a class . . . The 
romantic belief is a strong one, and it helps to kill the 
motivation of students who have struggled with mastery of 
technique" (17). Patricia Bizzell, like Gage, finds that 
her students accept the idea of writing as inspiration— the 
students seem to like the idea of "instant text production" 
("Composing Processes: An Overview"). She further points 
out that her students are not alone in this fantasy of 
"instant text production." Bizzell suggests that it is 
"part of a more general notion in our culture, a sort of 
debased Romantic version of creativity wherein verbal
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artifacts are supposed to be produced as easily and 
inevitably as a hen lays eggs" (49).
Here, Flower, Bizzell, and Gage illustrate my point 
about the way in which general myths surrounding Romanticism 
have entered the conversations about current rhetorical 
theory. It is true that we have come to view artists and 
poets as special beings blessed with transcendent power.
This probably does have its roots in Romanticism as Gage 
suggests, perhaps because the Romantic self-projections, the 
poet figures in the poetry of the Romantics, emanate a 
blessed and special quality, and also because, as Flower 
points out about the introduction to Kubla Khan, the poets 
liked to give readers the sense that their poems and 
creative visions just happened upon them. Yet, in larger 
works such as the Biographia Literaria and the Preface to 
the Lyrical Ballads, their theories on the making of poetry 
and the poet are less "adulating." Although the poets did 
believe they had a greater "sensibility" than the general 
population, they were not as elitist as Gage implies; the 
Romantics believed that this "sensibility" was something 
that could be cultivated.
Just as the accusation that the Romantics believed in a 
myth of the inspired writer is somewhat justified, the 
accusation that expressivists similarly hold to a notion of 
good writing as inspired, mysterious, and as some sort of
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gift in not unfounded. Scholars like William Coles, for 
instance, have suggested that writing is an art, and since 
art cannot be taught as a mere skill, we cannot really teach 
writing as writing ("The Teaching of Writing as Writing" 
111). While I agree with Coles that writing is much more 
than a skill and that if it is to be "good" writing it 
should not be taught as though it is a skill or a formulaic 
procedure, it still remains that it is dangerous to conceive 
of writing as an art or gift of genius. If we have a 
classroom where some students have god-given inspiration and 
others do not, or if we propose a theory that assumes good 
writers are inspired or must have innate genius, then an 
oppressive and undemocratic classroom has been 
predetermined. There are, after all, very few of our 
students whom we would classify as "genius," and thus there 
is no hope in the writing classroom for the majority of our 
students because we have automatically created an 
underclass.
David Russell sees this sort of undemocratic and
oppressive end to expressivist pedagogy:
At the level of public policy, then,
Romantic assumptions about composition have 
a particularly significant effect. If 
composition is an individual response to 
inner promptings, a mysterious process, 
then some will be prompted and some will 
not. Those who are not may be excluded.
Sometimes that exclusion is direct: a
student is not admitted, or admitted only 
to certain programs . . .  At other times
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the exclusion is more subtle: a student is
excluded from an education that empowers 
her to take a leadership role in society 
because an institution assumes that many 
(or most) of its students cannot write well 
enough to receive such an education, or 
that they cannot be taught . . .  to write. 
("Romantics on Writing: Liberal Culture and 
the Abolition of Composition Courses" 144)
I am not arguing against Russell's point that public policy
is affected, sometimes for the worse, if institutions assume
that good writing happens only through inspiration or that
composition cannot be taught. Rather, my point of departure
is with what Bizzell hints at when she notes that the myth
of instant text production is a Romantic idea which has been
"debased." I will be more blunt and call it an
understandable, but misuse nonetheless, of the term
"Romantic."4 To misconstrue Romantic ideas about genius and
inspiration has consequences: it confines expressivists to
a theory of composing that is limited and perhaps damaging
to students; and it allows critics of expressivism a
convenient reason to dismiss expressivist rhetorics as too
problematic to be useful. If we return to the Romantics in
order to understand more fully what it means to be the
"inspired writer" then perhaps this issue will become less
of a stumbling block. Critics might be less likely to cast
out what is good about Romantic rhetorics with what is bad,
and perhaps it will offer expressivists new insight, not
only into their heritage, but into the complexities involved
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with the composing of "good writing." We can also begin to 
correct for our students the misconceived notion of 
inspiration and genius so that they do not continue to 
believe in the idea of "instant text production" and so that 
"motivation is not killed" for those who have worked hard to 
"master technique."
Both expressivists and their critics who argue that 
expressivist theories suggest students must be geniuses or 
inspired to write well are confusing the education of the 
imagination or "encompassing intellect" with the production 
of a great poet or artist. Wordsworth and Coleridge 
probably would argue that an imaginative education is a 
precondition of becoming a great poet, but they nowhere 
suggest that it is only great poets who have imagination. 
Wordsworth, for example, believed that the imagination is 
innate, as his poetry about children suggests, but that it 
is "educated" out of us. He believed that the imagination 
can be cultivated and nurtured in all people, and since the 
imagination is the key ingredient for genius, he believed 
that genius is also innate but that it needs to be drawn 
forth with the right kind of education. Coleridge was more 
skeptical of this belief because he held that all people 
have Primary Imagination but not all are capable of 
utilizing the Secondary. However, the Secondary Imagination 
can be put into motion by a mind self-consciously aware of
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its own imaginative potential (Biographia Literaria XVII). 
Like Coleridge's discussion of the educated mind, this claim 
that the imagination can be voluntarily invoked points to 
the Romantic faith that people can nurture an imaginative 
mind. Thus, when we examine issues of inspiration, genius, 
and the imagination in this light, the negative criticism 
that a Romantic pedagogy does not work because our students 
are not poetic geniuses is less credible.
To expressivists who claim that we might as well not 
teach composition because good writing happens only when 
those few students who have genius and an imaginative mind 
happen to be struck with inspiration, and to critics who 
disregard Romantic rhetorics because of a debased 
understanding of Romantic inspiration, I suggest that a 
closer look at Romanticism will offer an alternative 
reading. I have already discussed the question of genius. 
Ideally, the issue of inspiration takes care of itself 
through the entire enterprise of cultivating in our students 
an encompassing and imaginative intellect. In other words, 
when the mind is properly prepared, inspiration becomes a 
habit, not an occasional gift from the muse.
In The Prelude, Wordsworth has written:
for I neither seem 
To lack that first great gift, the vital soul,
Nor general Truths, which are themselves a sort 
Of Elements and Agents, Under-powers,
Subordinate helpers of the living mind:
Nor am I naked of external things,
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Forms, images . . . .  (Book I 149-155)
This passage identifies "general Truths," "external things" 
and the "vital soul" as necessary seeds for the growth of 
the philosophical mind. At least two of the these core 
ingredients— "vital soul" and "external things"— also become 
essential to the educational philosophies of Arnold, Mill, 
and Dewey. Likewise, they have traversed time and are 
inherent in the theory and pedagogy of current expressivists 
such as Elbow and Murray. Each has made the point that if 
we foster what Wordsworth calls the "vital soul" or "living 
mind" we are promoting observation, perception, experience, 
discovery, feelings, and reflection. These, in their 
entirety, allow Wordsworth to compose poetry that appears to 
be spontaneous and inspired, allow Elbow to tap into the 
"good writing that can just flow," and allow Murray the 
surprising "moment of insight," not just occasionally, but 
on a regular basis for almost any writing task. In other 
words, inspiration for the Romantics, and for most Romantic 
rhetoricians, is not a phenomenon that is random and 
involuntary. As Coleridge says, the creative act is 
motivated by "voluntary will," and in the Preface to the 
Second Edition of the Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth suggests 
that it is practice that makes the poet different from the 
nonpoet: "from practice . . .  a greater readiness and power 
in expressing what he thinks and feels, and especially those
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thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or from the 
structure of his own mind, arise in him without immediate 
external excitement" (737).
The problem for a theory and pedagogy of writing, of 
course, lies in the fact that a writing course lasts ten to 
fifteen weeks— certainly not enough time to cultivate an 
encompassing intellect in students. Yet, it is Wordsworth's 
"practice" that Romantic rhetorics foster and hope to set 
into motion, not just for ten or fifteen weeks, but for a 
lifetime. However, when expressivists advocate pre-writing, 
freewriting, searching for voice, and discovery as ways of 
not only inducing "good writing" from our students but as a 
way of incorporating writing into their lives and for 
initiating the continued growth of the intellect as well, 
they are saddled with the unwarranted criticism that the 
expressivist approach sees no writing "worth doing" but 
writing for discovery. This is yet another way in which 
expressivist rhetorics are unfairly disparaged. Maxine 
Hairston, for instance, misreads expressivists on this 
point:
They [Murray, Elbow, Coles, Berthoff] 
believe that we create meaning by writing, 
that meaning does not exist as a separate 
entity to be communicated by writing. They 
hold that the essential features of good 
writing are originality and an authentic 
voice. These teachers seem to believe that 
every time students write they should do 
Class III writing [what Hairston calls 
reflective writing], spending substantial
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time on discovery and working through 
several drafts to find out what they mean.
They imply that no other writing is worth 
doing. ("Different Products, Different 
Processes: A Theory about Writing" 449)
Hairston is correct that expressivists believe "students
should write to discover themselves and to make sense out of
their world," but they do not imply that other kinds of
writing are unworthy. In Writing With Power, Peter Elbow
spends many pages discussing writing strategies for tasks
that do not lend themselves to discovery, drafting, and
reflecting. What Elbow does argue is that doing reflective
writing and writing for discovery whenever possible can make
one a better writer and thinker, thereby helping out in any
writing task. Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, he is talking
about "personal," "authentic," and "emotive" writing as
necessary to the growth of self and mind, not that it is
necessary for every written document. Like Mill, he
realizes that the emotive cannot be separated from the
analytical without consequences.
Elbow addresses these misguided criticisms himself when
he tells his reader that
in the short run there is probably a 
conflict between developing a real voice 
and producing successful pragmatic 
writing— polished pieces that work for 
specific audiences and situations. . . Deep 
personal outrage, for example, may be the 
only authentic tone of voice you can use in 
writing to a particular person, yet that 
voice is neither appropriate or useful for
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the actual document you have to write.
(Writing With Power 307)
Elbow would argue that a quick five- or-ten minute freewrite 
might clear the mind of this outrage, thus allowing for the 
faster construction of the appropriate text. The feelings 
are not denied but remain a counterpart to the analytical 
approach which produces the "appropriate" text.
I would argue, finally, that much of what creates the 
"vital soul," and thus what creates the most fertile 
opportunities for successful writing, can be taught to our 
students. We can, for instance, teach them to feel, to know 
and understand their passions through such exercises as 
Peter Elbow's freewritings and through personal journal 
writing. We can take the important step of teaching them to 
reflect on their feelings, thoughts, observations, 
perceptions, and experiences as Ann Berthoff does with her 
double-entry notebook. There is much that we can teach, and 
if we take our cues from the Romantics, perhaps we can 
envision and define a pedagogy that makes insight and 
inspiration a recurrent aspect of every student's daily 
thinking, and of the majority of their writing tasks, from 
the most mundane to the most artistic. If, on the other 
hand, we choose to teach writing as a skill of form and 
style and not as an act of thinking, or an act of the 
creative and imaginative mind, there will be very few 
students indeed who will become "good writers."
165
As this discussion on inspiration, genius, "vital 
soul," and good writing illustrates, it is difficult to 
discuss Romanticism and expressivist rhetorics without 
"emotions" and "feelings" creeping into the conversation.
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that there are 
certain myths, usually negative ones, surrounding 
Romanticism which have become commonplace. The Romantic 
concern with the emotive has resulted in one of these 
general misunderstandings. It has become a generally 
accepted cultural assumption that to be "Romantic" is 
equivalent to being overly sensitive, sentimental, and 
emotional. Likewise, there is a general feeling that 
expressivist rhetorics are "touchy feely," overly indulgent, 
and inappropriately tolerant of students wallowing in their 
own feelings. Admittedly, expressivists, especially Peter 
Elbow, do not balk at the idea of bringing personal feeling 
into the educational arena and the writing classroom; thus, 
it is easy to see how this assumption continues to thrive.
As I pointed out in my earlier discussion of Peter 
Elbow (Chapter 3), learning to write well relies a great 
deal on learning to write with a "real voice." Elbow 
believes that the search for voice means exploring feelings: 
"angry feelings, perhaps depressed feelings" (Writing with 
Power 284). This search for voice, in turn, is a catalyst 
to the sorts of reflective thinking and writing which result
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in "growth or development" (Elbow 284). If we remember, 
Elbow indicates that intellectual development might come 
about through writing to voice anger, hurt, or betrayal.
His point is, finally, that these feelings, whatever they 
may be, are crucial. However, just as it is wrong to view 
the Romantic poets as overly emotional, it is mistaken to 
assume that Elbow's students are allowed to devote an entire 
writing course to indulging their feelings.
Elbow is not advocating raw emotions and feelings as 
good writing even though they are part of fully experiencing 
something. He is advocating the Romantic version of 
experience and Wordsworth's and Dewey's belief that 
expression is at its best when an overflow of powerful 
emotion is recalled and recreated through language at a 
later time, not at the moment of the overflow. That is, as 
Wordsworth puts it in the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, 
"Our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed 
by our thoughts, which are indeed the representations of all 
our past feelings" (1815 735). What is important here, but 
often forgotten or ignored, is that Wordsworth's poetry is 
not written at the moment he is overwhelmed with raw 
feeling, but it is written from a distance while re- 
experiencing some event that yielded those strong feelings. 
This is exactly Elbow's point when he says that good writing 
arises out of the re-experience, the participation in an
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event. Peter Elbow is aware that people misconstrue the 
part emotions play in his rhetoric, and thus he makes a 
point to explain that writing is not just "loud emotion" 
(312), but rather, as Wordsworth argues, a "recollection in 
tranquillity."
Relevant to this discussion on emotion is the notion 
that the Romantic emphasis on personal feeling, greater 
sensibility, and experience is a reflection merely of the 
inner self and therefore meaningful only to the individual. 
The Romantic poets7 focus on self-discovery and personal 
vision are often interpreted as outright self-centeredness 
or egocentrism. In fact, this interpretation lies behind 
the fact that a focus on the personal seems to have entered 
into the general lore surrounding Romanticism as the 
"radical individualism" that Barzun identifies as an 
undeserving general accusation. In a similar vein, 
expressivist rhetorics appear to have been infused with this 
generally held misconception, and are perhaps too 
unthinkingly thought of as self-centered and "radically" 
individualistic (Berlin "Rhetoric and Ideology" 492). The 
Romantic notion of self, however, is more complex than these 
charges assume. Once again, in order to share with 
expressivists a deeper understanding of their heritage, and 
to dispel the tendency to stereotype expressivists because 
an ill-conceived myth has spilled into the ways in which we
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view current expressivist rhetorics, I would like to point 
out that it is a commonly held misconception that 
Romanticism is primarily subjective to the point of 
egocentricity.
Perception, observation, and reflection led the 
Romantics to a sharpened sense of empathy which allowed them 
to go beyond egocentrism. Coleridge makes it clear that the 
poet should transcend personal interest and any form of 
radical individualism. As poets, indeed as human beings, we 
should
live in the universal, to know no self but 
that which is reflected not only from the 
faces of all around us, our fellow- 
creatures, but reflected from the flowers, 
the trees, the beasts, yea from the very 
surface of the waters and the sands of the 
desert . . . .  (From The Philosophical 
Lectures, quoted in Wellek 162)
For Wordsworth, poetry exists primarily to work on human
feelings for the purpose of reaching mental and moral
happiness. He thought the circumstances of the poet were
often a buffer to what others actually suffered in the
world; thus, he believes sympathy and empathy are critical:
However exalted a notion we would wish to 
cherish of the character of a Poet, it is 
obvious, that while he describes and 
imitates passions, his employment is in 
some degree mechanical, compared with the 
freedom and power of real and substantial 
action and suffering. So that it will be 
the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings 
near to those of the persons whose feelings 
he describes, nay, for short spaces of 
time, perhaps, to let himself slip into an
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entire delusion, and even confound and
identify his own feelings with theirs.
(Preface 737)
Wordsworth also argued that one of the functions of poetry 
is to agitate people out of their "savage torpor" and 
"spread relationship and love." He aspired to give people 
more feeling in order to create not only happy and moral 
individuals, but a happy and moral society, and he saw his 
job as a poet to bring all of society together: "the Poet
binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of 
human society, as it is spread over the whole earth, and 
over all time" (Preface 738).
Blake has said that the most sublime act is to give up 
the self for another, and scholars have noted that Keats was
sincere, generous and open-minded, having "extraordinary
sympathetic and tolerant understanding of other people"
(Bate Major British Writers 317). Keats's concept of 
"negative capability" suggests that one way to grasp the 
complexities of life is by negating our own egos while being 
imaginatively open-minded, sympathetic, and receptive to 
differing kinds of experience.
Shelley, too, believed in an individualism which did 
not create an unfeeling or isolated self. In A Defense of 
Poetry , he argues that a moral and just society relies on 
"love":
or a going out of our own nature, and an 
identification of ourselves with the
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beautiful which exists in thought, action, 
or person, not our own. A man, to be 
greatly good, must imagine intensely and
comprehensively; he must put himself in the
place of another and of many others; the
pains and pleasures of his species must 
become his own. (Noyes 1101)
Within the Romantic enterprise, then, is the undergirding
for a rhetorical pedagogy that is based on the opposite of
radical individualism or egocentrism.
Those of us who teach first-year college students are 
painfully aware just how easy it is for students to get 
stuck in the subjective, to believe what they think and feel
is more important than what anyone else feels or has to say.
In light of this, it is possible, in fact probable, that 
some Romantic rhetoricians, in their hope to foster 
uniqueness, personal vision, and voice, have focused on 
individualism in such a way as to promote an already 
predisposed egocentricity that does not result in empathy. 
Many have not, however. Peter Elbow echoes Coleridge's cry 
for living in the "universal," for instance, when he argues 
that an organism cannot grow, the mind cannot grow toward 
knowledge, unless we allow ourselves to be "swallowed by 
what is different from the self— to merge or expand into 
what is different" ("The Pedagogy of the Bamboozled" 
Embracing Contraries 97). Elbow's "doubting and believing" 
game promotes a methodology for learning that is based on 
empathy. It is, in fact, a concept reminiscent of Keats's
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"negative capability."5 "The believing game," says Elbow,
"is essentially cooperative or collaborative":
the central event is the act of affirming 
or entering into someone's thinking or 
perceiving. It tends to imply a 
pluralistic model of knowledge— namely, 
that truth is often complex and that 
different people often catch different 
aspects of it; and that we get closer to 
seeing correctly by entering into each 
others' conflicting perceptions or 
formulations. ("Methodological Doubting 
and Believing" Embracing Contraries 289)
Like Keats, Elbow is aware that empathic action often leaves
one with a chaotic or disjointed feeling. Elbow suggests
that this uncomfortable feeling comes from a reluctance to
practice "believing" or empathy, and Keats argues that it is
the ability to sit comfortably with chaos or uncertainty
that is valuable: to be "capable of being in uncertainties,
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact
and reason" (Letters December 1817).
Donald Murray, though he differs from Elbow in that his
pedagogy seems less obviously based in empathy, is also an
expressivist who tries not to foster an egocentric
individualism in students. In fact, he urges students toward
an empathetic understanding of otherness. In Write to
Learn, Murray's text for student writers, he writes:
Another way to make yourself receive 
information that may be helpful to you as a 
writer is to practice empathy, the ability 
to put yourself in other people's skins.
We can imagine what it might be like to be 
rich if we are poor or poor if we're rich,
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to be a policeman, to be selling or buying.
(33)
In addition to role-playing, he urges students to make 
personal contact with people, observe and join a child at 
play, he might suggest. Or interview a poor person in order 
to find out what it is like to be without food and medicine, 
to hear first-hand about the pangs of hunger. Just as 
empathy allows Keats to take part in the existence of the 
sparrow that comes before his window, Murray wants his 
students, through observation, imaginative role-playing, and 
interviewing, to be able to take part in the existence of 
the lives of other people. He wants them, through their 
receptiveness, sympathy, reflection, and ultimately their 
writing, to discover other worlds, and make connections 
which make them aware, allowing them the greater possibility 
for communicating through language with those who are 
different from them. So, as I have argued, the Romantic 
self is not based on an individualism that supersedes 
concern for others. Nor, as Murray and Elbow show us, do 
current expressivist rhetorics necessarily promote 
egocentricity or negative forms of individualism in this 
regard.
The simplification of the Romantic philosophies of the 
self and of the pedagogical theories of Romantic 
rhetoricians does not stop with issues of empathy and 
understanding of others. Unfortunately, Romantic theories
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have perpetuated a sense that audience is unimportant. It 
is true that previous to the Romantics poets saw pleasing an 
audience as the major concern of artistic endeavor, and that 
part of what is so revolutionary about Romantic thought is 
the importance of the individual vision. It is a major 
shift in artistic orientation when the mind in the act of 
creation and composing becomes a major part of the 
rhetorical situation and the role of the audience seems 
subordinate to this vision. And although this shifting to 
include the importance of the individual vision can be 
interpreted as slighting the importance of audience, it 
certainly does not exclude all concern with audience.
Wordsworth, for instance, usually evaluates his poetry 
by its effects on the reader. He recognized that in order 
to gain the effect that he wanted he had to revise and 
perfect technique. There is overwhelming evidence of 
Wordsworth's laborious and constant revisions of both his 
theoretical discussions and his verse. Further, until 
recently critics have viewed Wordsworth as a poor theorist, 
or illogical in the argument he makes in the Preface to the 
Lyrical Ballads. This view is changing, however, and 
critics now recognize the rhetorical nature of Wordsworth's 
Preface. John Nabholtz, for instance, sees the Preface as a 
rhetorical work in which Wordsworth is attempting to build a 
relationship between himself as writer and his audience as
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reader ("My Reader, My Fellow-Labourer": A Study of English 
Romantic Prose). Although Anhradha Dingwaney and Lawrence 
Needham take issue with Nabholtz's reading, and believe that 
Wordsworth was not uniting reader and writer, they 
nonetheless argue that the Preface is audience-directed and 
"rhetorical in a specific sense" because it "seeks to clear 
the way and create a taste for the Ballads by taking to task 
those 'codes of decision' (and the audience which subscribes 
to them) standing in the way of a genuine appreciation of 
the poems; by doing so, it seeks to influence the subsequent 
reception of the Ballads" ((Un)Creating Taste; Wordsworth's 
Platonic Defense in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads 334).
And Coleridge, in spite of his attempts to make his poetry 
appear as though it came effortlessly and fully forged from 
the mind, always worked to create a product of careful and 
conscious organization. Finally, let us not forget that 
like most poets, the Romantics meant their works to be read 
and taken seriously by an audience: "Poets do not write for
Poets alone" (Wordsworth Preface 739). In fact, the 
Romantics were the first generation of writers to appeal 
directly to the reading public, not to patrons.
The propensity for Romantic rhetorics to face similar 
criticisms— that their focus on spontaneity and personal 
voice slight the importance of audience— seems natural 
considering how regularly the ill-conceived generalizations
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surrounding Romanticism have become commonplace today. Once 
again, Donald Murray helps to distinguish deserved 
criticisms from an unwarranted criticism that takes its 
power from a stereotype of Romanticism. He serves as an 
example of an expressivist who does not suppress the 
rhetorical importance of audience through a focus on the 
self. Murray does not allow his own writing, or that of his 
students, to remain egocentric or isolated from a wider 
audience. He pushes his writing, and that of his students, 
beyond the personal and private to the social. Murray is, 
after all, a poet, novelist, journalist, and regular 
columnist for the Boston Globe. As a writer, his goal is to 
reach an audience. He has written innumerable articles on 
audience and revision (eg. "What Makes Readers Read," "Write 
Research to be Read," "Teaching the Other Self: The Writer's 
First Reader," "Make Meaning Clear: The Logic of Revisions," 
"The Maker's Eye: Revising Your Own Manuscripts"); his texts 
always contain discussions on this part of the writing 
process, and his class is structured so as to pursue the 
craft of continuous revision. His students draft, and they 
meet in conferences with Murray and then draft again. They 
try countless leads and conclusions. They rewrite the same 
paper in a different style or voice. Sometimes they work on 
one project, continuously revising throughout the semester.
Because Murray believes that the most accurate 
definition of writing is "the process of using language to
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discover meaning in experience and to communicate it"
(Learning By Teaching 73), he advocates moving from what 
Linda Flower calls "writer-based" prose to "reader-based" 
prose. "Communication" is the key word, and the end goal, 
for Murray and his students. If you can order information, 
he says, "into significant meaning and then communicate it 
to others [you] will influence the course of events within 
town or nation, school or university, company or 
corporation" (Write to Learn 4). The awareness, the 
empathy, the greater understanding of self and others gained 
by Murray's students are set before the world in an attempt 
to understand and communicate. Contrary to what critics of 
Murray's pedagogy might think, this focus on self in his 
teaching philosophy does not totally eclipse the importance 
of audience.
Peter Elbow seems an easier target than Donald Murray 
for the accusation that expressivist rhetorics ignore 
audience more than they ought to. In fact, a major 
difference between Elbow and Murray is what Murray recently 
revealed to me as his obsessive need for closure and a 
relentless call for revision. Though Elbow does not ignore 
revision, he seems much more at ease with a lack of closure 
and with putting the emphasis on invention, and Murray makes 
no bones about this difference between them.
At any rate, it is certainly clear that audience is not 
the central element of Elbow's rhetorical teachings. Elbow
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acknowledges that there are charges of "audience dismissal" 
pending against him when he states: "It will be clear that 
my argument for writing without audience awareness is not 
meant to undermine the many good reasons for writing with 
audience awareness some of the time" ("An Argument for 
Ignoring Audience" 50). That Elbow anticipates resistance 
to his position is not surprising when a few paragraphs
later he takes the controversial stance that "ignoring
audience can lead to better writing— immediately. In 
effect, writer-based prose can be better than reader-based 
prose" (53).
Yet, those of us familiar with Elbow's work know that
he does directly address the issue of audience in his texts.
In Writing With Power, for instance, he writes:
They [readers] don't have us with them as 
they read and they lack all those cues they
would get from watching our movements and
hearing our tone of voice and emphasis. In
writing we must get the words on the page
so clear that there's no need for audio­
visual aids. Thus, readers in their 
solitariness need more of the very things 
that writers in their solitariness are most 
likely to omit. The moral of the story is 
obvious: pay lots of attention as you write 
to your audience and its needs. (177)
Elbow is aware that the most "frequent weakness in the
writing of beginners . . .  is too little attention to the
needs of the reader" (178). This is why discussions of
audience remain important, even in the expressivist's
classroom.
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Admittedly, audience is not the primary focus for
Elbow, because like Murray, Elbow believes that a premature
emphasis on audience can have deadly effect on student
writing: "some of their worst writing— both jumbled and
flat— comes from worrying too much about audience" at the
inappropriate time (178). He returns to this argument in
the more recent "An Argument for Ignoring Audience" as well:
"It is not that writers should never think about their
audience. It's a question of when" (51). And when the time
is wrong, suggests Elbow, not only is bad writing the
result, but the process of making meaning comes to an abrupt
halt. Elbow has placed his argument about audience in
opposition to that of neo-classical rhetoric:
Notice that two pieties of composition 
theory are in conflict:
(1) Think about audience as you write (this 
stemming from the classical rhetorical 
tradition).
(2) Use writing for making new meaning, not 
just transmitting old meanings already 
worked out (this stemming from the new 
epistemic tradition I associate with Ann 
Berthoff's classic explorations) (53).
As with the Romantics, the onus for expressivist 
teachers has shifted from audience as the cardinal 
rhetorical concern, especially at the beginning of a writing 
task, to personal voice and vision, to what the writer is 
trying to say. Nonetheless, audience remains a part of the 
rhetorical situation. I suspect, however, that most people 
in the discipline of composition understand Elbow's
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argument. They may not agree with him, but nonetheless they 
probably realize that Elbow is not advocating that students 
flatly repress their concern for audience in all writing 
tasks.
I would certainly grant, however, that students might 
misunderstand Elbow's teachings unless we apply his 
theoretical stance with care. I sense the possibility for 
misconstruing Elbow's perspective on audience is linked to 
the cultural assumptions surrounding the "myth of the 
inspired writer" that I discussed earlier. When teachers
such as Murray and Elbow focus on personal voice and vision
it is easy for students to cling to Bizzell's notion of 
"instant text production." As she notes, the result of this 
notion is a resistance to revision. "After all," students 
might think, "this is my personal vision. I said it in my
voice how I wanted to say it, and it was inspired." From
here it is an easy leap for students to resist revision and 
to deny that an audience should have any impact on their 
writing. What seems crucial, then, is that we be extremely 
careful when we apply Elbow's argument for ignoring 
audience, and that we be sure that the focus on personal 
vision does not continue to reinforce a misunderstood 
version of Romantic inspiration.
It is interesting to see how the denigrated theories of 
the Romantics come into play with current rhetorical
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theories when Elbow himself writes, "To celebrate writer- 
based prose is to risk the charge of romanticism: just 
warbling one's woodnotes wild. But my position also 
contains the austere classic view that we must nevertheless 
revise with conscious awareness . . ("An Argument for 
Ignoring Audience" 55). Elbow seems to wish to dissociate 
himself from the Romantic tradition from which his theories 
have evolved, perhaps because he has not considered an 
interpretation that sees Romanticism as already containing 
the delicate balance between raw material and revision. 
Romanticism is not advocating "warbling one's woodnotes 
wild," and it is worth offering another interpretation so 
that expressivists, and their students and critics, begin to 
realize that the Romantic tradition offers a version of 
inspiration that comes only after hard work and much 
practice. Even "an inspired piece of writing" is 
laboriously revised in light of an awareness of audience.
Recent criticisms by scholars such as Karen Burke 
LeFevre and James Berlin who align themselves with theories 
of marxism, social construction, or social-epistemic 
rhetorics find expressivist theories lacking because they 
seem to focus on the individual as opposed to the 
relationship that involves the dialectical interaction among 
writer, community, and social, political, and economic 
conditions of existence. Karen Burke LeFevre has written,
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for example, that within the Romantic tradition "the
inspired writer is apart from others and wants to keep it
that way" so as to "prevent himself and his creation from
being corrupted by society" (Invention as a Social Act 17).
And James Berlin has claimed that
expressionistic rhetoric is intended to 
serve as a critique of the ideology of 
corporate capitalism, proposing in its 
place an ideology based on radical 
individualism. In the name of empowering 
the individual, however, its naivete about 
economic, social, and political 
arrangements can lead to the marginalizing 
of the individuals who would resist a 
dehumanizing society, rendering them 
ineffective through their isolation." (492)
LeFevre's criticisms are at least partially founded on 
the debased commonplace definitions of Romanticism that 
Jacques Barzun has found so prevalent. Of course, the myth 
of the inspired and solitary writer, since it is so widely 
accepted, will continue to do the damage that LeFevre 
reports until we actively debunk it as I have been trying to 
do throughout this chapter. Berlin's charge against 
expressivism is also tied up in the misinformed 
generalizations surrounding Romanticism, but the 
misunderstanding lies with expressivists themselves and not 
Berlin. What Berlin presents is a clear case of 
expressivist theory gone awry in its application. That is,
I believe Berlin is correct in his assessment that 
"expressionistic rhetoric is intended to serve as a critique
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of the ideology of corporate capitalism," but that in 
practice expressivism can backfire. I will argue, however, 
that there is nothing inherent to a theory of expressivism 
that creates "ineffective" citizens, but that in the real 
world of the classroom a sort of "radical individualism" is 
practiced, perhaps because of a misconstrued vision of the 
Romantic individual.
As I have already pointed out, expressivist rhetorics 
and Romanticism evolved in part as a reaction to the 
establishment. In the case of contemporary expressivism, 
individuality becomes important since it appears that the 
individual is lost in the face of modern bureaucracy and 
corporate capitalism. In order to regain any sense of 
selfhood in the modern capitalist world, the predominate 
focus is shifted to the individual. Preliminary 
ethnographic research by Amber Ahlstrom, a doctoral 
candidate at the University of New Hampshire, suggests that 
teachers trained in an expressivist writing program are 
unaware of the complexities and depth of expressivist 
theory, and thus latch onto what is most accessible about 
it: a belief in personal voice, a belief in personal
vision, and a continual reinforcement of the individual in 
its opposition to a society that diminishes the individual. 
They understand these, however, in the most limited of terms 
so enacting or coming to grips with the social aspects of
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language, writing, and learning seems difficult for them. 
The teachers in Ahlstrom's study appear to support Giroux's 
belief that the "expressive view of writing ignores how 
writing works in the world, hides the social nature of 
language, and offers a false notion of a 'private self'" 
(Faigley 531). Consequently, Berlin's appraisal has merit: 
It is possible for "empowered" individuals to change a 
"dehumanizing society," but because they are unaware of the 
"economic, social, and political arrangements," they remain 
marginalized themselves and thus unavailable to precipitate 
change. Although expressivist theory evolves from a 
tradition which recognizes the economic, social and 
political conditions of existence, the practitioners of 
expressivism often seem to fall short of incorporating this 
tradition into their pedagogy.
Expressivist theory is not alone in its propensity for 
misapplication, however. It is as easy for those who are 
advocates of a social-epistemic rhetoric as for an 
expressivist teacher unintentionally to render students 
"ineffective through their isolation." Consider, for 
instance, if it is not as much of an alienating and 
isolating experience for a student to be constantly forced 
to examine herself in terms of a political and economic 
existence, to hold an opinion that is not yet hers, to be 
told that her conservative ideas are oppressive and
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undemocratic. I am not suggesting that there is something 
intrinsic to social-epistemic rhetorics that makes them 
equivalent to raw propagandizing anymore than there is 
something inherent to Romantic rhetorics that guarantees 
"ineffective" citizens. The potential for misuse is there 
for teachers who honor social and marxist theories for 
writing instruction, however. Yes, students must take 
responsibility for their ineffectiveness and the ways in 
which they oppress others, but the social-epistemic agenda, 
if not carefully applied, can shut down students rather than 
empower them, of course, force-feeding students any 
ideology, whether it is one we would consider desirable or 
not, will not necessarily create politically aware students. 
Recently, in fact, I had the opportunity of working with 
teachers and talking to graduate teaching assistants in 
Mississippi. They noted that one of their largest problems 
was applying a social-epistemic rhetoric in their 
classrooms. Their ultra-conservative students, according to 
these teachers, become more resistant and dogmatic as the 
instructors attempt to place reading, writing, and classroom 
activities in relationship to social class, politics, and 
the material conditions of existence. In effect, many of 
the students consciously isolate themselves or withdraw from 
the ideology that is being impressed upon them.
Although the effectiveness of social-epistemic theories 
is in need of examination by composition scholars, I would
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like to return now to expressivism and Romanticism in order 
to open up and enrich the possibilities for expressivist 
teachers and their critics by offering a rereading of the 
Romantics and Romanticism in regards to the individual and 
society.
While the Romantics helped to perpetuate a vision of 
themselves as isolated, lonely, and misunderstood by 
society, it is short-sighted to believe that the Romantics 
thought isolation was a natural or desirable condition or 
that an extended application of Romantic ideas has to result 
in a naivete about political and social issues. A more 
accurate view of Romantic "individualism" reveals that there 
is nothing inherently naive or undemocratic about the 
Romantic self, nor that the Romantic honoring of 
individuality implies a disparaging of social interaction.
In fact, the Romantic self is not as different from the 
social-constructivist self as we have been inclined to 
believe.
If current expressivists are true to their Romantic 
roots, they are returning to a vision of the human as an 
autonomous being with powers and rights. As Kathleen Coburn 
points out, Coleridge demanded that we respect the 
individuality of our friends, and even our opponents. She 
suggests that in Coleridge's view, "the worst thing one 
human being can do to another" is to deny a person autonomy,
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powers, and rights (The Self-Conscious Imagination 34). The 
fight against oppression was as important to Coleridge as it 
is for social-epistemic teachers today. Coleridge insisted 
on the need for self-consciousness, in part, because he felt 
it could help alleviate prejudice. He believed that we 
could not know others until we had a •'consciousness of 
self,” and that until we knew ourselves difference would 
continue to be linked with hatred (Coburn 32). Expressivist 
teachers like Murray uphold the Romantic tradition on this 
issue with statements like "respect them [students] as 
individuals, delight in their difference" (Expecting the 
Unexpected 108).
Contrary to popular misunderstandings, the Romantics 
did not deny the social construction of the self; they 
simply asserted the importance of the individual in a social 
environment that ignored or suppressed autonomy and 
individuality. In fact, if sociologist Dmitri Shalin is 
correct, it was during the Romantic era that the notion of 
the self as a social product was first established ("The 
Romantic Antecedents" 51). It would be useful, then, for 
expressivists to understand the nature of the self as 
defined by their Romantic heritage.
David Perkins points out that "beginning with 
Wordsworth, it is generally accurate to say that art tends 
less to distinguish between the outer world of events and
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the inner world of consciousness" (16). Rather, art
attempts to display their "interfusion." Thus, it is
Wordsworth's understanding that "we can know outward things
only as they are reflected and modified in some particular
consciousness or 'point of view'; and we can know our inner
world only as we are responding to something outside"
(Perkins 16). What we have, then, is a dialectical
relationship between self and world. Dmitri Shalin points
out that this dialectic is also present between the
"structure of self and the structure of society" (55):
The [Romantic] self is social not only 
because it reflects the needs of the 
moment, because it can assume this or that 
mask depending on the others with whom it 
interacts; it is social through and through 
because it has no objective being outside 
of its interaction with other selves, 
because it comes into being within a 
community, rather than merely adjusts to 
it, as the predecessor of Romanticism 
tacitly supposed. (51)
In other words, the paradox here is that in refusing the
idea of an objective self and embracing that of a
subjective, the self is always changed, if not created, by
the community that self is in. As I have already suggested
in my discussion of empathy, the main goal of the self for
the Romantic was to commune with another self. As Shalin
puts it, "to be conscious of oneself," to be "conscious of
anything at all, according to the Romantics, the individual
must become another to oneself, see oneself from without,
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from the standpoint of the other— a feat one can perform 
only as a member of society" (51).
In part, the Romantic desire to honor individuality is 
in reaction to Locke's view of the human infant as a blank 
slate or "tabula rasa." The self that arises from a 
Lockeian model is entirely "social," entirely a creature of 
its environment, but is not in interaction with its 
environment. The Romantic self, on the other hand, is 
shaped by environment but is also self-unfolding. In other 
words, as Coleridge's plant metaphor implies, the individual 
is the joint product of an innate seed and an extrinsic or 
environmental soil, air, and water. The community and the 
individual are interdependent; they cannot be separated.
My point is that it is false to assume that Romanticism 
defines a "radical individualism" that is unaware of how the 
self is socially shaped. It is, in fact, an awareness of 
the ways in which we are socially shaped that prompted their 
special focus on the personal and subjective. And, as 
Shalin suggests, the Romantics were the first to acknowledge 
the self as a social product; thus our current elaborations 
on notions of social constructivism are further extensions 
of a very valuable Romantic idea.6
There are current expressivist rhetoricians who, like 
their Romantic predecessors, also acknowledge the social 
aspects of the self and of the writing situation. Ann
189
Berthoff, for instance, embraces social theories as a part
of her expressivist rhetoric. She often writes from an
expressivist's point of view with a social constructivist's
insight into social influences:
Language seen as a means of making meaning 
has two aspects, the hypostatic and the 
discursive. By naming the world, we hold 
images in mind; we remember; we can return 
to our experience and reflect on it. In 
reflecting, we can change, we can 
transform, we can envisage. Language thus 
becomes the very type of social activity by 
which we might move towards changing our 
lives. The hypostatic power of language to 
fix and stabilize frees us from the prison 
of the moment. Language recreates us as 
historical beings. ("Is Teaching Still 
Possible?" 751)
Berthoff's belief in experience, reflection, the
imagination, and knowing as the "mind in action," and her
acceptance of language and thought as not meaningful
"outside a social context" and as necessarily established in
a "social setting" (749), identifies her as an expressivist
fully attuned to, and willing to embrace, social theories of
the self, learning, and writing.
There is one other aspect of the Romantic and 
expressivist self that needs clarification, critics of 
Romantic rhetorics, such as David Kaufer and James Berlin, 
believe that these rhetorics have the potential to focus on 
individualism to the point of rendering students or writers 
politically and socially ineffective. And similarly, Lester 
Faigley points out that "Marxism would accuse expressivism
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of failing to deal with key concepts such as class, power, 
and ideology. Kaufer, for instance, in "Point of View in 
Rhetorical Situations: Classical and Romantic Contrasts and 
Contemporary Implications," assumes that expressivist 
rhetorical theories are only committed to their "personal 
point of view" for reasons of "self-development," and that 
they are not "bound to social action" (185). If Kaufer is 
right in his assumption, if Marxist critiques are right that 
class, power, and ideology fall by the wayside, and if 
Berlin is right in his argument that expressivist rhetorics 
result in individuals who are naive about "economic, social, 
and political arrangements," then perhaps those of us who 
remain interested in expressivism as a theory for 
composition pedagogy could learn some important lessons from 
our Romantic ancestors.
The English Romantics were, in actuality, very aware of 
political and economic concerns, and they were without doubt 
dedicated to "social action." The British Romantics saw the 
people of nineteenth-century England as indifferent and 
apathetic. The Romantics envisioned a better world, changed 
through their educational ideas and their writing. They 
wished to stir the imagination of the masses. They wanted 
their readers to be concerned about war, the reform of 
Parliament, dislocation of rural life, and a starving lower 
class, so they could improve, as Mill says, "the physical
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and social condition of mankind." They yearned to be, as 
Shelley argued they were, the "legislators of the world."
The Romantics were actively involved in the movement 
for social change. Coleridge, for instance, preached 
"sedition" from both pulpit and pamphlet for many years. 
Wordsworth went to France twice during the Revolution and 
was quite taken with political fervor. Young Shelley went 
to Ireland and printed leaflets of advice for social change, 
and Byron denounced crown policy in his first speech in the 
House of Lords. Byron died in Greece while trying to help 
the cause of Greek independence.
The Romantics were greatly concerned with, and wrote 
extensively on, the forces and political ideologies behind 
the French Revolution, and the consequences of the 
ideologies for English society. Blake wrote of the 
atrocities done to children in poems like "The Chimney 
Sweep." He pointed a harsh finger at both the church and 
the government in poems like "London," while graphically 
bringing to our attention the squalor and destitution of the 
city streets. Shelley spent a great deal of time writing 
and talking earnestly about renovating society, and in 
"England 1819" he draws an unflattering portrait of George 
III while revealing the horrid realities of this ineffectual 
king's rule:
An old, mad, blind, despised and dying king,—
Princes, the dregs of their dull race, who flow
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Through public scorn, — mud from a muddy spring,—  
Rulers who neither see, nor feel, nor know,
But leech-like to their fainting country cling,
Till they drop, blind in blood, without a blow,—
A people starved and stabbed in the untilled 
field,—
(lines 1-7)
Even Wordsworth is clearly, in Kaufer's terms, "bound 
to social action." The poet's job, according to Wordsworth 
is to shake people out of their "savage torpor" and to bind 
society together. In poems like "The Ruined Cottage," 
Wordsworth wants to force readers into questioning a society 
where the horrors of poverty are abundant. Margaret, the 
main character of "The Ruined Cottage," is suffering the 
ravages of war and rural poverty. Her husband has left her 
and two children behind to join the army in order that they 
might receive the bonus money given him for enlisting. 
Margaret obstinately awaits his return, and in so doing she 
and her humble cottage fall into ruins. By the end of the 
poem Margaret's moral decay matches that of her physical 
decay. Wordsworth indicates her final devastating fall into 
despair when the eldest son is given to the church and the 
infant dies of neglect. Wordsworth does not make our task 
as readers easy in this poem. He does not make a moral 
judgment for us, but instead unfolds the scene in front of 
the reader, pushing us into thinking, questioning, and 
reflecting on the economic, political, and societal 
structures that are the root cause of Margaret's demise.
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The expressivist heritage, then, is not apolitical, and 
expressivist teachers themselves can strive to problematize 
social and political concerns as part of the classroom 
agenda. We can politicize our courses and make the students 
socially aware through discussions and writing about 
campus, state, national, and international events, and 
issues concerning class, race, poverty, and bigotry. The 
Romantic tradition and the first generation of expressivist 
teachers and theorists have given us much to build on. In a 
sense, I am calling for a new generation of expressivists 
who can reclaim the Romantic heritage and put into action 
what is best about the rich and complex theories of the 
Romantic poets; of Mill, Arnold, and Dewey; and Peter Elbow, 
D. Gordon Rhoman, Donald Murray, and Ann Berthoff.
I would like to note, however, that the expressivist 
agenda is already more political than we might realize at 
first glance. For instance, the fact that the expressivist 
teacher views herself as an authority but not as the 
absolute repository of knowledge is the buttress for a 
democratic and non-oppressive classroom environment. 
Expressivists assume that the act of writing, and the things 
that go into it— observation, discovery, vision, 
reflection— will lead to knowing. Thus, the teacher's job is 
not to parcel out what she knows, but rather to help 
students create knowledge on their own. By allowing
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students their own authority expressivist pedagogies can 
begin to dismantle the hierarchy of the traditional 
classroom. In this regard, expressivists share an important 
tenet with the liberatory pedagogy of Paulo Freire. Like 
Freire, expressivist pedagogues offer "a revolutionary 
model" because they provide "a method which does not depend 
on knowledge that has been 'deposited' (in Freire's best- 
known metaphor of education as banking)" (Berthoff "Paulo 
Freire's Liberation Pedagogy" 364). Ann Berthoff, for 
instance, has become Freire's most ardent proponent. She 
recognizes that Freire's "pedagogy of knowing" is the 
pedagogy she cultivates as an expressivist. Of course, it 
is clear that Berthoff differs from Murray and Elbow in that 
she does not hesitate to make politics a central part of her 
educational philosophy. To the contrary, Murray is adamant 
about refusing to force a political agenda on his students.
The issue of student and teacher authority is not 
easily settled, but expressivists are not naive about the 
difficulties that arise when teachers attempt to shift 
traditional patterns of power within the classroom.
Although Donald Murray prefers to stay out of the 
discussions on "liberatory pedagogy," Elbow, though he 
disagrees with Ann Berthoff's whole-hearted acceptance of 
Freire, enters freely into the political fracas. In "The 
Pedagogy of the Bamboozled," for instance, Peter Elbow
195
argues that in order to create a "truly liberatory" 
classroom "the teacher must work as a collaborating ally of 
the student, not as a supervisor [original emphasis]
(Embracing Contraries 87). But this is difficult to achieve 
within the institution, and Elbow insists that it only 
"seems" as though we have a genuine collaboration with 
students:
There is a crucial contradiction in the 
role of almost every institutional teacher 
that prevents our being genuine allies of 
the student: we are both credit-giver and
teacher. As credit-giver we are the hurdle 
the student has to get over; as teacher we 
are the person who helps the student get 
over the hurdles. It is very common for 
teachers to imply that they are more truly 
allies of the student than this 
contradiction permits. This is a source of 
bamboozlement for students, especially in 
their relations with experimental, liberal, 
open teachers who profess to be entirely 
"on the student's side." (88)
Since we cannot truly give up all authority, what we can do,
according to Elbow, is to be forthright with our authority.
When we choose the readings for our students, we should do
so as an authority; when we give a grade, we should do so as
an authority. As Elbow argues, "An honest exercise of
authority, even if it is hated, would not bamboozle" (91).
Unmasking our authority is itself a step toward dismantling
the traditional hierarchy— a hierarchy which, in part,
claims its power by hiding the extent to which it owns the
reins of control. So, while Berthoff seems willing to
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believe a liberatory pedagogy is a possibility, Elbow 
remains less enamored by it.
The expressivist emphasis on personal voice and vision
also helps to establish a pedagogy of equality. In
nurturing individual uniqueness, vision, and voice,
expressivists are creating a climate in which all students
can be heard. Those who remain silent or oppressed in other
courses, or in their daily lives, can enter into the
empowering act of naming their own experiences when they
know that their voices and experiences are not only
encouraged, but heard and valued. Also, the fostering of
each individual voice leads to a chorus of perspectives. We
must be wary, however, of letting the focus on individual
vision and voice isolate our students form the social
aspects of writing and selfhood. And even though I believe
expressivist pedagogies, or what Patricia Bizzell calls
"personal-style" pedagogies are valuable, there are pitfalls
that we must watch for. Bizzell reminds us, for example,
that it is necessary to bear in mind how
One's speaking, reading, and writing are 
always shaped by one's social and cultural 
background and by the political relations 
this background creates with audiences of 
similar or very different background. This 
shaping is as much a matter of what the 
writer knows as of what she does. For 
example, a student may fail to produce an 
acceptable personal-style essay because she 
comes from a social group that does not 
value the sort of intense introspection 
such an essay calls for. Hence, she may
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either be simply too unfamiliar with 
introspection to produce it, or too wary 
with classmates (and teacher) from other 
social groups to produce it for them to 
read. ("Composing Processes: An Overview"
55)
If we are not aware of the social, political, and economic 
conditions that bind our students our success will be 
limited and we may, in fact, oppress the very individuals we 
are attempting to liberate. I an not, however, suggesting 
that we should back away from personal introspection and the 
kinds of writing that elicits personal reflection. As Kurt 
Spellmeyer argues, the sorts of personal essays that 
expressivists often ask their students to write are probably 
the last opportunity our college students have to "discover 
the relationship of mutual implication, a relationship 
fundamental to all writing, between the self and the 
cultural heritage within which selfhood has meaning" ("A 
Common Ground" 269).
While I do believe that the cultivation of personal 
voice and personal perspective should not be compromised, at 
the same time, I do not believe that any opinion, especially 
those that are bigoted or fascist, should be unconditionally 
tolerated. To believe, however, that Romantic rhetorics 
actually provide a catalyst for bigoted thinking is a 
simplification of the expressivist stance. For instance, 
what Donald Murray realizes is that diversity, in its 
fullest sense, cannot become a reality if any opinion, no
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matter how atrocious, is cut off and not given the chance to 
be heard. Even though Murray is generally thought of as 
apolitical, his perspective on diversity is as radically 
political, and perhaps more so, than some social-epistemic 
perspectives.
Although the bigot in an expressivist classroom will be 
given the chance to speak, he will also face hard-line 
resistance. Elbow's point in "Methodological Doubting and 
Believing" is valid, however. The student will not grow, 
there is no hope for a change in perspective, if the teacher 
and classmates do not play the "believing game" before the 
"doubting game." More often than not, if the student 
holding the unacceptable belief is not afforded this initial 
hearing he will retreat, sand-bagging his opinion against 
the flood of criticism and holding onto a bigoted conviction 
in defiance. Doubting remains important, but if what Elbow 
calls a "bargain and an exchange of temporary or conditional 
assent" ("Doubting") is reached, then the student is more 
willing to examine his belief critically. And, it is in 
unexamined convictions that the greatest danger lies. The 
expressivist acceptance of personal vision is an attempt to 
protect diversity, but it is not an acceptance of bigoted 
thought. Rather, expressivists like Donald Murray and Peter 
Elbow realize that the unacceptable opinion needs to be 
voiced, and heard, in order to be examined. If it is not 
examined, there is no hope for change.
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Expressivist classrooms also encourage group and 
collaborative work, and the recent surge of research and 
scholarship on student collaboration has increased the 
opportunity for successful results. Group work provides a 
built in forum for differing perspectives to be heard, tried 
out, revised, and sometimes rejected. Since many 
expressivists pedagogies rely on group work, student 
interaction, and discussion rather than lecture, plenty of 
opportunities are created for conversation and dialogue to 
take place. Further, the expressivist emphasis on empathy 
helps assure that a diverse classroom will become a reality. 
Diversity can thrive where a multiplicity of voices is truly 
heard, and where students and teachers bend into those 
voices in order to empathize with and understand, though not 
unthinkingly accept, a plethora of divergent perspectives.
Though we are inclined to forget and thus are apt to 
ignore or misuse what is already there, the expressivist 
approach to classroom pedagogy is broadly political in 
nature even though it does not necessarily have politics as 
a subject. It strives for a democratic classroom, equality, 
and true diversity. It pushes hard against pedagogies that 
strive for the assimilation of those who are different. By 
consciously working from a foundation of empathy and 
personal voice and vision, it offers the chance for students 
to become effective rather than "ineffective” citizens. In
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the end, expressivist rhetorics and pedagogies are capable 
of creating a democratic classroom.
There is much about Romanticism which has been
misunderstood by scholars in composition studies and the
culture as a whole. These misunderstandings have led to
perspectives which assume Romanticism and expressivist
rhetorics promote a dangerous form of radical individualism.
In reality, however, Romanticism is much more balanced and
complex than expressivists know and anti-Romantic critics
have been willing to admit. In its embracing of emotion and
the particular individual, for instance, Romanticism's and
expressivism's goal is to accept humankind as it really is—
diverse. The Romantics themselves arose out of a great
political and social need for change and reconstruction. As
Jacques Barzun insightfully argues:
The vast horizons opened up by war and social 
upheaval gave romanticism its scope: it was
inclusive, impatient of barriers, and eager for 
diversity.
It . . . respected the individual as a source 
. . . Accordingly, its political philosophy was an 
attempt to reconcile personal freedom with the 
inescapable need of collective action. (Classic, 
Romantic, and Modern 137)
If we re-evaluate our conceptions and interpretations of
Romanticism, perhaps we will find aspects of the tradition
from which expressivist rhetorics develop worth keeping
alive as we continue to explore the rhetorical theories of
the present and the future. Finally, if expressivists can
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reclaim the rich heritage from which they evolve, new 
possibilities for Romantic rhetorics will arise.
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Endnotes
1 Peacock's essay, "The Four Ages of Poetry," is 
what prompted Percy Shelley's solemn response in A 
Defense of Poetry.
2 Barzun attaches an appendix to his study which 
lists some of the ways in which the term Romantic is 
being used in modern conversation. These include 
"attractive," "exuberant," "ornamental," "unreal," 
"materialistic," "irrational," "futile," "heroic," 
"mysterious," "bombastic," "picturesque," "formless," 
"fanciful," and "emotional on principle."
3 Wordsworth, in The Prelude, actually calls the 
reader's attention to the fact that he has short­
changed the importance of books in both his childhood 
and in later years: "Thus far a scanty record is
deduced \ Of what I owed to books in early life; \
Their later influence yet remains untold;" (Book V 606- 
608) .
4 What Russell does in this article is label 
Lounsbury and Campbell Romantics because of their 
desire to abolish writing courses on the grounds that 
writing cannot be taught and that good writing only 
happens to those few who are inspired.
5 Keats, of course, argued that Coleridge, though 
he wanted to be, was incapable of really living "in the 
universal" or practicing "negative capability" becuase 
Coleridge was not able to "remain content with half 
knowledge."
6 Shalin's article, "The Romantic Antecedents of 
Meadian Social Psychology," chronicles the growth of 
George Herbert Mead's stance on social psychology out 
of Romantic philosophy.
CHAPTER V
ROMANTICISM AND ROMANTIC RHETORIC: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
As a woman and a feminist I have always found myself quite 
comfortable with the fact that I am also a Romanticist and 
an expressivist teacher. Some of my friends and colleagues 
find feminism at odds with Romanticism, and wonder at my 
ease with Romantic philosophies. It is true that 
Romanticism and feminism are not perfect counterparts or 
easy allies in all regards. There is, however, much about 
Romanticism and expressivist writing theory that 
accommodates feminist theory and pedagogy, and it would, I 
think, behoove expressivists to consider Romantic rhetorics 
in light of recent feminist contributions to both literary 
and composition studies. If, for example, expressivist 
theories and pedagogies are already empowering for women in 
various ways as I hope to show they are, then a conscious 
revision of expressivism that includes feminist perspectives 
will be invaluable for creating a theory of composition that 
strives for gender equality.
Feminist discussions on Romanticism have been slow in 
coming to literary studies. Feminist critiques of Romantic 
rhetorics have been equally slow. A collection of essays 
edited by Cythnia L. Caywood and Gillian R. Overing entitled
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Teaching Writing: Pedagogy, Gender, and Equity, is the one 
major contribution to the conjoining of feminist studies and 
expressivist theories, or what the authors call 
"revisionist" writing pedagogies. Other scholars will 
sometimes mention the compatibility of expressivist and 
feminist teaching styles, but they do not make a critique of 
expressivism their major concern (Flynn "Composing as a 
Woman" Goulston "Women Writing").
Perhaps the timid move toward feminist perspectives on 
Romanticism are a result of just how resoundingly male the 
Romantic tradition has been. Anne K. Mellor points out, for 
instance, that the Romantic canon has lagged behind all 
others in any reformulation in light of feminist 
contribution (7). This "lag" in the canon is two-fold: 
feminine voices from the Romantic Age have been slow to 
enter the literary canon; and the canon of scholarship, if I 
might call it that, has been slow to see the influence of 
feminist scholarship on Romanticism. Virtually hundreds of 
writers, many of them women, from the late 1700's to the 
mid-1800's have been marginalized or ignored as possible 
Romantics. Prior to the early 1980's and the contribution 
of feminist scholarship by such writers as Margaret Homans, 
Anne Mellor, Susan Wolfson, Mary Jacobus, and Susan Levin, 
the Romantic canon has consisted of primarily six males: 
Blake, William Wordsworth, Coleridge, Percy Shelley, Byron,
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and Keats. As my own project illustrates, the tradition 
from which expressivist rhetorics arise has also been, in 
large part, identified as male.
Thus, the time has come to examine, from a feminist 
perspective, what the implications and consequences of this 
are for expressivist theories and pedagogies. A feminist 
critique will raise potential philosophical questions for a 
rhetoric and theory of education based on such a thoroughly 
male tradition. In her introduction to Romanticism and 
Feminism, for example, Anne K. Mellor has suggested that the 
canonization of only six of the writers from the Romantic 
age has "legitimized the continued repression of women" (8). 
It is worth noting, however, that these six writers did not 
canonize themselves— male literary historians of a later 
date have done so. He still might ask, though, if a 
rhetorical pedagogy primarily grounded in the philosophies 
of two of these six Romantics would also continue the 
repression that Mellor notes. After all, there is a long 
history of denial of education for women and the Romantics 
did not all work to ensure women access to a full education. 
Although Percy Shelley did, Coleridge, a major figure in my 
history of expressivist theories, makes clear that his 
argument for a schooling which would nurture the "truly 
educated mind" was solely for men. Women were to be 
educated differently and for other purposes than that of the 
cultivation of the imaginative and reflective mind.1
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Of more immediate concern for writing theory is James
Catano's argument that the expressivist rhetorics of William
Coles, Peter Elbow, and Ken Hacrorie are masculine because
they are built on a male self-formulation. This self-
formulation, according to Catano, describes learning to
write in language which is combative and aggressive, and
sees learning to write in terms of mastery. Masculine
aggression is apparent in Coles and Elbow, and this
aggression excludes women and is even ’’anti-feminine,"
according to Catano (433). Peter Elbow's language in
Writing with Power demonstrates what Catano identifies as
aggressive male language:
Having rejected "subjective bullshit" in 
the first text (141), Elbow follows up in 
the second with a variety of aggressive 
descriptions and metaphors of writing:
"the experience of battle conditions with 
live ammunition" (33); "my decision . . . 
to force the world to listen to me" (122);
"wielding the knife and seeing blood on the 
floor" (123); and "the power of the words 
to hit readers in the gut" (369). (Catano 
429)
This "masculinist" use of language is widespread and 
the works of other writing theorists are also saturated with 
a language of aggression and combat. I have recently been 
examining the metaphors that arise from a rhetoric of 
violence in the works of social-constructivist David 
Bartholomae ("English Studies and the Metaphors We Live 
By"), for instance, and Susan Meisenhelder has noted that
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"examining modern conceptions of rhetoric and the handbooks 
on writing we teach shows us that we often teach an 
adversarial model of discourse" ("Redefining 'Powerful' 
Writing: Toward a Feminist Theory of Writing" 186). 
Meisenhelder suggests that when we teach writing based on 
discourse models that are built on metaphors of war and 
violence such as "attacking" and "defending" points of view, 
and when we talk of using words as weapons and as acts of 
aggression we are "promoting a patriarchal mode that 
encourages students to internalize a rhetorical stance of 
dominance . . . "  (186). This has negative consequences for 
women students because it reinforces a way of acting and 
writing in the world which is unfamiliar to them and it 
works to keep women oppressed by a male hierarchy.
The fact that expressivists' discourse models also 
harbor language that is exclusionary and even "anti-
feminine," as Catano suggests, is an issue that should
concern expressivist rhetoricians as well as feminists. We
should make concerted efforts to remove these metaphorical 
constructs and to replace them with language that welcomes 
and invites rather than excludes women. Perhaps we can make 
better use of nurturing and connecting metaphors and help 
bring forward the expressivist focus on empathy and 
discovery. Peter Elbow, for instance, has a pedagogy that 
is so clearly built on empathy that it seems strange to find
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these aggressive metaphors, and I suspect that they are not 
present in as large a number as more accommodating 
metaphors. Yet, it does seem urgent that he reconstruct his 
language in passages like that quoted above by Catano.
Although some of the metaphors on which an expressivist 
model of discourse is built do need prompt attention, they 
are not reason to abandon expressivist rhetorics. To the 
contrary, expressivists need to explore what feminists are 
now identifying as the feminine tradition in Romanticism in 
order to alleviate some of these problems and issues as well 
as enrich the Romantic tradition from which composition 
scholars and teachers can draw. Further, in spite of 
Romanticism's male tradition, it is not necessarily a 
"masculinist" tradition; on the contrary, the poets often 
attempted to cultivate a "feminine consciousness." Finally, 
Romanticism, even without the additional benefit that will 
arise with a consideration of a female tradition in 
Romanticism, can benefit from and accommodate feminist 
theories and pedagogies thereby creating the potential for a 
rhetoric that is empowering for our women students.
First, let me point out that we must continue to be 
concerned by the fact that Romantic educational theories 
were originally male-centered. We must not be deterred, 
however, or women will continue to be denied a valuable 
educational experience. As Jane Roland Martin points out,
209
women have been excluded throughout the history of 
education, both as objects of educational thought and as 
subjects ("Excluding Women" 135).2 In order to stop the 
recurrent denial of the feminine by forcing women into a 
masculine mode of education and composing, we can expand the 
realm of expressivist rhetorics by widening the male 
Romantic tradition to include women, and by revising 
expressivist theory in light of feminist contribution. This 
widening can take place on several levels. It can include 
both women who were contemporary with the Romantics and it 
can include women as writers, readers, and learners in 
today's academy. As expressivists we can join our 
colleagues in literary studies to explore what Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, Felicia Hemans, Emily Bronte, 
Dorothy Wordsworth, and others can add to our tradition.
Many will be surprised to find that Wollstonecraft 
anticipated current social theories by arguing that women 
are social constructions, shaped by our environment and the 
type of education we receive (Martin 77), and that the 
writings of Dorothy Wordsworth offer a "female version" of 
the Romantic self which takes into account "the complexities 
surrounding a woman's psychological development" (Levin 5). 
Further, feminist literary scholars have already begun to 
show that Dorothy Wordsworth's vision of the self expands 
"individual subjectivity to visionary community" (Wolfson
2X0
Romanticism and Feminism 145), offering further reason for 
not dismissing Romantic rhetorics on charges of radical 
individualism.
Although we are inclined to see "collaboration” and 
writing "communities” as primarily feminist orientations, 
feminists themselves are reminding us that Romantic writers 
very consciously formed discourse communities through which 
they enabled their art and writing. Levin reminds us, for 
instance, that the Wordsworth circle at Grasmere was a 
"community of language; and it was finally a community of 
writing, a mutuality of writing energies in which each 
shared in his or her own way" (6).3 It is in such writers 
as Dorothy Wordsworth and Mary Shelley that we find an 
alternative to the myth of the lonely writer. Their works 
show the community in action and collaboration, a community 
of men and women alike.
In order to alleviate the masculinist rhetoric that 
Catano has perceptively pointed out in expressivist 
pedagogies, we must be self-reflective and we must 
incorporate feminist theoretical and pedagogical 
perspectives into expressivist stances: we can examine and
change our metaphors so that they are not anti-feminine or 
anti-woman; we can include a feminist rhetoric which models 
a mode of composing founded on metaphors of collaboration 
and caring rather than on metaphors of "war" and "rape"
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(Meisenhelder 193). We can recognize and problematize the 
fact that the powerful autonomous self of the Western world 
is usually that of the "self-made" man not the "self-made" 
woman or the socially constructed woman; we can take our cue 
from feminists and change the expressivist rhetoric of the 
self to a plurality of selves. In sum, expressivists can 
publicly articulate feminist theories in contrast to 
masculinist theories.
A feminist investigation of the feminine tradition in 
Romanticism will yield expressivist theories many valuable 
prospects for teaching, but the philosophies of the male 
poets also lend themselves to a feminist perspective. In 
Reclaiming a Conversation: the Ideal of the Educated Woman, 
the feminist educational philosopher Jane Roland Martin 
calls for a rethinking of education which will enable 
emotion and feeling to become as much a part of the 
educational process as analysis, critical thinking, and 
self-sufficiency (192-193). As I have shown, this was the 
basis for Wordsworth and Coleridge's educational plan.
Martin also asks for an educational system that honors, and 
melds together, both "reproductive societal processes" which 
have traditionally been seen as the feeling and emotional 
realm of the female, and the analytical realm of knowledge 
making which is seen as the "productive societal processes" 
usually ascribed to the world of the male (197). Martin
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recalls a 1977 address by Adrienne Rich to women college 
students in which Rich asked the students to claim an active 
education that would connect with their experiences as women 
rather than to passively receive one that privileges the 
male experience. Adrienne Rich, writes Martin, "was saying 
that in becoming mere receptacles for a university learning 
that excludes their experience and thought, women's lives 
can be damaged beyond repair" (2). As I have been arguing 
throughout, the Romantic philosophies allow for a version of 
an ideal education which promotes what Rich and Martin argue 
for: an active rather than passive education, and a wedding 
of the emotional and analytical, or the reproductive and 
productive processes.
Although William Wordsworth has been accused of 
relegating nature to the realm of the feminine in order to 
assert his masculine poetic identity over the natural world 
(Homans), he is just as likely to assert a more feminine 
consciousness. As the feminist critic Susan Wolfson argues, 
"just as typically, and with a full range of investigation, 
this poet may represent male consciousness as passive, 
itself inscribed by voices of the 'other'" Romanticism and 
Feminism 147). She quotes The Prelude: "'the changeful 
earth . . .  on my mind had stamped / The faces of the moving 
year' (Prelude 1.586-88); the 'common face of Nature spake 
to me . . . impressed /Collateral objects and appearances, /
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Albeit lifeless then, and doomed to sleep / Until maturer 
seasons call them forth / To impregnate and to elevate the 
mind' (1.615 24)" (147). In these lines, argues Wolfson, 
"the self is not just passive but feminine, and imaged, 
implicitly, with the potential of female (re)productivity" 
(147). in effect, Wordsworth's lines here depict his male 
consciousness in a state that is not asserting its identity 
against the natural world. Rather, as Wolfson suggests, his 
male consciousness is being "inscribed by voices of the 
'other'." The result, as Wordsworth implies, is an 
"impregnation" of the mind and the distinctly female ability 
to give birth, to (re)produce. In effect, Wordsworth's 
description of the philosophical mind is androgynous.
Coleridge, too, strove for a consciousness that was as 
much feminine as masculine. As I have already pointed out, 
he believed that the imaginative and "truly educated" mind 
must be androgynous, must combine the feminine with the 
masculine. Indeed, by using the figure of the androgyne as 
a central metaphor throughout his philosophical discussions, 
Coleridge was able to suggest a union between the masculine 
consciousness and the feminine, thereby creating a mind that 
is potentially (re)productive.
It is valid to note that the male poets were not always 
successful in their attempts to nurture a feminine 
consciousness along with their male consciousness. This
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failure prompts some feminist critics to argue that the 
Romantics' attempts to incorporate the feminine did 
irreparable damage to the women of their community (Homans, 
Richardson). It is also clear that both Wordsworth and 
Coleridge viewed the feminine in a stereotypical manner. An 
examination of their writings, for instance, shows that they 
ascribe the feminine part of the androgynous mind with 
passivity rather than action. Coleridge's model of the 
androgynous mind can actually be broken down into typical 
opposites— the masculine as light, life, mind, and reason 
and the feminine as darkness, death, body, and passion. 
Coleridge and Wordsworth's acceptance of the feminine as 
crucial to the education of the encompassing intellect, 
then, is premised on diminishing views of the feminine.
Feminists should be leery of terms like "male" and 
"female" or "masculine" and "feminine" when refering to the 
mind or consciousness. It is but a simple step to 
essentializing masculinity and femininity. When the 
creative mind is viewed as masculine, feminine, androgynous, 
or in any way gendered, it is because centuries of male 
writers have constructed these metaphors. My ambition is 
not to argue for these essentializing metaphors, but for the 
intent, no matter how badly represented, that Wordsworth and 
Coleridge had in trying to deconstruct the image of the 
creative mind as solely masculine. They did work toward
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cultivating a feminine consciousness during an historical 
time in which the feminine consciousness was seen as 
inferior and in which the feminine was conceived of in 
stereotypical terms. At the same time Wordsworth and 
Coleridge were working from this stereotypical perspective 
of the feminine, they were also attempting to work against 
it, for embedded in Wordsworth's quest for the philosophic 
mind and Coleridge's belief that the creative mind is 
androgynous is a theory consonant with a philosophy that 
honors the connection of feeling and emotion, analysis and 
critical thinking, and the productive and reproductive 
processes necessary to create an education that truly 
accommodates women as well as men. And, if we are willing 
to join with feminists in diffusing the stereotypical views 
of the feminine and masculine and in deconstructing the 
belief that the attributes of masculine and feminine must be 
separate, perhaps current expressivists can succeed where 
our Romantic forebears failed.
A recent study of women's intellectual development also 
suggests that aspects of Romantic educational philosophy are 
beneficial for women. In Women's Ways of Knowing, Mary 
Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule 
Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule, chronicle the 
psychological development of women as they move from 
positions of "silence" to positions of "constructed
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knowing," from powerless to empowered selves capable of not
only receiving knowledge, but of making knowledge. Their
study suggests that the development of voice and self is
crucial to the development of women's minds and they find
that for the most part the process of education has
traditionally not allowed for the psychological and
intellectual growth of women because it has separated the
affective from the analytical, and lived experience from
academic experience. Likewise, although she differs with
Belenky et al. on other points, Jane Roland Martin finds
that the educational journey is primarily one which is
damaging because it splits reason from emotion ("Becoming
Educated" ). Interestingly enough, the suggestions Belenky
et al. make for creating an educational system that would
foster the development of women echo many of those made by
the Romantics for the cultivation of the "philosophical" or
"truly educated" mind:
We have argued in this book that educators 
can help women develop their own authentic 
voices if they emphasize connection over 
separation, understanding and acceptance 
over assessment, and collaboration over 
debate,* if they accord respect to and allow 
time for the knowledge that emerges from 
firsthand experience; if instead of 
imposing their own expectations and 
arbitrary requirements, they encourage 
students to evolve their own patterns of 
work based on the problems they are 
pursuing. These are lessons we have 
learned in listening to women's voices.
(229)
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The Romantics advocated growth of the self, discovery of 
voice, "connection," "understanding," "experience," and 
although we don't usually perceive of the Romantics as 
"collaborative," in practice they formed writing 
communities, shared their work, and even collaborated on the 
writing of their poetry. Wordsworth and Coleridge, for 
instance, not only collaborated to compile the Lyrical 
Ballads, but often made additions, sometimes full stanzas, 
to each other's poems. They used each others' poetical 
ideas and conversations with each other as ways of 
overcoming writing blocks or as means of "inspiration."
Moreover, the epistemological stances in women's
development identified by Belenky et al.— "silence,"
"received knowledge," "subjective knowledge," "procedural
knowledge," and "constructed knowledge," are similar to the
developmental path described by the poets in the growth of
the creative, knowledge-making intellect.^ in the stage of
silence, for instance, women seem to be "'deaf and dumb' and
are unaware of the power of words for transmitting
knowledge" (36). "Silent" women are cut off from their
experience; they are unable to connect with the world around
them, nor are they able to connect with language. They are
voiceless and without self:
Even though each of the women had the gifts 
of intelligence and of all their senses, 
they were unaware of the potential of such 
gifts. While no one was actually "deaf and
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dumb," this metaphor suggests their 
experience more accurately than does 
"gaining a voice." They felt "deaf" 
because they assumed they could not learn 
from the words of others, "dumb" because 
they felt so voiceless. (24)
Because they are cut off from the practice or privilege of
"making sense" of the world around them, do not "perceive"
as the Romantics would say, cannot connect with experience,
these women are missing a crucial link in the discovery of
self, which in turn leads to the ability of "finding a
voice" and making meaning through language.
Belenky et al. suggest that the silence these women 
suffer is culturally imposed. In its most extreme, this 
imposition comes through such tragic and drastic forces as 
emotional, physical, and sexual abuse. If, however, women 
can shed this cultural imposition and the consequent 
"deafness and dumbness," if they can learn to connect with 
experiences in some way, they move toward a means of knowing 
that is analogous to Wordsworth's "wise passiveness.
During a time of "received knowledge," women begin to 
observe, perceive, and experience. They "learn by 
listening" (36). And as it is for Wordsworth, this stage is 
important to women because although passive, it is a time of 
experiencing and discovering through observation, and this 
experiencing becomes important in later stages of creating 
knowledge through language.
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Having found ways to move from silence to the ability 
to "receive," the women in the study by Belenky et al. were 
able to begin the important job of constructing self- 
knowledge through language. This necessarily comes from a 
position of subjectivity, just as it did for the Romantic 
poets. What becomes important is the individual's lived 
experience or vision, and at this stage the "subjective 
knower" starts to see the world in terms of an individual 
self. She finds her own experience understandable and 
worthwhile, perhaps for the first time in her life. The 
authors of Women's Ways of Knowing capture the difficulty 
women who finally come to trust their own experience have
connecting with the experiences of others with a quote from
a young woman who was a "subjective" knower. This woman 
could find little sense in the experience revealed in 
classical texts because it seemed irrelevant to her own 
experience:
A college senior was highly critical of a 
male professor: "1 never knew what the man
was talking about. It was the way he spoke 
or the words he used or just the way he put
words together that was hard for me to
understand. You can't learn from teachers 
and books like you can from experience."
(74)
Her experience did not match the sense of this academic 
world and at this point she is able to trust little else but 
her own words and experience. Because she has finally found 
the power in her own experience and her own words, she finds
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it difficult to relate her experience to anyone else's and 
she seems hesitant to reflect on the disparity between her 
own experience and that revealed in the texts she is reading 
or that the professor is trying to convey. She remains 
stuck as a "subjective knower" because she has not, as the 
Romantics knew was crucial, "abandoned both subjectivism and 
absolutism in some areas [of her life]. . . in favor of 
reasoned reflection" (Women's Ways of Knowing 88).
According to Belenky et al., reflection is of utmost 
importance to women's intellectual development just as it is 
to the growth of Wordsworth's philosophical mind and 
Coleridge's educated mind. For Coleridge, reflection leads 
to mental growth which eventually leads to a "distinct 
consciousness," which is, in effect, a mind capable of 
making meaning. Likewise, the ability to be reflective is 
the catalyst that moves women into the stage of development 
that the authors of Women's Ways of Knowing call "procedural 
knowledge." Within this stage are two modes of knowing: 
"connected" and "separate" knowing. Separate knowers seem 
to be the less productive of the two. When a separate 
knower is given a writing task, for instance, they "write 
well," but often "feel the papers they write are pointless. 
They have no connection to the papers they write for 
teachers and they [the papers] are empty of their own 
feelings, ideas, and voice" (188). "Connected" knowing, on
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the other hand, is not disconnected from the self and world
as separate knowing is. It is the '•epistemological
orientation that is toward relationship" (101). It is the
balanced position between subjectivity and objectivity that
the Romantics strove to find. Connected knowing seems to
bear much in common with Romantic philosophies. In fact,
the authors of Women's Ways of Knowing suggest that
Coleridge is a connected knower (113). The ties are not
limited to Coleridge, however. Belenky et al. write,
Connected knowers develop procedures for 
gaining access to other people's knowledge.
At the heart of these procedures is the 
capacity for empathy. Since knowledge 
comes from experience, the only way they 
can hope to understand another person's 
ideas is to try to share the experience 
that has led the person to form the idea.
(113)
This quote seems to describe the Romantic desire to connect 
themselves with others. It is reminiscent of Keats's 
"negative capability," the ultimate ability to negate one's 
own ego in order to identify and connect with an other. And 
it is certainly reflective of Wordsworth's entire project as 
a poet: "to bring his feelings near to those of the persons
whose feelings he describes" (Preface 737).
Unlike "separate knowers," women who are connected 
knowers are not only able to write well in the conventional 
sense, but they are also able to do so with voice, feeling 
and critical thought. Separate knowers are examples of what
222
the Romantic poets felt that a misguided education of 
analysis, severed from the emotive and experiential, 
produced. Separate knowers are capable of parroting back 
information they have received, but as Belenky et al. note, 
they are incomplete and uninvested in the making of 
knowledge: "For women . . . who are separate knowers, 
thinking and feeling are split asunder; they feel fraudulent 
and deadened to their inner experiences and inner selves" 
(135).
If women are able to cultivate experience, feeling,
voice, self, and reflection, they can become connected
knowers, and connected knowers are able to move into the
fifth epistemological position identified in Women's Ways of
Knowing, that of "constructed knowledge." This stage is
finally the culmination of growth and development. It is
most like William Wordsworth's mature mind— the
philosophical mind. Constructed knowers have the abilities
of the encompassing intellect. They blend reason and
emotion, subjective and objective. They are able to create
knowledge because they have, in effect, incorporated those
things the Romantics found crucial to a viable educational
process, "reflection," "experience," "empathy," "self-
consciousness," and "personal voice":
These women [constructed knowers] were all 
articulate and reflective people. They 
noticed what was going on with others and 
cared about the lives of people about them.
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They were intensely self-conscious, in the 
best sense of the word— aware of their own 
thought, their judgments, their moods and 
desires . . . Each was ambitious and 
fighting to find her own voice— her own way 
of expressing what she knew and cared 
about. Each wanted her voice and actions to 
make a difference to other people and the 
world. (133)
Romantic educational philosophies, although originally
directed primarily at men, are also useful in the
epistemological development of women. The research done by
the authors of Women's Ways of Knowing suggests that women
students would actually benefit from Romantic educational
philosophies, and likewise, they would be well accommodated
by expressivist rhetorical theories and pedagogies. In
fact, some feminist researchers have noted a correlation
between feminist theories and expressivist theories. Cythnia
Caywood and Gillian Overing, for instance, suggest that
"revisionist” writing theories are a critique of a
patriarchal system just as are feminist theories:
In assembling it and reviewing these two 
bodies of research, we have discovered a 
consistent pattern, one characterized by 
the recurrent intersection of several major 
premises at the heart of both bodies of 
research. The most important of these are: 
the relation between revisionist critiques 
of traditional writing theory and the 
feminist critique of masculinist, 
patriarchal ways of being; and the 
correlation between the revisionists' 
restructuring of pedagogy and revaluing of 
the student and feminists' restructuring of 
cultural models and revaluing of the 
experience of women.
The familiar revisionists view of 
writing as process, which challenges the
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classical view of writing as product, 
offers a paradigmatic dialectic appropriate 
to feminist discourse, (intro Teaching 
Writing xii)
Both feminist theories and revisionist writing theories 
question authority: feminist theory that of the patriarchy
and revisionist theory that of the product.
While Overing and Caywood do not specify expressivist 
theory as the "revisionist" theory they argue for, the focus 
on the private and individual voice, personal experience, 
and the process over product they identify as aspects of 
"revisionist" theory clearly belong to expressivism. So 
expressivist rhetorics seem linked to feminist theory in 
their critique of oppressive hierarchies as in earlier 
decades when Romantic ideas and philosophies arose in Mill, 
Arnold, and Dewey, and in Berthoff, Murray, Rohman, and 
Elbow as reactions to oppressive establishments and 
traditional schooling curricula. In effect, as Caywood and 
Overing argue, expressivist theory, what they call 
"revisionist" theory and feminist theory are kindred in 
their opposition to an established hierarchy: "the process
model, in so far as it facilitates and legitimizes the 
fullest expression of the individual voice, is compatible 
with the feminist revisioning of hierarchy, if not essential 
to it (xiv).
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule also find 
expressivist rhetorical theories and pedagogies
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accommodating to women students. They refer to and quote 
Peter Elbow extensively in their study. They cite him as a 
writing teacher who fosters a learning climate in which 
women can excel. Both his focus on development of voice and 
the privileging of "believing" over "doubting" allow women 
to take part more fully in their own educations because 
they are able to work from a center of assent rather than 
dissent and debate.
Peter Elbow's pedagogy also relies on connection and 
empathy, two qualities critical to women's emotional and 
intellectual growth. Small groups provide Elbow's students 
with the environment necessary for connections among people 
to take place. His "sharing" groups, where student's learn 
to share their writing and listen closely to each other, are 
helpful for women who are both searching for their own voice 
and learning to "hear." These groups stress active 
listening, and they give students a chance to say what they 
know without facing, in the beginning of the search for 
voice, negative criticism and harsh response. As Belenky et 
al. point out, many "silent" women do not survive the 
academy because they are not themselves secure with 
language. For many of these women, language is a weapon 
which has been used against them to ensure their continued 
silence in the face of male dominance and abuse. Elbow's 
groups, then, provide at least two important educative needs
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for women: a place to practice using language and finding a
voice; and an environment in which negative criticism is 
deferred until the writer has enough sense of self and 
voice, perhaps alleviating the feeling that language is 
necessarily a weapon to silence them.
Romantic rhetorics nurture experience and a "wise
passiveness," and expressivist teachers advocate seeing,
listening, hearing, receiving, and putting experience into
words through such exercises as Ann Berthoff's detailed
record of ten-minutes of observation and close description.
Moreover, Berthoff and Murray's use of the journal is
another example of how expressivist#s pedagogical techniques
invite women into the realm of discourse. Feminists have
recognized that the private language used by women in
journals can be an important step toward learning how to
speak in the public language of the academy (Gannett Gender
and the Journal: Diaries and Academic Discourse
forthcoming). Meisenhelder finds the journal invaluable for
women students and feminist teachers:
In this way [through journal writing] we 
aim to launch students— often especially 
women students— on a private search for 
self-identity and meaning in their own 
lives. This is an important development for 
several reasons. Besides the value in 
helping students develop awareness,teaching 
such a form of writing has been an 
important step in transforming notions 
about discourse and language. This kind of 
writing allows students to experience the 
power of important feminist ideas about
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language— especially the value of the 
particular, the concrete, and the 
emotional. From journal writing, students 
learn that language doesn't have to be 
distanced, logical, objective, and abstract 
in the traditional model of rational 
thought for it to convey meaning. (184)
Peter Elbow's freewriting is also a way in which
students can learn that language which is emotional and non-
logical has value. In fact, pre-writing of all kinds are
especially inviting forms of discourse for women. As Wendy
Goulston reminds us,
Prewriting is, after all, what women have 
been doing for centuries in letters and 
journals and conversations with each other, 
"freewriting," brainstorming," meditating, 
overflowing with uncensored feelings and 
ideas. ("Women Writing" 25)
When we use these familiar and "expressive" modes as a
foundation for academic prose, says Goulston, "women can
draw on their own thinking and feeling to develop the
rhetorical strategies that best suit their styles, their
arguments, their values" (25).
Pre-writing, freewriting, journal keeping, exercises of 
observation and reflection are the kinds of activities that 
can help move our women students from the position of 
silence where they are without self, voice, and power, to a 
discursive position where they can break through "dumbness 
and deafness." By learning to experience, perceive, and 
listen they can move to the position of "received 
knowledge." Activities such as pre-writing and freewriting
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can allow our women students as well as men to make their 
personal experience part of their learning process. As 
Peter Elbow suggests, they can write about their feelings 
and what is important to them. Elbow believes that 
freewriting can help in the development of voice, and voice 
is a crucial part of women's emotional and intellectual 
growth, according to feminist researchers.
Also, the expressivist focus on reflection, empathy, 
and voice can provide the vital means of moving through 
•'subjective knowing" to "connected knowing," and eventually 
to the stage of "constructed knowledge." When teachers like 
Donald Murray create a learning environment which focuses on 
discovery of both self and others, our women students can 
learn to become connected knowers through empathy and an 
understanding of how the self interacts with the world. 
Moreover, through practice like Ann Berthoff's students gain 
while writing in double-entry notebooks where they rethink, 
question, study, and reflect on their own observations and 
experiences, our students can move beyond subjective knowing 
to connected knowing. In sum, since Romantic rhetorics, 
both in original and modern forms, foster an encompassing 
intellect in our students through pedagogies which blend the 
emotive and analytical, the subjective and the objective, 
discovery of self and discovery of others, they offer a 
theory and practice that can help women reach their 
potential as "constructed knowers."
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Although I have Initiated a feminist response to 
Romantic teaching philosophies and expressivist rhetoric, 
there is still further need of examination from a feminist 
perspective. Feminists can discover in what ways the 
expressivist emphasis on the imagination, feeling, and 
voice, empower women students, and we can determine what 
kinds of "selves" we are empowering. We can learn in what 
ways we fall short of creating the ideal learning situation 
for women. Feminists can revise the Romantic tradition from 
which expressivist theories grow to include the feminine 
tradition in Romanticism. We can begin to explore what 
Emily Bronte, Felicia Hemans, Dorothy Wordsworth, Mary 
Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft and many others can add to an 
expressivist rhetoric. By continuing to explore 
expressivist rhetorics from a feminist perspective we can 
not only widen the tradition from which they arise, but we 
can continue to illuminate what is valuable about them. We 
must understand, however, that although Romantic educational 
philosophies and expressivist rhetoric do provide an 
educational climate favorable for women by integrating 
reason and emotion, thought and action, and self and 
experience, it is not satisfactory to just make note of 
this. As Jane Roland Martin argues, changing the 
educational realm in any valuable way will require an 
understanding that
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the exclusion of both women and the 
reproductive processes of society from the 
educational realm by philosophy of 
education is a consequence of the structure 
of the discipline and not simply due to an 
oversight which is easily corrected. Thus, 
philosophical inquiry into the nature of 
those processes or into the education of 
women cannot simply be grafted onto the 
philosophy of education as presently 
constituted. ("Excluding Women" 148)
Thus, it is only in continuing to revise and redefine
expressivist theory and pedagogy in light of feminist
perspectives that we can create a theory for composition




1 Coleridge held this view in spite of the fact 
that he argues that the imaginative mind cannot reach 
its full potential unless it is feminine as well as 
masculine, unless it is an androgynous mind. This, of 
course, raises the philosphical question for feminists 
as to whether the Romantics wanted to grant the 
feminine autonomy and power at all, or whether they 
really wanted to absorb the feminine into the 
masculine.
2 Martin points out that Rousseau's educational 
plan for Sophie, which was drastically different from 
that of Emile's, is rarely mentioned throughout the 
history of educational thought and philosophy.
2 Other Romantic communities included Byron and 
the Shelley household, the Hedge Club, and the 
Trancsendental Club in America. All of these groups 
included writing women members. (See Levin's Dorothy 
Wordsworth and Romanticism)
4 I am grateful to Thomas Newkirk for noticing 
that Wordsworth was a "connected knower." Professor 
Newkirk's insight led me to explore more fully the 
parallels between women's ways of coming to the act of 
knowing and that of the poets.
5 The authors of Women's Ways of Knowing suggest 
that often the ability to connect with experience comes 
for some of these women when they are able to make the 
human connnection between themselves and a child.
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A NOTE ON ROMANTIC RHETORICS AND THE CROSS-CULTURAL 
CLASSROOM: THE WEIGHT OF TOO MUCH LIBERTY
In exploring the value of the Romantic tradition for 
composition studies I am not recommending acceptance of the 
entire program of Romanticist or expressivist theories. The 
lashings expressivist theories have been receiving from 
proponents of social-constructivist rhetorics will hopefully 
push expressivists to closely examine their assumptions, 
theories, and pedagogies. If we are not willing to reflect, 
question, and critique with rigor the underpinning 
philosophies of expressivism, we will not only fail to draw 
on a valuable tradition as advantageously as we might, but 
we will be blind to its problems and pitfalls as well. I 
believe, for example, that expressivists have not reflected 
enough on cross-cultural issues, and minority and non-native 
students. There is a great deal for expressivists to learn 
from our ethnic minority students and non-native speakers, 
and from our colleagues in linguistics and English as a 
Second Language. James Paul Gee and Shirley Brice Heath, 
for example, have shown us that ethnic minority students 
come to our classes with discourse conventions that are 
culturally, socially, and historically formed, and students
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themselves have pointed to differences between what writing 
teachers ask for and what they traditionally do as writers 
of their own culture. It is important, in light of what 
these students and scholars can tell us about cultural 
issues, to examine closely whether expressivist theories and 
pedagogies are helpful to minority students.
Fan Shen, a Chinese graduate student at Marquette
University, has made it clear that there are culturally
determined writing structures and has noted the distinctly
different forms that the writing of his native Chinese and
that of the Western world take.1 He claims, for instance,
that although it is often the expected form in the American
academy, the topic sentence format is not "natural" for
Chinese writers:2
A Chinese writer often clears the 
surrounding bushes before attacking the 
real target . . . before touching one's 
main thesis, one should first state the 
"conditions" of composition: how, why, and
when the piece is being composed. ("The 
Classroom and the Wider Culture: Identity 
as a Key to Learning English Composition"
463)
According to Fan Shen, this "bush-clearing pattern" has been 
accepted as the norm in China for over two thousand years 
(463). Fan Shen notes "that clearing the bushes" began with 
Kong Fuzi (Confucius) who says that "one first needs to call 
things by their proper names" (463). Fan Shen explains that 
this requires stating how, why, and when the essay is being
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composed before one states the major thesis: "like the
peeling of an onion: layer after layer is removed until the 
reader finally arrives at the central point, the core"
(463). In time this technique became formalized and the "Ba 
Gu" or "eight-legged" essay became the norm. Most Chinese 
students, according to Fan Shen, are taught to follow a 
certain pattern in the writing of narrative essays as well.
A recent Chinese textbook for writing he tells us, lists six 
necessary "steps for writing a narrative essay, steps to be 
taken in this order: time, place, character, event, cause, 
and consequence" (463). With my students I often try to get 
them to shake up the order of things in a narrative essay.
It is apparent by what Fan Shen points out that the request 
to shift place and time or consequence and cause might cause 
a Chinese student an especially difficult problem.
My own limited experience with Japanese women suggests 
that they are culturally shaped in ways that make argument, 
as usually defined in American terms at any rate, an almost 
impossible task for them. Most of these women appear to 
work within a language of conformity and obedience, and they 
seem to have an unwavering respect for age and authority.
To these students, for whom polite negotiation and 
accomodation are the norm of social interaction, the 
confrontational American approach to argument is threatening 
and silencing. When asked to write an argumentative paper,
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the Japanese women have been unable to do so in conventional 
American style. Their papers take a completely different 
form, a form that is usually a summation of ideas but that 
contains no personal disagreement with any of the ideas 
presented. The Japanese society is also a culture where to 
bring shame on one's self or to another is to be avoided at 
all costs. To claim disagreement is to bring dishonor not 
only to the student, but to the person she is disagreeing 
with. Thus, argumentative papers by these students tend to 
present various perspectives without critical or negative 
comment.
It stands to reason, then, that if this is the 
"natural" form the writings of at least some of our Asian 
students will take, we either have to accept it as is (and I 
expect the academy would object), or work with the students 
so they may become conversant in the American traditions as 
well. This will require pushing against "two thousand 
years" of cultural tradition in the case of Chinese students 
and resocializing a way of being in the world for many 
Japanese women. Not all non-native students will come to us 
with such drastically different forms as Chinese and 
Japanese students do, but we be can sure that differences 
will be abundant. In fact, the more different the 
structural forms of our students from what we are familiar 
with, the easier the forms may be to address. If the
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differences are subtle it may prove more difficult to ferret 
out these differences in order to address the various 
structures. If we choose to help these students learn the 
American forms, expressivists will need to address the 
"varieties of structures" (Mitchell) in a forthright manner.
Some ESL experts argue that expressivist rhetorics are 
not helpful, and are perhaps even harmful, when it comes to 
writing instruction and the minority student or non-native 
speaker. Candace Mitchell, for instance, a cross-cultural 
literacy specialist, suggests that the expressivist 
assumption that writing will "naturally" find form can be 
less than helpful. She argues that what "Berthoff and others 
of the expressive school" do not address is the "issue of 
the varieties of structures and ways of coherently ordering 
reality through texts that exist across cultures" ("Four 
Schools of Writing" 13). Mitchell seems to suggest that 
there is something inherent in expressivist theories that 
keeps us from addressing the different traditions and 
culturally-bound written forms of our minority and non­
native students:
The message is, again, that form will 
emerge naturally as long as opportunities 
to engage in the "process" are provided.
No explicit statement as to what 
constitutes good form is needed as the 
assumption is that students will come to 
uncover the implicit expectations of the 
academy. Somehow out of the search for and 
the subsequent finding of meaning will 
emerge a coherent form. Form-finding and
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form-creating may in fact be natural 
abilities. Coherence may in fact emerge in 
the act of writing. The point remains, 
however, that the form to emerge may not be 
the form anticipated by the academy. (13)
Although I find nothing inherent in expressivism as a theory
that warrants Mitchell's charges, she does raise issues that
expressivists should explore. In practice, does our
acceptance of organic form privilege forms "natural" to
American students while excluding the "natural" forms that
arise from the cultural heritage of our ethnic minority
students? (When I use the term "natural" it is with full
recognition that what is "natural" for our students is
culturally determined.) If so, are we unintentionally
placing these students at a disadvantage? In order to
alleviate the risk of this possibility we can make efforts
to recognize and understand the various structures that will
"naturally" arise when students of differing cultural
backgrounds write. And it seems that expressivists are in a
good position to do so since it is less likely that we would
demand an ethnic minority student to write, at least
initially, in a structure privileged by the Western world if
we truly allow "organic form" to emerge. In other words,
expressivists are apt to have created the opportunity to
consider and understand the various cultural structures by
fostering an environment which forgoes extrinsic structure
for what comes about "naturally."
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Mitchell also argues that the "organic" form the 
student writer comes to may not be "anticipated" or accepted 
by the academy, and she hints that the expressivist emphasis 
on organic form excludes the teaching of these anticipated 
academic conventions and structures. She further implies 
that "academic" form is the only "good" and right form: 
"[expressivists provide] no explicit statement as to what 
constitutes good form . . .  as the assumption is that 
students will come to uncover the implicit expectations of 
the academy" (13). These are troublesome issues indeed.
Composition scholars have joined Mitchell in taking 
expressivists to task for not specifying and making explicit 
the discourse conventions of the academy (Bartholomae, 
Bizzell). They agree with Mitchell that the "natural" forms 
students produce do not always take the forms expected and 
privileged by the academy. David Bartholomae believes that 
unless we teach the academic discourse conventions to all of 
our students, and especially our underprivileged students, 
they will remain outside the academic conversations and will 
thus remain marginalized and perhaps even be winnowed out of 
the academy as failures. But the potential discrepancy 
between academic conventions and the forms that students 
come to is recognized by most expressivist teachers. In 
fact, the expressivist emphasis on voice, sincerity, 
reflection, and organic form is often an attempt to counter­
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act the academy's forms and conventions. The expressivist 
stance is a conscious stand against the barrage of empty/ 
lifeless, prose that often mirrors our students' lack of 
critical thought or investment in a subject, and which often 
comes neatly packaged in one or another of the academic 
prose forms.
Admittedly, the primary goal of an expressivist 
rhetoric is to foster the growth of the whole being, the 
imagination, and ultimately the encompassing intellect 
rather than to teach specific forms. However, the 
expressivists' goal of educating the encompassing intellect 
through a pedagogy that honors student voices, lived 
experience, and emotional capacities does not have to remain 
separate from introducing students to the forms and 
conventions of the academy. Mike Rose's success with 
underprepared students, for instance, relies heavily on 
incorporating his students' lived experience and interests 
into his pedagogy. Rose is aware, as are expressivists, 
that a model for the teaching of writing "must honor the 
cognitive and emotional," and he is aware, as are social 
theorists, that these cannot be separated from the 
"situational" dimensions of language ("The Language of 
Exclusion" 357).
Rose, then, like the Romantics, Mill, Dewey, Murray, 
Elbow, and Berthoff, knows that the cognitive and the
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affective should not be split asunder. He also shares with 
expressivists the perspective that writing is a "means of 
defining the self and defining reality . . . and is an 
activity that develops over one's lifetime" (348). He is in 
sharp disagreement with most expressivists, however, and 
joins Mitchell, Bartholomae, and Bizzell in the argument 
that to deny students explicit practice within the discourse 
conventions of the academy is to perpetuate the potential 
for failure. He argues that our students ought to be 
required
a complete, active, struggling engagement 
with the facts and principles of a 
discipline, an encounter with the 
disciplines texts and the incorporation of 
them into one's own work, the framing of 
one's knowledge within myriad conventions 
that help define a discipline . . . .  (359)
To require students this engagement with a discipline is a
tall order, and it certainly would require the cooperation
of the university as a whole. Some expressivists, moreover,
might argue that it is not the composition teacher's job to
teach students to write for a discipline, but rather to
teach students to write to learn for a more general
knowledge and for the world at large.
Expressivists can learn from teachers like Rose how to 
prepare students to be successful within the discourse 
requirements of the academy while still preserving the focus 
on lived experience, self, and voice. Mike Rose, it seems,
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has begun the synthesis of cognitive, expressivist, and 
social theories that Lester Faigley has called for 
("Competing Theories of Process" 537). Ultimately, 
expressivists need not ignore academic discourse 
conventions, for academic forms are only some of many to 
choose from and they do have their place. This is not to 
say, however, that expressivists will continue to differ 
from many of their critics in that academic forms remain of 
secondary importance to the more important goal of educating 
the whole being and encompassing intellect.
More problematic, however, than whether the teaching of 
academic forms is of primary or secondary importance, is 
Mitchell's implication that academic forms are inherently 
"good." For many expressivists, academic forms are anything 
but good. We are regularly dismayed by the formal 
correctness of our students writing when it matches what the 
academy asks for, say an "objective" essay that argues a 
point through a particular linear structure and that 
contains a clear thesis statement at the end of the first 
paragraph. What is often distressing about this 
"correctness" is that it more often than not lacks, on the 
student's part, any real critical thought, insight, or even 
personal involvement with the content of the writing. The 
crux of expressivist theory lies in personal vision and 
engagement, and in deep, reflective thought. Therefore, it
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is not surprising that expressivists question whether we 
should teach academic forms that often seem lifeless, a form 
that students are capable of producing, but which are not 
necessarily going to promote learning or the making of 
knowledge.
Questions surrounding academic forms become even more 
muddy in light of some liberatory pedagogies and social- 
epistemic rhetorics that accuse the academy of replicating 
non-critical, "corporate-minded" students who leave the ivy 
halls and enter mainstream America (e.g. Berlin, Ohmann).
The problem, according to scholars like Ohmann, is that 
these "corporate-minded," non-thinking students become 
citizens who perpetuate the most destructive and oppressive 
facets of the "military industrial complex" which fuels 
America (English in America). Writing instructors have come 
to realize that students can produce forms the academy 
requires without necessarily engaging on any personal level 
with what they are writing, or without engaging in critical 
thought. Thus, it has become the opinion of many in the 
field of composition that those academic forms which are 
more concerned with particular stylistic or discourse 
conventions than with any making of knew knowledge might 
actually contribute to this replication of non-critical 
students. It was expressivists during the 1960's, for 
example, who precipitated the movement away from academic
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form. Patricia Bizzell describes the anti-academic prose
movement this way:
the academy itself began to seem 
discredited, in the eyes of many students 
and teachers, by political developments in 
the nation at large. . . the academy was 
reluctant to incorporate new methods of 
responding to these developments . . . this 
reluctance was seen as enforcing 
discriminatory social sorting, with white 
middle-class men being educated for 
positions of power and all others being 
disenfranchised. Academic expository 
prose, the mastery of which was a 
prerequisite for traditional academic work, 
was implicated in the indictment of the 
academy as an institution of political 
oppression . . .  By fostering students' own 
styles, instead of forcing conformity to an 
oppressive institutional standard, writing 
teachers could feel they were making their 
own contribution to reform of oppressive 
academic and political institutions.
("Composing Processes" 52-53)
Having seen little change in the academy as a whole over the
intervening years, some expressivists continue to wonder
whether traditional academic expository prose should be
taught, especially in introductory writing courses.
Feminist scholarship which argues that academic forms are
oppressive, especially for women, because they privilege a
white male discourse have helped bolster expressivists'
resistance to academic conventions. Further, if there is a
correlation between the "mastery" of academic forms and
oppressed American citizens, it seems insidious to turn our
ethnic minority students, students who might well work to
correct what is most negative about our society, into the
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same passive and non-critical writers and thinkers as are 
many of our American students.
Granted, many minority students might well be eager to 
enter into what many of us find negative about mainstream 
American ideology, and participate in what they see as the 
rewards. Expressivist theory and pedagogy, however, and its 
stand against empty form, can still play a vital role in 
engendering the necessary critical capacities in all 
students, majority and minority. Because of the focus on 
diversity, expressivist approaches to the teaching of 
writing might, in fact, be especially useful in promoting 
the differing perspectives minority students already hold.
In other words, expressivist pedagogy can offer the 
opportunity for identity within diversity to flourish, and 
this can enable our ethnic minority students to both 
participate in and also criticize mainstream American 
culture, including the academy.
It is, of course, unfair to assume, as Mitchell seems 
to, that no expressivists talk about what constitutes "good" 
or "academic" form. Some may not, but it is not an emphasis 
on "natural" form that precludes this, nor is it Romantic 
rhetoric as a whole. The expressivist stance is simply that 
pre-determining form can be inhibitive and limiting.
Writing that is allowed to grow into form will find its own 
coherence, and it does not necessarily have to conform to
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traditional conventions of academic discourse. Joseph
Harris argues against the notion that
our students should necessarily be working 
towards the mastery of some particular, 
well-defined sort of discourse. It seems 
that they might better be encouraged toward 
a kind of polyphony— an awareness of and 
pleasure in the various competing 
discourses that make up their own. ("The 
Idea of Community in the Study of Writing"
17)
If we are not careful with the instructional trend toward 
pedagogies that focus primarily on making students 
conversant in academic discourses, our students can end up 
like Richard Rodriguez— fully fluent in the public language 
of the academy but exorcised of the private language of 
their cultural discourse and community. There is, of 
course, a debate raging over whether the loss of an ethnic 
cultural background is debilitating or even whether 
replacing one's culture with another constitutes a loss at 
all. Rodriguez suggests, in Hunger of Memory, that the loss 
of his familial culture and his assimilation into the 
majority culture was not a bad thing, and was even 
necessary. What seems to me, however, to be the better 
option is the one Harris offers: students can become
members of a number of discourse communities "whose beliefs 
and practices conflict as well as align" (18).
Perhaps, then, we should not push our students toward 
the leaving of one community so that they might replace it
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with another. The better solution might be in creating a 
classroom where they can reorient themselves in connection 
to several discourses or what Harris calls a "polyphony." 
"Our goals as teachers," argues Harris, "need not be to 
initiate our students into the values and practices of some 
new community, but to offer them the chance to reflect 
critically on those discourses— of home, school, work, the 
media, and the like— to which they already belong" (19). 
Expressivist theory would seem to supply what is necessary 
for students to take a critical look at these various 
discourses. The expressivist focus on reflection, for 
instance, especially if we apply Coleridge's summation of 
reflectiveness which requires critical examination not only 
of the self but of what is read and written, might easily 
initiate the opportunity to "reflect critically" as Harris 
requests. Moreover, the emphasis on organic form allows for 
the "polyphony" or multiple discourses to arise in the first 
place.
This is not to deny that expressivists should address 
"variety of structures" with our students— non-native and 
native alike. If we do not, however, the consequences may 
be greater for our minority students, and as Mike Rose has 
argued, for those underprivileged students on the 
"boundary." One of the insights I have gained from 
colleagues in ESL is that many foreign students are
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overwhelmed by the expressivist's tendency not to offer some
formal structure. Initially this lack of explicit form is
too great a liberty and students are left confused and
unable to write at all. Perhaps, then, we should reevaluate
our position: we can still let the form emerge "naturally"
if our cross-cultural students are able to overcome
confusion and compose at all; we can also make sure our
students know the various forms from which they can choose.
In fact, if we look back, once again, to the Romantics
themselves, we can see that the Romantic emphasis on organic
form does not deny the usefulness of formal structure. Here
is William Wordsworth on the value of form:
Nuns fret not at their Convent's narrow room;
And Hermits are contented with their Cells;
And students with their pensive Citadels:
Maids at the Wheel, the Weaver at his Loom,
Sit blithe and happy; Bees that soar for bloom,
High as the highest Peak of Furness Fells,
Will murmur by the hour in Foxglove bells:
In truth, the prison, unto which we doom 
Ourselves, no prison is: and hence to me,
In sundry moods, 'twas pastime to be bound 
Within the Sonnet's scanty plot of ground:
Pleased if some Souls (for such their needs must 
be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty,
Should find short solace there, as I have found.
Through the tightly structured form of the sonnet,
Wordsworth not only illustrates the value of form, but
suggests that it is not always confining. Structure, then,
can be liberating, and our prison of academic forms may not
always be a prison for our students, especially for those
who have "felt the weight of too much liberty."
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Expressivists, then, are faced with these questions:
Do we need to make explicit, perhaps especially for minority 
ethnic students, how the form that their writing takes 
differs from what the academy asks for? Are we inclined to 
accept the "natural" forms of our American students over 
those of our non-native and minority students? Are we 
promoting forms that privilege a certain race, gender, and 
class? Do we wish to teach academic forms at all? And 
finally, what are the consequences of the way in which we 
answer these questions for our ethnic minority students?
In order to answer these questions we need to enter 
into conversation with our associates in ESL, and we must 
not stop examining and reflecting on our goals and 
assumptions. If, for example, our agenda is to subvert the 
expectations of the academy in an attempt to change its 
literacy conventions rather than continuing to accept them, 
we must ask if we are harming or sacrificing students by not 
giving them every opportunity to empower themselves within 
the codes of convention upheld by the academy. We must 
determine if we are explicit enough about varieties of form, 
including academic form, so that our students of all 
cultural orientations will be able to manipulate form and 
discourse conventions well enough as readers and writers to 
survive and flourish in the university and in the public 
world for which it prepares us. In other words, we must
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answer for ourselves as well as for our critics, how the 
emphasis on organic form can lead to student empowerment 
through choice and flexibility rather than to a naivete 
about, or unthinking acceptance of, academic forms. Let's 
rise to the charges leveled by Mitchell and others, and as 
expressivists consider the "varieties of structures" and the 
ways in which forms that "naturally" arise are determined 
socially, culturally, and historically.
A particular cultural concern, for instance, which 
needs reflection and investigation in this regard is the 
nature of the self or "I." Since the growth of the self is 
such an important aspect of Romantic rhetorics, it is 
necessary to consider that the self will be very different 
for our students depending on their cultural heritage. The 
"I" of the middle-class white student will differ greatly 
from that of a student whose culture has taught her to 
suppress the "I" for the good of the collective. James V. 
Catano, for instance, in his recent article, "The Rhetoric 
of Masculinity: Origins, Institutions, and the Myth of the 
Self-Made Man," argues that the self of male rhetoricians 
like Peter Elbow and William Coles is that of America's 
"self-made" man, the hero of the Protestant work ethic or 
the ideal corporate entrepreneur. We must examine the 
cultural "I" we privilege as rigorously for our cross- 
cultural students as feminists have for women. We must be
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aware that the singular, autonomous ••I" that Elbow and Coles 
are comfortable with is one that values individuality, 
whereas the "I" of our students might not.
In fact, the self is not even a concern in many non- 
Western cultures. Xio Ming Li, a Doctoral student in 
Composition Studies at the University of New Hampshire, 
suggests that a focus on self is a problem unless we explain 
what the "Self" is. Li questions the validity of "self- 
expression" because it presupposes an autonomous self. For 
her, self exists only in relationship to others. Since, as 
Xio Ming Li suggests, many cultures do not have as much of a 
stake in what is "personal" as we do here in the United 
States, oriental students will often have difficulties 
writing a personal essay at all, and they will be more 
confused than liberated by an expressivist emphasis on self 
discovery and personal voice. Perhaps reading and 
discussing with these students concepts of the self that 
arise in American writings like Thoreau's Walden, Whitman's 
Song of Myself, and Maya Angelou's I Heard the Caged Bird 
Sing would help. Nonetheless, the concept of self raises 
important questions if we wish to retain the self as an 
important element in expressivist rhetorics. Is our goal to 
have our non-native and minority students learn to take on 
the more American "I" of the majority of our students? Is 
it to allow the students to retain their own culture's
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concept of self while also being able to understand and 
employ American selves? How can we best aid this 
transformation?
Since the "I" or self is culturally formed, and since 
the "I" plays such an integral part in expressivist theory 
and pedagogy, expressivists would do well by their students 
to consider whether Romantic theories of the self can 
successfully cross cultural boundaries. Fan Shen suggests 
that they can, but that in order to help at least Chinese 
writers, it is "helpful if he or she [the teacher] pointed 
out the different cultural/ideological connotations of the 
word "I," the connotations that exist in a group-centered 
culture and an individual-centered culture" (466). Are we 
willing to do as Fen Shen asks, and if not, are we willing 
to consider that the result might be expressivist rhetorical 
pedagogies that are less than helpful, perhaps even harmful, 
as our critics like Candace Mitchell suggest?
Terry Dean's essay, "Multicultural Classrooms,
Monocultural Teachers" suggests that expressivist classrooms
are beneficial for ethnic minorities in some regards. Dean
points out that ESL students, no matter how educated, often
stumble into difficulties with errors and pronunciation
which become what she calls "writing blocks":
It is not unusual for ESL errors to persist 
in the writing or the pronunciation of 
highly educated people (doctors, lawyers, 
engineers, professors) because, consciously
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or unconsciously, those speech patterns are 
part of the person's identity and culture 
. . . Language-oriented topics are one way 
to allow students to explore this kind of 
writing block. Assignments that require 
students to analyze their attitude towards 
writing, their writing processes, and the 
role that writing plays in their lives can 
make these conflicts explicit. (30)
Expressivism's orientation toward "process" predisposes it
to be useful in solving the problem Dean has identified
here. Moreover, some expressivists, as in the case with a
great many teachers at the University of New Hampshire where
the expressivist hand of Donald Murray is no longer directly
active but still felt, it is common practice for students to
write reflective papers about their writing processes, ways
in which these processes may have changed, and ways in which
learning about these processes have changed or not changed
them as writers and people.
Dean notes that response groups, a mainstay of many 
expressivist pedagogies, can also assist the teacher of a 
multicultural classroom: "peer response groups encourage
active learning and help students link home and university 
cultures" (31). Working in peer groups can help students to 
function in more than one discourse community at a time.
Dean argues that group work is valuable for providing " a 
supportive environment for exploring culturally sensitive 
issues that students might hesitate to bring up in class 
discussion or with the teacher" (32). Joan Wauters suggests
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that a non-confrontational approach is especially valuable 
in the multicultural classroom. She points out that in some 
cultures a "direct verbal criticism implies 'loss of face'"
("Non-Confrontational Critiquing Pairs: An Alternative to 
Verbal Peer Response Groups" 159). Although Wauters's 
argument in this ossay is for pairs of students to work on 
editing in a non-abrasive way rather than in peer response 
groups which can sometimes lose their supportive tone in the 
fervor of criticism, it appears that Elbow's non- 
confrontational sharing groups might also achieve worthwhile 
results since the hard and fast rule of no confrontation or 
harsh criticism are followed by group participants. Yet, we 
must not just assume that this nurturing environment is 
helpful in all regards. A recent article in the Boston 
Sunday Globe (June 10, 1990), for instance, points to the 
negative aspects: "the nurturing and cultural reinforcement 
in bilingual classrooms often unravel when the students move 
on to regular programs . . . ." The possibility exists, 
then, that the nurturing aspects of expressivist pedagogies 
set students up for a way of learning that does not exist 
elsewhere in the university.
There are many questions that arise when we consider 
expressivist rhetorics and the cross-cultural classroom.
But as Peter Elbow says, in the search for knowledge we must 
"fight the itch for closure" (Writing Without Teachers 177),
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and thus, I have offered few, if any, answers here. My 
discussion merely brushes the snow from the top of the 
cross-cultural crevasse. We need further investigation into 
the ways in which our theories and pedagogies are helpful or 
short-sighted in multi-cultural classrooms. We need to 
listen to the experiences of non-native writers like Fan 
Shen, and we need to turn to our colleagues in second 
language acquisition, cross-cultural literacy, 
sociolinguistics, and anthropology for information and 
guidance. Expressivism needs to reconsider itself in light 
of cultural issues. Expressivists can learn more about 
social theories, adapting to them and perhaps embracing many 
of them since it is clear that even "organic" form is not 
"natural" in the sense that form is in important ways 
culturally determined. Finally, we must not dogmatically 
hold onto assumptions and theories assuming that if they 
work for American students they will work for all students. 
We can begin to reconsider expressivist pedagogy as it 
relates to students from various cultures. There is much in 
Romantic rhetorics of value and we should not dismiss 
expressivism; yet we must be willing to reflect on and, if 
need be, let go of those assumptions which are not useful.
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Endnotes
1 Throughout this section, "form" is a term that 
shifts meaning. At times I use it to mean types of 
discourse defined by a topic (as in the discourse of 
science or the discourse of literary studies), at other 
times the way the subject is constituted, and at times 
sentence or speech patterns or methods of exposition. 
There is a problem, I believe, in coming up with any 
clear definition of what I mean by "form" because the 
word has multiple and conflicting uses in the rhetoric 
of our discipline.
2 I am not willing to grant that the topic 
sentence is necessarily "natural" for the Western 
tradition either.
CONCLUSION
A common complaint among educators in general, and 
teachers of writing in particular, is that many of our 
students are passive and indifferent. They seem not to care 
about the problems of the modern age. They seem to ignore 
the urgent environmental dilemmas which have become an 
undeniable part of their inheritance; they often appear 
untroubled by moral issues such as abortion, the arms race, 
capital punishment, sexism, and racism, believing that if 
they are not immediately and directly affected by these 
concerns, then these pressing issues are not of consequence.
In response to this legacy we have witnessed calls for 
"new" approaches to teacher education, critical pedagogies, 
and literacy. Paulo Freire, for instance, argues for a 
"pedagogy of the oppressed" in which literacy becomes the 
means for peoples of oppressed societies to take action 
against dictatorial leadership. Maxine Greene argues for a 
dialectic leading to an "education of freedom" achieved 
through imagination and resistance to forces that limit, 
determine, and oppress. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren 
strive for a "democratic" schooling that values student 
experience and student voice. James Berlin, speaking for 
many in the field of composition who have turned toward 
social theories for composition, calls for a "social-
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epistemic" rhetoric that educates students who become 
conscious of economic, material, social, and political 
concerns and strive for a more ideal democracy. What these 
various perspectives have in common is that each is informed 
by a perceived need to find a pedagogy that reduces the 
passivity and indifference of students and offers them an 
active role in their own intellectual growth.
What I have argued here is that, inasmuch as these 
scholars call for an approach that places individual 
students as participants in their own education rather than 
as mere "observers" or "beneficiaries," these scholars may 
turn to, and rely on, many of the tenets of the educational 
philosophies of the British Romantics. Romantic educational 
philosophies also offer expressivists a teaching approach 
that denounces oppression and that educates students who are 
democratically conscious. Wordsworth and Coleridge 
articulated a theory of education and the intellect which is 
built on active and participatory education. These ideas 
have been passed down to us not only through their own 
writings, but through those of other educators such as Mill, 
Arnold, and Dewey. Current expressivists share a similar 
philosophical grounding, not only with the Romantics, but 
with Mill, Arnold, and Dewey, and the best of Romantic ideas 
are now evident in the teaching philosophies of current 
expressivist rhetoricians like Peter Elbow, Donald Murray, 
and Ann Berthoff.
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When we examine the Romantic tradition from which 
expressivist rhetorics arise and the assumptions under which 
expressivists themselves operate, it becomes clear that 
there is much to value. Romantic rhetorics lend much to 
feminist theories and pedagogies. And if we consider that a 
Romantic rhetoric, like the original Romantic movement in 
England, is not anti-intellectual, it defies the charge that 
this pedagogy loses intellectual rigor by focusing on 
creativity. A Romantic pedagogy need not exclude 
challenging reading and writing, both in depth and breadth. 
Rigorous study and a wealth of knowledge gathered from 
various doctrines and disciplines are a valued part of what 
Wordsworth has called the "philosophical mind." So too is 
imaginative activity, which by combining both analytical and 
imaginative study for our students can result in a 
synthesizing intellect.
Moreover, since a fuller understanding of Romanticism 
shows that it does not require our students to be geniuses 
or "inspired" (in the generally misunderstood sense of the 
"inspired writer") in order to communicate and write well 
enough to make changes in their world, as teachers we need 
not fear that composition cannot be taught, or that our 
students cannot learn to be good writers. As teachers of 
writing we can cultivate both analytical and imaginative 
ability in our students; we can model what Coleridge has
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called reflection and a "mind self-consciously aware of its 
own imaginative potential."
The charge that Romantic rhetorics have a tendency to 
create isolated and self-centered students who do not write 
to communicate with an audience beyond themselves might be 
true far too much of the timfe. This short-sighted 
application of Romantic theory, however, is not inherited 
from the British Romantic poets. To believe so is a false 
conception of the poets and their work. To the contrary, the 
poets have given us a model of open-mindedness and empathy, 
and if expressivists understand our Romantic heritage we can 
choose to include this valuable model in our teaching 
philosophies. We can, for instance, choose a teaching model 
that urges students to practice empathy. We can create the 
opportunities for our students to talk with people who are 
different and have had differing experiences. We can create 
the opportunity for contact with ethnic minority students 
and others who differ in some way from the majority classes. 
We can introduce reading and writing assignments that bring 
students in touch with other ways of living, thereby setting 
various ways of seeing against each other, enabling then to 
"recognize the political and moral implications of competing 
models of understanding" (Paul Armstrong 31). Through 
seeking new experiences, and understanding and awareness of 
others, our students are able to take part in the existence
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of the lives of other people. Through their receptiveness, 
empathy, and ultimately self-discovery, they gain knowledge 
and the ability to imagine and reason about ways in which to 
work with those who are different.
As educators working from a pedagogy founded on 
Romanticism, we can make a concerted effort to make sure our 
students do move beyond isolated selves to the social world. 
As expressivist rhetoricians we can embrace social theories 
while retaining what is most valuable about expressivist 
doctrine. We can nurture the process of discovering meaning 
in experience and communicating it. We can make sure that 
our students know that personal experience is information 
that can be shared as public information, and that 
communicating it can influence "the course of events within 
town or nation, school or university, company or 
corporation" (Murray Write to Learn 4). The awareness, the 
empathy, the greater understanding of self and other, that 
students can gain through a rhetoric based on the philosophy 
of the British Romantic poets, need not be kept within the 
individual, and it need not undercut an awareness for social 
and political realities. Nor need it deny that the self is 
socially as well as individually defined. As even Kinneavy 
who has argued so energetically against Romantic theories 
must finally admit;
expressive discourse is, in a very
important sense psychologically prior to
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all the other uses of language. It is the 
expressive component which gives 
all discourse a personal significance to 
the speaker or listener. Indeed, the 
expressive component of discourse is what 
involves a man [or woman] with the world 
and his [her] fellows to give him his [her] 
unique brand of humanity . . .  A democracy 
which ignores expression has forgotten its 
own roots. (396).
A personal definition of self aids, and is indeed necessary,
in the development of humans' awareness of their socially
defined interactions with others.
What I am finally arguing is that a rhetoric and a 
pedagogy based on Romanticism can be one of vision and 
possibility, one that urges students to see and understand 
themselves and others. A pedagogy that works from a basis 
of empathy and diversity is vital if we are to teach 
students how to interact and communicate in the challenging, 
changing, and complex world they will live and work in.
For too long we have focused our concern primarily on 
preparing students to be productive members of the labor 
force. In a time when we are destroying our environment, 
facing starvation and drought, world-wide epidemics, and the 
possibility of nuclear destruction, we must prepare them for 
more than competency in reading, writing, and arithmetic.
Not only must they have the technical knowledge to discover 
a cure for aids, but they must have the vision to understand 
the importance and significance of their work outside the 
laboratory walls. They must be encouraged to imagine a
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better world, and not dismiss the idea as "unrealistic" or 
"utopian." They must learn to empathize and communicate.
As teachers we must aid them in doing this by insuring them 
at least the potential for reaching the full use of their 
intellectual powers. By means of a Romantic teaching 
philosophy and rhetoric that celebrate self-discovery, 
personal experience and the experience of others, empathy 
and awareness, and the imagination as well as reason, a 
better world may have a better chance at becoming a reality.
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